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Abstrakt (Danish abstract)
Med udgangspunkt i implementeringen af EU's CO2 kvotehandelssystem, analyserer dette speciale
tilstrækkeligheden af den nuværende regulering af den danske energisektor i forhold til at sikre
langsigtede CO2 reduktioner og håndtere fremtidige forsyningssikkerhedsudfordringer. Det
konkluderes, at EU's CO2 kvotehandelssystem vil begunstige kraftværker med høj
brændselsudnyttelse og gøre brændselstyper med lavt CO2 indhold mere konkurrencedygtige. CO2
kvotehandelssystemet er imidlertid ikke i sig selv tilstrækkeligt til at fremme det teknologiskifte,
som er nødvendigt for håndteringen af de fremtidige udfordringer.
For at sikre, at investeringerne i elsektoren i højere grad anvendes til fremme af perspektivrige
teknologier, anbefales det, at staten overtager det overordnede ansvar for fremtidens energisystem.
Regeringen bør udvikle en langsigtet strategi for energisektoren, som indeholder virkemidler
indenfor elproduktion, transmission og forbrug, og udbud bør anvendes til at sikre, at hovedparten
af nye investeringer i elkapacitet sker med teknologier baseret på vedvarende energi. Udbuddene for
ny kapacitet skal koordineres med de eksisterende forsknings- og udviklingsstrategier og ske under
hensyntagen til dansk industris interesser og kompetencer indenfor energiteknologi.
EU's kvotehandelshandelssystem kan blive et brugbart instrument til at sikre opfyldelse af
Danmarks internationale drivhusgasreduktionsforpligtelser, i den udstrækning ovennævnte
initiativer på forbrugssiden og til fremme af vedvarende energi ikke er tilstrækkelige. I den
forbindelse anbefales det, at den danske regering fremmer joint implementation (JI) og clean
development mechanism (CDM) projekter, der indeholder elementer af teknologioverførsel og/eller
teknologiudvikling i modsætning til for eksempel at købe kvoter på markedet eller fremme
projekter med brændselsskift mellem fossile brændselstyper (kul til gas fx).
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Abstract
Using the recent implementation of the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) as a starting point, this
project analyses the current regulation of the Danish energy sector with regard to achieving long-
term CO2 reductions and dealing with future security of supply challenges. It is concluded, that the
EU emissions trading scheme will give incentives to increase the carbon efficiency of the sector, but
on its own accord is not capable of driving the technological change which is needed to deal with
the challenges of the sector.
To ensure that future investments in the power sector to a higher degree are diverted toward
supporting prospective technologies it is recommended that authorities take over the general
responsibility for deciding on the future power system. The government should develop a long-term
strategy for the energy sector, coordinating the different measures for ensuring the security of
power supply. The strategy should include measures within generation, transmission and
consumption of energy, and tendering ought be used as the primary means to assure competition
and to divert the majority of new investments in power capacity toward renewable energy
technologies. Tenders for new capacity have to be coordinated with the current research and
development strategies, and the interests of the Danish energy equipment industry should be taken
into account.
The EU emissions trading scheme can prove a useful tool to ensure compliance with the
international greenhouse gas commitments to the extent that the above-mentioned initiatives to
promote energy savings and to divert new investments toward renewable energy technologies are
not sufficient. In this regard it is recommendable that the Danish government support Joint
Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, which have elements of
technology transfer and/or technology development, as opposed to buying quotas on the market or
supporting e.g. coal to gas fuel switch projects.
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Abbreviations and glossary
AAU: Assigned Amount Unit. International emission allowances. Annex B countries are allocated AAUs
accordance with their commitments of the Kyoto Protocol.
Annex B countries: Countries whose emissions have been capped in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol
(developed countries)
ASPO: Association for the Study of Peak Oil
BAU: Business as Usual
CCGT: Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (gas and steam turbine).
CDM: Clean Development Mechanism. Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol which allows annex B countries to
invest in GHG reducing projects in developing countries in order to obtain credits to assist in meeting
their national targets.
CER: Certified Emission Reduction. Credits from CDM projects.
CHP: Combined Heat and Power
DEA: Danish Energy Authority
DEPA: Danish Environmental Protection Agency
DGC: Dansk Gasteknisk Center A/S
EE: Energy Efficiency
EEA: European Environmental Agency
EIA: Environmental Impact Assessment
ERU: Emission Reduction Units. Credits from Jl projects.
ESCO: Energy Service Companies
ET: emissions trading. Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol which allows annex B countries to trade allowances
to meet their commitments.
ETS: Emissions Trading Scheme
EUA: European Union Allowance. Allowances valid in the EU emissions trading scheme.
EU ETS: European Union's emissions trading system for energy intensive companies
FF: Fossil fuel
GHG: Greenhouse Gas
HVAC: High Voltage Alternating Current
HVDC: High Voltage Direct Current
IC (engine): Internal Combustion (engine)
IEA: International Energy Agency
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Established by the United Nations Environment
Programme and the World Meteorological Organization in 1988 with the purpose of assessing
information important to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change,
potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation.
IRP: Integrated Resource Planning. Planning for electricity supply, which examines supply as well as
demand side measures in order to provide energy services at a minimum cost (including environmental
and social costs).
Jl: Joint Implementation. Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol which allows annex B countries to invest in GHG
reducing projects in other annex B countries in order to obtain credits to assist in meeting their national
targets.
LRMC: Long Run Marginal Cost
NAP: National Allocation Plan. Plan for allocation of EUAs, which all EU member states must prepare.
NFFO: Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation. UK measure used for supporting RE through tenders.
Nordel: Body for cooperation between the transmission system operators of the Nordic countries.
PJM: Pennsylvania (New) Jersey-Maryland (interconnection)
PSO: Public Service Obligation
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PV: Photovoltaic (solar cells)
R&D: Research and Development
RE: Renewable Energy
SRMC: Short Run Marginal Cost
TSO: Transmission System Operator
UCTE: Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity
UPS: Uninterruptible Power Supplies
USGS: United States Geological Survey
UVE: Udviklingsprogrammet for Vedvarende Energi (development program for RE)
VOLL: Value Of Lost Load
Chapter 1 - Introduction
1 Introduction
The recent liberalization of the power sector - initiated by the EU directive concerning common
rules for the internal market in electricity (EU 96/92/EC) - has led to new strategies for controlling
greenhouse gas emissions. In Denmark the government was previously highly involved in the
decision making of the energy sector. Heat planning was carried out, agreements were entered with
the power companies on fuel change, district heating plants were dictated to convert to combined
heat and power (CHP) production and so forth. Decisions were often controlled all the way down to
the retail level.
Following the commencement of liberalisation in Denmark in 1999 framework control of the sector
has come increasingly on the agenda - also in relation to greenhouse gas (GHG) control. From 2000
to 2004 a national, Danish, CO2 emissions trading scheme operates and from 2005 and onwards the
main CO2 emission sources of the energy sector will be regulated by a common EU scheme. Under
these schemes it is the responsibility of the market players to undertake the necessary measures to
comply with their allocated CCh-quota.
Another trend can be observed as well - that is the European Union playing a more and more active
role in the regulation of the sector. Besides the emissions trading scheme the EU is involved in
enhancing e.g. renewable energy (directive EU 2001/77/EC) energy efficient building (e.g. directive EU
2002/91/EC) and combined heat and power (EU 2004/08/EC). Thereby the framework for member states
to carry out national energy policies is changed.
According to the Danish climate strategy from February 2003 the EU emissions-trading scheme is
going to be a central means to ensuring the fulfilment of the Danish Kyoto commitments. In this
regard questions arise, whether such a system is capable of ensuring environmentally sustainable
solutions, solutions that are economically sound and furthermore capable of developing
technologies that reach into the future. These issues have been the centre of a heated debate that
took place following the publishing of the government's strategy and will also be addressed in this
project.
However, let us first dwell on the actual emissions problem. Since 1750 the atmospheric
concentration of CO2 has increased by 31 %, the highest concentration in the atmosphere for at least
420,000 years (likely more than 20 million years) (IPC 2001a: 7). According to the latest reports from
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change the global average surface temperature has
increased by about 0.6 ° C during the 20th century, and "most of the observed warming over the last
50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations. " (IPCC 2001 a:
10). In order to limit the temperature increase to a maximum of 2 degrees above pre-industrial level
(corresponding to a CO2 concentration below 550 ppm), as proposed by the EU in its Sixth
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Community Environment Action Programme, GHG emissions reductions in an area of 70 % of will
be needed (Decision No 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council).
The Kyoto-Protocol, which was signed in 1997 under the United Nations Framework Convention of
Climate Change, aims to reduce climate change, and its potential consequences, by setting reduction
targets for the emission of greenhouse gasses1 from industrialised countries. The EU target is an 8
% reduction from the 1990 level by 2008-2010 (UNFCCC, 1997). The European Union ratified the
Kyoto-Protocol in its decision of 25. April 2002 (EU 2002/35 8/EC), but the Protocol is as yet not
effectuated. The reason for this is that 55 countries accounting for 55 % of total CCh-emissions^
must ratify the protocol before it enters into force (UNFCCC, 1997: art. 25, stk. 1). At the beginning of
2004 120 countries have ratified the protocol but only 44.2 % of the emissions of industrialised
countries are encompassed. Neither the US (36.1 % of CCh-emissions in 1990), Russia (17.4 %) nor
Australia (2.1 %) has ratified the protocol3. Russia has been sending mixed signals, but according to
its Foreign Minister Russia intends to ratify and thereby bring the protocol into effect (Point Carbon,
2004a).
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Figure 1: Actual greenhouse gas emissions of the EU-15 compared with targets for 2000 (Convention on Climate
Change) and 2008-2012 (Kyoto Protocol) (EEA 2003b: 15)
Though reductions have taken place in the EU since 1990 (see Figure 1) projections show that it
will be a challenge for the EU to fulfil the international commitments of the Kyoto-protocol (EEA
2003a: 29-36). Without new initiatives at national or EU level (excl. the impact of the recently
1
 Six greenhouse gasses are covered by the Kyoto-Protocol, these are: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous dioxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride (UNFCCC, 1997: annex A)
2
 Of the CO2-emissions from industrialized countries in 1990.
3
 The US has announced that it will not ratify the Kyoto Protocol (for further details see IEA, 2002a: 70).
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adopted directive on emissions trading) forecasts indicate that the EU as a whole could be short by
3.3 percentage points in 2010 (EEA 2003a: 29). According to the European Environmental Agency
(EEA) the decline, which has taken place since 1990, has for a great part been due to one-off
factors, the restructuring following the unification in Germany and the dash for gas in the UK
following the liberalisation of energy markets (EEA 2003a: 101).
The Kyoto-Protocol introduces three flexible mechanisms to help reach the reduction targets, these
are emission trading (ET) and the two project based mechanisms Joint Implementation (JI) and
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). According to the Kyoto protocol and the following
negotiations in Marrakech use of the flexible mechanisms shall however be supplemental to
domestic actions (UNFCCC 1997: Art: 12 & 17, UNFCCC 2002a: 2). The European Union's directive on a
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading between energy intensive European
companies (EU2003/87/EC) - and an amendment (the so-called linking directive) which allows the use
of credits from JI and CDM under the scheme, supports these mechanisms (European Parliament, 2004).
The Danish climate strategy also stresses the use of the flexible mechanisms as important means to
reach Denmark's reduction target. Besides applying the EU emissions trading scheme funds have
been made available on the Budget to support CDM and particularly JI projects (Regeringen, 2003: 8).
In order to share the responsibility from the obligations in Kyoto, the EU decided on a burden
sharing agreement in 2002 setting different emission limitations and reduction targets for each
member state. According to this agreement Denmark must reduce its GHG emissions by 21 % in
the period 2008-2012 in relation to the base year of 1990 (Decision 2002/358/EC). Denmark's
emissions in 1990 amounted to 69.2 Mt, which compared to the neighbouring years is a fairly low
figure due to a high electricity import from Sweden and Norway this year. On this background the
Danish government claims that the reduction burden for Denmark should be adjusted for electricity
exchange. This base year question will not be solved until 2006 when individual member state
commitments in tonnes are decided (Decision 2003/358/EC). The yearly emissions in 2008-2012 are
expected to be 80 Mt CO2 equivalent per annum provided that no new measures are initiated. This
entails that Denmark has to reduce its emissions by 20-25 Mt a year in the period 2008-2012 to
meet the 21 % target - the disparity between the figures shows the impact of the adjustment of the
base year emissions (Energistyrelsen, 2003c; DEPA, 2003: 13ff).
The liberalisation of the energy markets has not alone affected the CO2 reduction strategy, but also
another significant energy sector issue - the security of supply. Basically the security of supply
depends on the supply of power and the supply of fuels. To cover the electricity consumption in
Denmark it is necessary to have a robust transmission grid, sufficient available production capacity
and the supply of energy (Elkraft System, 200la:29). Currently this situation is satisfying in Denmark.
11
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The power balance, which assesses the available production capacity4 in Denmark against the
maximum consumption5, is positive in both system areas (Eastern and Western Denmark). The
level of fuel supply is also high due to the domestic production of oil, natural gas and renewable
energy, together with a high degree of supply security for coal (Elkraft System, 2001a: 29, Elkraft System,
2003a:19). Since 1980 Danish self-sufficiency has increased from 5 % to 145 %6 as a result of
increasing primary energy production - mainly oil and gas from the North Sea - and more or less
constant gross energy consumption (Energistyrelsen, 2003a: 4). In the short term perspective the security
of supply in the European Union is also satisfying with regard to power and fuel supply, but the
security of supply in the European Union as well as Denmark faces some challenges ahead
(Energistyrelsen, 2002a:4).
Particularly in the short term the key question is whether a liberalised market can ensure that new
production capacity is established as old plants are decommissioned and energy consumption
increases. With the liberalisation of the market the responsibility for investments in production
capacity lies with the commercial players. Supply and demand fundamentals tell that when there is
a lack of production capacity, the price on the market will increase, giving an incentive to invest
(Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeriet, 2002: 18). So far the electricity market opening in the Nordic countries
has led to the decommissioning of a number of unprofitable plants, but only a few new investments
in production capacity has been decided, where subsidies have not been offered. The largest of
these new investments is a 1,600 MW Finnish nuclear power plant to be commissioned in 2009.
The investors of this plant are large consumers (industrial enterprises) and a range of power
companies (www.tvo.fi, 2004-07-15).
The experiences with liberalised markets in other countries show that uncertainty may arise with
regard to the security of power supply, e.g. in the US, California, where the lack of investments in
new production capacity together with a considerable increase in energy consumption, has led to
shortage of electricity in several situations (Elkraft System, 2001a: 34)7. The consequences of blackouts
can be severe. The cost to society of the Californian black-outs in January 2001 has thus been
estimated at 43 billion dollars or 3.4 % of California's GDP (EU KOM(2002)-488).
A key problem is the lacking consumer response to high power prices, and furthermore that the high
level of uncertainty with regard to future electricity, heat and fuel prices may stall the investors
from making investments. Introducing emissions trading in the power sector adds an additional risk
4
 Available production capacity excludes reserve needs.
5
 The maximum consumption is set as the consumption on a very cold winter day
6
 2002 figure. Self-sufficiency: Production of primary energy over gross energy consumption
7
 Though it should be noted that the actual market set up in California is not directly comparable with the Nordic market
model. Price capping for instance has been emphasised as a particular problem for the Californian market design
(Sioshansi, FP, 2001)
12
Chapter 1 - Introduction
element to new investments because the cost of emitting CO2 will depend on the market for CO2
quotas (Elkraft System, 2003a: 39).
As a means to deal with the uncertainty of the security of supply the EU in its new electricity
market directive from July 20038 requires member states to ensure the possibility of providing for
new capacity or energy efficiency/demand-side management measures through a tendering
procedure9 if the market is not capable of ensuring sufficient production capacity. Furthermore
Member States should have the possibility of tendering for new capacity on the basis of published
criteria, in order to promote environmentally benign and/or infant new technologies (EU 2003/54/EC,
Art. 7).
On a longer term fuel supply can become a problem as well. The demand for energy is expected to
grow steadily in Denmark as well as the rest of the European Union (European Commission, 2002:2;
Elkraft, 2003a: 2). Forecasts in the EU Green Paper "Towards a European strategy for the security of
energy supply" projects that in the EU15 gross energy demand is projected to be 11 % higher in
2030 than in 1998, and for EU30 a rise by 25 % is projected (European Commission, 2000: 4; 66). The
Green Paper also anticipates that the European dependency on imported energy will grow from 50
% today to 70% in 2030 if no further initiatives to improve energy efficiency and energy savings
are taken. It also stresses that it is necessary to diversify the supply routes on the fuel side by
promoting the use of renewable energy sources (European Commission, 2002:2). Denmark will also
become increasingly dependant on energy imports as oil and gas production is expected to dwindle
over the coming decades. Already around 2010-2012 Denmark will no longer be self-sufficient with
gas and around 2015-2020 oil demand is likely to exceed Danish oil production (to be elaborated on
in chapter 5).
Viewed in the light of fuel security and the need for environmental protection the EU has adopted
or proposed a range of directives in addition to the directive on emissions trading. In 2001 the
directive on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable sources in the internal electricity
market was adopted. The directive undertakes the member states to comply with indicative national
targets for consumption of electricity based on renewable energy10 (EU 2001/77/EC). The Danish
indicative target for the contribution of electricity produced from renewable energy is 29 % of gross
domestic electricity consumption by 201011 (EU 2001/77/EC: Annex). In 2002 renewable energy
sources amounted to 19.5 % of the electricity produced in Denmark (Energistyrelsen, 2003a: 9), which
8
 With effect from 1st of July 2004
9
 Or any procedure equivalent in terms of transparency and non-discrimination, on the basis of published criteria.
Renewable energy sources are defined in art. 2 of the directive as "non-fossil energy sources (wind, solar,
georhermal, wave, tidal, hydropower, biomass, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and biogases); (EU
2001/77/EC).
11
 The indicative target for the share of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in total Community
electricity consumption by 2010 is 22.1% (EU2001/77/EC: art. 3, subsection 4)
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means that Denmark still has to make an effort to reach the target. Though the renewable energy
targets are only indicative, the targets could, according to article 4 of the directive, be accompanied
by a common EU support scheme, depending on the outcome of a commission report on the
member states' progress in 2005. The directive should be seen in relation to the White Paper on
Energy for the Future - renewable energy from 1998, which is a strategy to promote renewable
energy. The White Paper sets a guiding target for the Community of 12% renewable energy sources
Of grOSS domestic energy consumption by 2010 (Kommissionen, 1998:9).
Other recent means of the EU encompass the directive on energy savings in buildings (Directive
2002/9 l/EC) focusing on demand management, the directive extending the use of combined heat and
power (EU 2004/08/EC) and a directive on taxation of energy products and electricity (EU 2003/96/EC).
It is reasonable to believe however that the effect of these initiatives will be more profound in other
EU countries, than Denmark, because CHP-extension, energy taxes and building standards are
already high in Denmark compared to the EU average12.
In addition to being the most important source of greenhouse gases the energy sector is also a major
contributor to other types of air pollution. Though emissions of NOX and particularly of SO2 from
energy related activities (incl. transport) have been reduced notably in Europe during the 1990's
(EEA 2003a: 32), Western Europe still has to make further reductions of both substances, mainly of
NOX emissions, in order to reach the 2010 targets set in the Gothenborg Protocol of the Convention
on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (EEA, 2003a: 120-121). Measures aimed at reducing air
pollution, most notably the directive on emissions from large combustions plants (EU 2001/80/EC),
could require replacement of existing power plants and thus increase the demand for new
investments in the sector.
In the above light CO2 reduction strategies for the energy sector could probably benefit from
incorporating measures that benefit the solutions of the other important challenges of the sector,
most notably maintaining a positive power balance and a high degree of fuel supply security.
Examining whether such synergistic effects exist is one of the objects of this project.
The current Danish CO2 strategy for the energy sector relies heavily on the European emissions
trading scheme for companies. This approach has the advantage of ensuring emissions at a certain
level and a high degree of economic efficiency (at least short-term), but also holds some potential
drawbacks as it for instance increases the risk element associated with power plant investments.
Though some initial testing of CO2 emissions trading have been applied - for instance in Denmark
and the UK - it is also a new way of regulating greenhouse gases in the EU, which makes it
interesting from a research point of view.
1
~ Cf. for instance the explanatory memorandum of the proposal for the directive on the energy performance of
buildings (EU 2001/0098 (COD)) for a comparison of the building regulation in the EU. The exact impact of these
directives will of course require a more detailed analysis.
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1.1 Research question
The above leads to the research question of this project:
What measures are required to deal with the long-term challenges of the Danish energy sector, and
what part should the EU emissions trading scheme play in this regard?
The focus of the project will be on measures within power generation. Due to the importance
currently attached to the EU emissions trading scheme I will approach the research question by first
analysing the sufficiency of this scheme as a CO2 reduction means - both with reference to the
relatively short-term commitments of the Kyoto Protocol, but also as a long-term means of
regulation.
Afterwards I will elaborate on the security of supply challenges, including the current approach to
the procurement of new power capacity. Based on this I will propose new means of regulation and
consider the role of the EU emissions trading scheme in this regard.
15
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2 Methodology
This chapter describes the method used to answer the research question. It elaborates on the selected
empirical material and the demarcations I have made.
2.1 Research field
Three of the central challenges of the energy sector are: CO2 reduction and security of supply in
terms of fuel and power capacity availability. These aspects are shown in the figure below, where
the box around the triangle illustrates the main framework conditions affecting the energy sector,
i.e. the liberalised energy market and the EU emissions trading scheme. Ensuring economic
efficiency may be seen as the overall consideration overarching the liberalization of the sector and
emissions trading13.
Fuel supply
security
Liberalization
Power balance
Emission trading
o reduction
Figure 2: The overall research field (own figure)
The triangle serves to illustrate that initiatives in the sector have an effect on all three fields. The
commissioning of a new coal-fired plant does for instance contribute to ensuring sufficient power
capacity but could have a negative effect on the emissions of CO2. Gas-fired power plants are more
advantageous with regards to CO2 emissions, but are less attractive from a fuel supply security point
of view. Windmills on the other hand could both reduce CO2 emissions and increase fuel security,
but may be less suited to improve the power balance, and so forth.
Regulation of the sector needs to take account of these conflicting aspects. Today CO2 emissions
are expected to be regulated by the EU emissions trading scheme, whereas the security of supply
issues, fuel supply as well as the power balance problem, remains more or less unregulated with the
13
 According to the original EU electricity market directive the "establishment of the internal market in electricity is
particularly important in order to increase efficiency in the production, transmission and distribution of this product"
(EU 96/92/EC). Similarly the EU directive on emissions trading "aims to contribute to fulfilling the commitments of the
European Community arid its Member States more effectively, through an efficient European market in greenhouse gas
emission allowances, with the least possible diminution of economic development and employment" (EU 2003/87/EC).
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market players. There is a risk that the current regulation set-up does not properly take into account
the conflicting aspects and potential synergies, when answers are to be found to these problems.
It is intended that the present analysis have a broad approach to the key challenges of the energy
sector in order to find solutions, which take into account all three main challenges
2.1.1 Demarcation of research field
This project deals with the energy sector, which for this purpose will be defined as all steps
connected with delivering electricity and heat services to consumers.
In contrast, it should be mentioned, that the EU directive on emissions trading encompasses many
other business sectors: metals production industry, mineral industry as well as paper and pulp, but
only combustion plants with a thermal input exceeding 20 MW (EU 2OO3/87/EC). Since much of the
potential for an optimisation of the energy sector requires interaction with energy activities not
covered by the scheme, for example increased wind power or the extension of the district heating
system on the behalf of individual oil-fired burners, this project will in some regards have a broader
scope than the directive on emissions trading and in other a more narrow.
Analyses of regulation and mitigation options will focus mainly on supply side options whereas the
demand side will be dealt with through more general considerations. This is not because demand
side options are less relevant than supply side options but because exploring demand side options
will require detailed analyses of a range of different means within different sectors, which is beyond
the scope of this project.
At the European level the future role of nuclear energy is an issue, under debate in relation to
security of supply and climate policy (EU Kommissionen, 2002: 5) However due to the Danish
parliament decision from 1985 (Miljø- og energiministeriet, 2001: 21) on the rejection of nuclear power as
part of Danish energy planning, this is not a likely alternative in Denmark. The head of the main
Danish power producer Elsam's development department, Flemming Nissen, confirmed in an
interview (Appendix A) that nuclear does not seem a probable option in Denmark. Hence I will not
account for the pros and cons of nuclear power. It should be noted however that future European
nuclear policy would of course impact on the regional climate change and security of supply
discussion.
2.2 The analytical scope
The aim of this subchapter is to specify some of the important aspects, which future regulation of
the sector should take account of. These will be drawn on in connection with the evaluation of the
sufficiency of the EU emissions trading scheme and to guide on new means of regulation.
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2.2.1 The energy chain
An appropriate starting point for an evaluation of the regulation of the sector could be to look at the
basics of the energy system - the energy chain. The energy chain describes the course from primary
energy sources to energy services, and basically it is within this system that among other things the
emissions trading scheme should generate changes - emission reductions. Figure 3 gives an
example of the energy chain (inspired by Swisher et al: 1997:5). The upper part of the figure illustrates
the general steps of the traditional energy chain: A primary source is extracted and converted to an
energy carrier, which is distributed in the energy system. Here it is used by a final consumer by the
means of an end-use technology in order to deliver an energy service.
In the lower part of the figure this is made clear by the means of two examples. The first example
(A) treats with delivering of light for reading (with coal being the primary energy source) and the
second (B) with delivering a comfortable indoor temperature, (with oil as the primary energy
source). The examples also show that there can be synergies through the delivery of energy services
(here light and comfortable temperature). Thus if the coal power plant produced combined heat and
power the hot water could substitute oil, or if the household applied an internal combustion engine
instead of an oil-fired burner, the electricity produced could substitute electricity from the coal
power plant (shown by dotted lines).
To illustrate that energy services can be met in other ways than through the traditional steps of the
energy chain I have included the examples of daylight to serve lighting needs and a well-designed
house to deliver comfortable room temperature. The better these other options are exploited the less
is the need for energy services through the energy chain.
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(A)
(B)
house
Figure 3: The energy chain (own figure).
Furthermore the figure explains where GHG emissions occur in the energy chain examples.
Since the emissions trading scheme only covers CO2 emissions from combustion technologies
above the 20 MW thermal capacity limit (it also includes oil refineries) most emissions from
centralised conversion technologies are covered, but not emissions from small-scale end-use
conversion technologies (like IC engines, oil-fired burners etc).
When analysing the emission reduction potential of the energy system it seems fruitful to
distinguish between three types of measures: fuel change, improvement of fuel utilization rate and
energy savings and efficiency measure14.
These are summarised and exemplified below:
A fourth measure, which could become an option in the longer run, is separation of CO2 at large power plants and
subsequent storing underground or e.g. in oilfields as a means to increase oil production. There is however much
uncertainty associated with these end-of-pipe solutions, regarding both the economy and the sustainability of storing the
GHG. Furthermore the separation requires a massive energy consumption, which would reduce power capacity of the
affected power plants by app. one quarter, and finally it has not yet been approved as a CO2 reduction means by the
IPPC (Finansministeriet et al., 2003: 135-7). On this background these solutions have not been examined further in this
thesis.
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Measure
1) Fuel switching
2) Improvement of fuel
utilization rate
3) Energy savings and
efficiency measures
Examples
Change from coal to biomass firing at power plants.
Increased electric efficiency of condensing power plant. Increased use of
combined heat and power.
Reducing demand for energy services, e.g. by accepting a lower room
temperature.
Improving efficiency of end-use technologies (e.g. pumps, bulbs etc.)
Table 1: Emission reduction measures (own table)
Note that the last category essentially encompasses two kinds of measures: measures aimed at
reducing the demand for energy services provided through the energy chain (either by simply
reducing the service level or by other approaches such as improved insulation, better utilization of
daylight etc.) and measures optimising the traditional energy chain
The first two kinds of measures, which are the focus of this project, would primarily have to be
carried out by energy supply companies, whereas the third type of measures traditionally lies with
the consumers15. Some initiatives however, like changing from individual heating to micro CHP,
would be an improvement of the fuel utilization rate, but - at least physically - lie at the consumer.
If the EU emissions trading scheme is to become an effective means, it should optimise or at least
contribute to optimising the supply of energy services. My assumption is that, as the incumbents of
the scheme are the major energy players, the scheme might not entail the right incentives to ensure
that for instance CHP and energy saving measures are carried out to a sufficient extent. Previously
these measures were usually initiated at central level (heat planning, CHP conversion programme
etc) and encompassed by the integrated resource planning (IRP) of power utilities - but with the
liberalisation of energy markets these tasks are assigned to the market players.
2.2.2 Technological development
A particular important element in a lasting optimisation of the energy chain is encouragement of
technological development. If greenhouse gas reductions are to take place beyond the Kyoto period,
development of new and improved technologies is crucial. The need for technological development
among others has to do with the long-term prospects for reaching a continued global agreement on
combating climate change. The CO2 emissions of developing countries are expected to increase
dramatically over the coming decades (exceeding OECD emissions in 2030), and as the
International Energy Agency states, "until the wealthier and more technologically advanced Parties
15
 So-called ESCOs (energy service companies) are on the other hand examples of suppliers (e.g. electricity trading
companies) taking over the responsibility of changes in the consumer end of the chain (see Elkraft System 2001b: 10).
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(to the Kyoto Protocol) have adopted measures to mitigate emissions, developing countries see little
justification to act" (IEA, 2002: 41,64). And this involves instigating a push for technological
innovation "that will support climate change mitigation, and more importantly, advance the
development of poorer countries" (IEA, 2002:64). Some researchers have even argued that
international agreements on promoting technological development could succeed the Kyoto
Protocol (IEA, 2002: 87).
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Figure 4: Illustration of experience curves for selected EU technologies in the period 1980-1995 (IEA, 2000:22).
Generation costs drop as more units are produced and experience with these are gained.
Aiming at accelerating technological development it is important to recognize that technological
development encompass more than research and development in the traditional sense. Learning
through manufacturing and learning through utilization are essential as well (Skytte et al., 2004: 94),
see Figure 4. Therefore technological development is not only dependent on funds and strategies for
research and development (and demonstration) (the technology push), but also very much on
incentives, which are capable of bringing new technologies on to the market, where they can be
further developed (the demand pull). In the latter regard emission trading will play a part, which
will be examined and evaluated in this project.
2.2.3 Security of supply
Security of supply challenges can also be illustrated by the means of the energy chain. Within the
power system security of supply is dependent on fuel supply, power plant capacity, transmission
capacity and distribution capacity (see Figure 5). The power sector distinguishes between system
adequacy and system security. System adequacy has to do with the sufficiency of the system, i.e.
whether power plant, transmission, and distribution capacity is sufficient and properly placed
geographically, to deal with peak load situations. Concern about system adequacy particularly
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involves power production capacity because this part of the system has been liberalised. System
security relates to how the system handles spontaneous interruptions without collapsing. This
concerns system performance of power plants and grid as well as consumer response - among other
things (Energistyrelsen et al., 2002:11). System security will not be analysed in this project.
Fuel supply Power plant Transmission Distribution End-user
Figure 5: Elements of security of supply (own figure)
How sufficient power capacity is ensured in the power sector is an issue of great relevance to the
overall research question of this thesis, because the conditions for establishing new capacity impacts
on the choice of technology and thereby on greenhouse gas emissions, technological development
as well as on security of fuel supply. The current approach to ensuring sufficient power capacity,
relying on the market to decide on new investment (deciding on time of commissioning, plant type
and location) has advantages and disadvantages, which will be considered.
Security of fuel supply constitutes a separate analysis element which will be taken into account by
approaching what I have deduced as the three major energy security concerns: long term depletion
of fossil fuels, stability of fuel supply (the risks related to uneven geographic distribution and
consumption of resources) and effects on the balance of trade.
2.3 Options for review of the EU emissions trading scheme
Though the directive on emissions trading (EU 2003/87/EC) defines the basic appliance of the
emissions trading scheme (allocation method, installations covered etc.) for the period 2005-2012,
article 30 opens up for "Review and further development" of the directive. In this regard the
Commission shall no later than the 30th of June 2006 submit a report to the European Parliament
and Council, including appropriate proposals. This report must address several important issues
such as:
"the relationship of emissions trading with other policies and measures implemented at Member
State and Community level, including taxation, that pursue the same objectives"
and "the relationship of Community emission allowance trading with the international emissions
trading that will start in 2008;"
Therefore recommendations in this project on alteration on the appliance of the scheme would have
an opportunity to be taken into account of at the EU level.
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2.4 Project strategy
Figure 6 shows a visualization of the overall project design. Following a general description of the
regulation of the energy sector (chapter 3) the sufficiency of ETS as CO2 regulation means will be
analysed in chapter 4. In order to perform an analysis of new (additional) measures it is required
that the security of supply challenges are given more consideration. This is done in chapters 5 and 6
before the final analysis of new measures takes place in chapter 7.
1. Introduction
T
2. Methodology
3. Regulation of the energy
sector
4. Analysis of the EU
emissions trading scheme
5. Security of fuel
supply
6. Procurement of
new power capacity
7. New
8
means of regulation
V
. Conclusion
Figure 6: Visualization of the project design
In order to structure the overall research question I have defined a number of work questions, which
will be dealt with in different sections of the project. These appear from Table 2, which also shows
the approach used to answer the work questions, the main empirical data used and the outcome of
the chapter. Each chapter contains a roundup where partial conclusions will be drawn with relation
to the work questions.
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Chapter
3.
Regulation of
the energy
sector
4.
Analysis of
theEU
emissions
trading
scheme
5.
Security of
fuel supply
6.
Procurement
of new power
capacity
Work questions
-How have the
objectives, and the
means to reach the
objectives, changed in
Danish energy planning
and regulation?
- Who are the main
stakeholders of the
sector?
-How are the Danish
commitments of the
Kyoto Protocol tackled?
-What are the theoretical
arguments for
introducing emissions
trading?
-What are the
implications of
introducing emissions
trading in the energy
sector?
-How will the EU
emissions trading
scheme impact on the
issues of security of
supply?
-How do energy supply
concerns affect the
energy sector?
-How is the current
Danish and Nordic
supply and demand
situation?
-How is the liberalised
market supposed to
provide for new
capacity?
-How do relevant
stakeholders in the
power sector relate to
Approach for
analysing questions
An examination of the
changes of regulation,
which has come with the
liberalization, and the
changed Danish
approach to climate
change mitigation.
An examination on pros
and cons of introducing
emissions trading,
including possible
suggestions for
improvement of its
current set-up.
An analysis of which
technologies are
attractive to invest in
under the scheme, and
whether it will instigate
technological
development.
An examination on the
ETS's effects on security
of supply issues.
A description of the main
challenges of security of
energy supply, in order
to determine
whether/when there will
be problems with the
security of supply, and
what requirements this
puts to the power sector.
An examination of the
power balance problem,
and the Nordic "spot
market" approach and its
advantages and
disadvantages
compared to alternative
models.
Main empirical data
Danish Energy plans,
Electricity supply act,
Danish Climate strategy.
Relevant EU directives
and reports, Theory on
emissions trading:
Coase and Dales
(original texts), and
Pearce and Turner
(environmental economy
textbook).
Danish CO2 quota
allocation plan.
Statistics on Danish
power plants.
Reports on emissions
trading from the IEA,
Elkraft System and
others.
Estimations of fossil fuel
reserves and their
distribution
(internationally,
regionally and nationally)
from e.g. the IEA, BP,
DEA, IPCC. EU green
paper on security of
supply and its technical
document.
Reports from the Danish
TSOs, DEA and Nordel
on their view on the
power balance issue.
Interviews with TSOs,
the DEA and the
generator Elsam.
Outcome
A mapping of the
institutional structure of
the sector - roles and
tasks. Point out the most
essential changes,
caused be the new
approach to regulation,
which has come with
liberalization. The
mapping provides
background information
for following chapters.
A conclusion on whether
the EU ETS is an
appropriate means to
ensure CO2 reductions,
including options for
improving the set-up of
scheme.
A brief discussion on
possible impacts on
security of fuel supply
and the security of
power supply caused by
the EU ETS.
A conclusion on whether
(to what extent) security
of fuel supply concerns
is a driver for
transforming the energy
sector.
An evaluation of the
demand for new power
capacity in the years to
come and an
assessment of the
market as a means to
provide for this capacity.
A discussion of
advantages and
disadvantages of
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7.
New means
of regulation
8.
Conclusion
the power balance
problem?
-How should support for
new technologies take
place?
-How should a new
strategic planning for the
sector take place?
Return to the general
research question.
Analyse how support for
new energy technologies
should be designed.
Use results from
previous chapters to
discuss a new approach
to providing for new
capacity.
Summarise the main
conclusion(s).
Literature on
technological
development (Skytte et
al., Sawin).
Interviews with the wind
power industry, the TSO
and the DEA.
increased political
guidance.
A selection of the most
suitable scheme(s) for
supporting new
technologies.
A proposal for a new
strategy for the energy
sector.
Table 2: Project design
2.5 Empirical data
As indicated from Table 2 the project's empirical foundation is mainly written sources. These can
roughly be divided into four groups.
Statistical material
Among others statistical material regarding Danish power plants acquired from the Danish Energy
Agency (DEA) (made anonymous for commercial reasons), and statistics regarding fossil fuel
reserves from the International Energy Agency (IEA), BP's statistical review of world energy, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as well as the DEA.
Legal material
EU directives, Danish electricity supply act
Reports
Reports of the Danish Energy Agency, the EU, the Danish TSO's, their Nordic organization for
cooperation (Nordel), the International Energy Agency etc.
Academic papers/books
Theory on emissions trading: Coase and Dales who are the fathers of the emissions trading
instrument, as well as Pearce and Turner (environmental economy textbook). Theory on
technological development: among others Skytte et al. Articles from the journal Energy Policy has
been used as a source of information to fill in gaps.
2.5.1 Interviews
I have made personal interviews with a range of the key stakeholders in the sector16,17:
16
 In addition a preliminary interview was made with Nikolaj Harbo, secretary to the management, from power
generator Energi E2 the 10lh of December 2003, but this interview has not been used in the project.
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• Flemming Nissen, Head of development department, Elsam. 2004-02-17. Appendix A.
• Paul-Frederik Bach & Kim Behnke, Deputy director and planning consultant, Eltra. 2004-
02-17. Appendix B.
• Jakob Lau Hoist, Danish Wind Industry Association. 2004-04-14. Appendix C.
• Lars Gullev, Manager, VEKS (West Copenhagen Heating Transmission Company). 2004-
06-03. Appendix D
• Kaj Stærkind, Contact person on energy infrastructure project, Danish Energy Authority.
2004-08-23. Appendix E
• Peter Meibom, RISØ National Laboratory. 2004-04-02. Appendix F (no transcript made)
• Hans Henrik Lindboe, sectional engineer, Elkraft System. 2004-09-02. Appendix G.
The interviewees have primarily been used as informants, and moreover as sources of inspiration
and discussion partners with regard to assessing various solutions to the challenges of the sector.
All the above interviews have been made in Danish. Voice files as well as transcripts (in Danish and
most of them in note form) are provided in the enclosed appendix CD as documentation. The
appendix CD also includes spreadsheets with own calculations used in e.g. chapter 4 to assess the
impact of the EU ETS on the power sector (Appendix H -O).
2.5.2 Conferences
Furthermore I have attended a range of meetings/conferences, which have dealt with the problems
i a
of this thesis .
2.6 Target group
The primary target group for this project is policy makers in Denmark as well as the EU. The
project includes recommendations regarding the future Danish energy policy as well as the EU
emissions trading system. It may be used in connection with the recently decided action plan for the
Danish energy infrastructure, which will also include analyses on the perspectives for the future
Danish energy supply.
17
 Five of the above interviews (App. A, B, C, D and F) were made together with Nicolai Kipp who is writing a master
thesis on wind power in the Danish energy sector.
18
 1) "Når den billige olie slipper op" (oil depletion), 2003-12-18. Organizer: The Danish Board of technology
2)"Temadag om distribueret elproduktion" 2004-26-01 (distributed generation) Org.: "Brændsels- og energiteknisk
selskab" 3) Conference regarding the Danish allocation of CO2 quotas, 2004-02-24. Org: Dansk Energi 4)"Klima og
forsyningssikkerhed", 2004-05-10 (climate change and security of supply). Organizer: Økologisk råd 5)"Vind eller
forsvind", 2004-05-27 (strategy for wind power). Org: Danish Wind Industry Association. 6)"Langsigtet
energiplanlægning", 2004-08-26 (long term energy planning) Org: Selskabet for Grøn Teknologi og EnergiDebat
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3 Regulation of the energy sector - history and trends
This chapter is supposed to introduce the reader to the changes of regulation, which have occurred
in the Danish energy sector during the last 30 years - particularly the changes that have taken place
since the late 1990'es, when energy markets where gradually liberalised. Three work questions will
be answered: "How have the objectives, and the means to reach the objectives, changed in Danish
energy planning and regulation?", "Who are the main stakeholders of the sector?" and "How are
the commitments of the Kyoto Protocol tackled?"
Following a brief introduction to the history of Danish energy planning and regulation a more
detailed description of the current liberalised markets will take place. Focus will be on the
electricity sector, but I will also include a short description of the heating market. Finally the current
Danish climate strategy and the challenges of the Kyoto commitment will be elaborated on.
3.1 Danish energy planning and regulation
The comprehensive Danish energy planning and regulation was commenced as a response to the oil
crises of the 1970'es. During the late 1960'es and the beginning of the 1970'es the major oil
producing countries, since 1960 organised in OPEC19, gained increasingly control over their oil
resources, which had previously been managed by international oil companies. And in the autumn
of 1973 the organisation of Arab petroleum exporting countries (OAPEC) decided to cut the supply
of oil to the USA and other industrialised countries supporting Israel in its war against Egypt and
Syria (the so-called Yom Kippur war). This cut of supplies not only led to highly increased oil
prices but also showed how depended a society like the Danish was on foreign energy resources
from an unstable region (Federspiel, 2002:103, Linderoth 1992:43). In 1972 more than 90 % of total fuel
consumption was based on oil - a large amount of this deriving from OPEC countries
(Energiministeriet, 1981: 20,48).
In addition the crisis proved to the oil producers of OPEC, that restricting oil supplies through cartel
cooperation, would increase their profit from the oligopolic oil market (Linderoth, 1992: 14,60).
As a consequence of this development the Danish energy sector, which before the oil crisis had
been more or less unregulated with regard to fuel choice, suddenly became the centre of political
focus. Energy policy issues were placed under one minister (the Minister of Trade, and later under
ministers of energy) and an energy policy statement was published in 1974. The overall objective of
the energy policy statement was diversification of the supply of fuels (Federspiel, 2002: 106). In 1976
the energy policy statement was followed by the first energy plan of Denmark, Energy Policy 76,
which set up a range of means to ensure the security of fuel supply (see Table 3).
19
 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
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In the following years much attention has been given to energy planning in Denmark. Table 3
summarises the main objectives and means of the energy plans that have been published since the
oil crisis. Whereas the energy planning of the 1970'es was mostly focused on security of fuel
supply, socio-economic considerations were key in the planning of the 1980'es and in the 1990'es
environmental issues became essential. During these periods the Danish state has been a central
player e.g. through the planning for the extension of district heating and natural gas supply systems
and by means of instructions and negotiations with electricity companies to apply certain fuels.
Figure 7 shows the effects the Danish energy policy (as well as changing fuel prices) has had on
gross energy consumption in the period 1972-2002. It appears that the consumption of first oil
(security supply reasons) and later coal (environmental concerns) has decreased on behalf of natural
gas and renewable energy sources. It is also notable that initiatives within energy saving and energy
efficiency has made it possible to maintain a more or less constant gross energy consumption over
the period.
Since the energy plan "Energi 21" from 1996 and its follow-up plan from 1999 no energy plan has
been published. This can be understood in association with the latest development of Danish energy
policy, namely the liberalisation of energy markets and increasing EU regulation particularly on
environmental issues. Apparently these developments seem, at least for a while, to have made
comprehensive energy planning superfluously. Much of the analyses of the sector have instead been
performed as part of the Danish climate strategy for reduction of greenhouse gases from February
2003 as well as in the report "Liberalisation of the Energy Markets" from October 2002 (Danish
Government, 2002 and Danish Government, 2003).
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Evaluated period
Energy plans
1973-1980
"Energy Policy 76"
(1976)
1981-1989
"Energy 81 "(1981)
1990-1999
"Energy 2000"
(1990) and follow
up (1993)
"Energy 21" (1996)
and follow up
(1999)
2000 - 2003
No actual energy
plans.
Danish Climate
strategy (2003)
Main objectives
Ensure the security of
fuel supply - due to high
dependency on oil.
Security of supply and
energy to lowest
possible costs.
Socio-economic
considerations.
Improve balance of
payments.
Sustainable
development.
20 % reduction of Danish
CO2 emissions by 1988
level in 2005 (Energy
2000).
Liberalisation of energy
markets.
Fulfil the commitments of
the Kyoto Protocol of
1997
Cost efficient dealing
with environmental
issues.
Means to achieve objectives:
A diversified fuel supply (from oil to coal,
natural gas and nuclear power), energy
savings and heat planning involving
counties and municipalities. Taxes on
electricity, oil products and gas are
introduced. Grants given for insulation,
exploitation of surplus heat (CHP) and
renewable energy installations.
Renewable energy primarily a long term
means.
Increased use of energy taxes.
Continuation of the heat planning, the
natural gas project and exploitation of
CHP potential.
Decision to disregard nuclear energy in
1985.
Further use of environmental and energy
taxes. Savings in energy consumption
(labelling, efficiency standards, regulation
etc.). Greater energy efficiency by
extending CHP and increasing consumer
connection to natural gas and district
heating systems. Increase share of RE.
R&D in new more efficient technologies.
Market based solutions.
Cap and trade systems to ensure CO2
reductions from energy intensive
companies.
Make use of the flexible mechanisms of
the Kyoto Protocol to ensure over all cost
efficiency.
Environmental
considerations
Not given priority.
Limited focus in Energy 81.
RE support introduced -
mainly argued for from a
security of supply point of
view. End of pipe solutions
for power plants. During the
decade more focus was
given to environmental
problems, particular to SO2
and fly ash, and later on also
GHG.
Environmental
considerations and
sustainable development
were the pivotal points of the
energy plans of this decade.
Indicative objectives for RE
energy in Energy 21.
Environmental initiatives are
increasingly made subject to
economic considerations.
Environmental
considerations have to some
extent been reduced to
achieving compliance with
international agreements.
Table 3: Danish energy policy 1973-200320.
The latest energy policy statement from April 2004 indicates that we might see a return of the
energy plans. According to this statement in March 2005 the minister will present an energy
infrastructure plan going to 2010, and include perspectives on the energy supply for the period up to
2025 (Energistyrelsen, 2004a). Due to the liberalisation of the energy markets the plan is however likely
The table is based on following energy plans: Energiministeriet, 1981; Danish Ministry of Energy, 1990 and 1993;
MEE, 1996; MEE, 1999, Danish Government, 2003 and Energistyrelsen 1998.
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to be significantly different from the energy plans of the past because the government's role within
many of the energy markets is now confined to providing the framework for the market players.
• Oil • Natural Gas B Coal and Coke • Renewable Energy etc.
Figure 7: Danish gross energy consumption 1972-2002 (note that figures for 1973 and 1974 are missing)(source: own
figure based on data from www.ens.dk, 2004-07-15)
3.2 The electricity market
In order to understand the change of regulation regime of the Danish electricity sector it is fruitful
to briefly know the history and structure of the previous regulation and organisation of the sector.
3.2.1 Before liberalisation
The electricity supply system basically consists of power production, transmission and distribution.
Distribution companies in Denmark have traditionally been consumer owned through co-
operatives/limited companies or owned by municipalities (Hvelpund, 2001: 90). These distribution
companies have again owned power production companies and worked together on transmission
and load shifting. In the western part of Denmark this corporation between distribution companies
have taken place in the company Elsam and in Eastern Denmark in the company Elkraft. The
control of the electricity system has therefore to a wide extent been done by the consumers, though
their representation in the boards of distribution and production companies may often have been
very indirect21.
21
 Representatives in the distribution companies could e.g. be elected by the members of the town council, these
representatives again elect a board of directors in the distribution companies, who elect directors in power plant
companies etc. (cf. the description of the organisation of the Jutland-Funen electrical power system by Hvelplund
(2001:92)).
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The previous Danish electricity system has been described as a non-profit system, because the
electricity supply acts have not permitted the electricity companies to build up a surplus or to use
any surplus for non-energy purposes. Surplus generated one year should be returned to consumers
the next year through lower prices. The system has also to a large degree been self-financing since
consumers have paid in advance in a five-year period (also regulated by the Electricity Supply Act), for
new power plants, through their electricity prices (Hvelplund, 2001:92). This way the system led to a
high degree of supply security since the utilities were able to plan for the appropriate amount of
capacity and even get it financed in advance. Rather there was a risk that the system could lead to
excess capacity (Hvelplund, 2001: 131)22
Next to the consumer owned system many independent power producers (IPP's) appeared on the
scene during the 1980'es and 1990'es. They generated power on renewable energy (wind power
plants and combustion of biomass) and natural gas, selling their power at fixed prices (incl.
subsidies) to the grid. In contrary to the consumer owned system these plants could not finance
investments in advance and therefore had to go for finance elsewhere23. Windmill cooperatives have
been one of the ways to finance projects (Skytte et al., 2004: 21-22). The IPP's have thus financed their
investments on market conditions before liberalisation.
3.2.2 The electricity reform
In March 1999 a reform for the electricity sector was agreed upon in the Danish parliament
(Elreformen, 3. marts 1999). Its purpose was to start the liberalisation of the electricity sector.
A driving factor behind the liberalisation was the EU directive (96/92ÆC) concerning common rules
for the internal market in electricity24, which "establishes common rules for the generation,
transmission and distribution of electricity" (art. 1). The EU directive demanded among other things
a gradual opening of the market for large consumers (art.19), unbundling of generation, transmission
and distribution with regard to accounting (art. 14), and furthermore the establishment of system
operator companies (art. 7). According to the preface of the energy reform agreement on
liberalisation the reform is among others supposed to ensure lower consumer prices and give the
market actors more individual choices. (Elreformen, 3. marts 1999)
22
 New plants were however subject to approval from the energy authority (Interview w. Hans Henrik Lindboe, Elkraft
System, Appendix G)
Though for instance for new wind power plants it was possible to obtain investment support from the state up to
August 1989 (Kjær & Andersen, 1993: 85).
Another motive for the liberalised market in Denmark has, according to the Energy Policy Statement of the Energy-
and Environment minister from May 1999, been the swift development toward liberalisation in the other Nordic
countries (Energipolitisk Redegørelse 1999). Norway initiated competition in the electricity sector already in 1991, with
Sweden and Finland following in 1994 and 1996 (Federspiel, 2002: 412)
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The main components of the March 1999 agreement involved the opening of the market before the
1st of January 2003 to all electricity consumers, giving them the right to buy electricity wherever
they want to25, and furthermore the establishment of a new organisational structure for the
electricity sector, giving a clear separation of competition and monopoly activities.
This has implied a structure consisting of:
• Power generation companies and electricity trade companies, which run as commercial
companies.
• System operator companies, which have the overall responsibility for the security of
supply and coordination of the overall electricity system and administrate funds for R&D in
environmentally friendly production technologies.
• Transmission companies, which are monopolies in charge of managing the transmission
grid. The management of the high voltage transmission grid is at the system operator
companies, whereas regional transmission companies own the lower voltage grid.
• Distribution companies, which are non-profit monopolies in charge of managing the
distribution grid. Furthermore the companies are responsible for promoting energy savings
and efficiency.
• Electricity supplier companies, which have to offer electricity (on fair conditions) to all
customers in their supply area. Their aim is to protect small consumers with little options for
acting on the commercial market.
(Hvelplund, 2001: 168, Dansk Energi, 2003: 57, Elreformen, 3.marts 1999)
It appears that only power generation companies and electricity trade companies are commercial,
whereas the other elements of the power supply have remained monopolies.
As a consequence of the liberalisation new investments in power plants can however no longer be
taken for granted - i.e. investment will only take place when it is profitable for market players. On
the face of it, it may seem like the previous high-level objective of security of power supply is given
lower priority in favour of a system which should expectedly result in lower energy prices.
Furthermore it is now, with the liberalization of energy markets, the responsibility of the market
players to decide which technologies will characterize the future energy system. Since some power
plants in the current Danish power system are more than 40 years old26 and capital costs make up a
great part of total energy costs, these decisions may shape the energy system for a very long time,
including future GHG emissions and the level of fuel supply security. The government will no
2:1
 Large consumers were given free access to supplier some time earlier - the largest of these and distribution
companies already the first of January 1998 (Energipolitisk Redegørelse 1999)
16
 Cf. Energistyrelsen 2003h: Energiproducentælling 2002. The expected technical lifetime of new large power plants is
app. 30 years (DEA et al., 2004: 17, 29)
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longer have the same possibilities of addressing orders to the market players, as it was the case with
consumer-owned utilities.
In addition to the restructuring of the sector, the 1999 agreement also laid the basis for different
environmental regulation, i.e. a national CO2 cap and trade system (running from 2000) and a RE
certificate system, which is postponed (cf. e.g. L 236 B, 2004: §56)27. Furthermore it was agreed that the
financial support for renewable energy production, which was previously financed by the state,
should be financed qua the electricity price (Elreformen, 3. marts 1999).
The Danish emissions trading scheme, which was decided to run from 2000 to 2003, encompasses
the largest Danish power plants28 (LOV nr 376 af 02/06/1999: § 4). During that period the cap has been
reduced from 23 Mt to 20 Mt. The penalty for exceeding the quotas under the Danish system is 40
DKK/ton (wwvv.ens.dk/swl93.asp. 2004-02-29), which is quite low compared to the coming EU emission
trading system (see chapter 4)29. In 2003 it was decided to let the system run for yet another year (Lov
nr. 1229, 2003).
The introduction of the CCVquota system illustrates the development from detail regulation
towards increased framework regulation. This is supported by the fact, that there are no
requirements regarding CO2 emissions for new power plants, which are to be encompassed by a
CO2 or GHG emissions trading scheme according to the current departmental order on conditions
and procedures for the approval of new power plants(LBK 493,2003: §7).
3.2.3 Stakeholders
The key stakeholders of the power sector are: power producers, electricity trading companies,
system operators, distribution companies, electricity supplier companies, transmission companies
and consumers. Figure 8 shows the basic ownership structure of the electricity sector today.
The authorities of the sector include The Danish Energy Authority (DEA), which has the tasks of
" establishing framework and instruments in the field of energy" "and conducting "analyses and
21
 There does not seem to be any official reason for the postponement of the system but high transaction cost in
combination with the new government's lack of interest in expanding the share of renewable energy may explain the
postponement of the system.
28
 CHP plants with emissions below 100.000 tonnes are excluded from the scheme. Furthermore CO2 emissions from
heat production at CHP plants is excluded using the "200 percent heat efficiency method" (LOV nr. 376 af 2/6-1999,
§2,§4).
On the face of it a tougher penalty should have been preferable from an environmental point of view. The national
CO2 quotas system suffered however from the problem that by raising the penalty generation would be increased on
power plants in neighbouring countries not encompassed by the scheme. Therefore global emissions would not
necessarily decrease (rather they could increase if production were to take place at plants with lower efficiencies, lignite
fired etc). In a EU scheme a heavy penalty makes sense because interconnection capacity to countries outside the EU is
relatively smaller.
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assessments of the development in the field of energy, nationally and internationally" (www.ens.dk,
2004-05-18), Danish Energy Regulatory Authority which "deals with and decides cases regarding
prices and conditions for electricity, gas and heat supply" (www.energitilsynet.dk, 2004-05-18), and the
Danish Competition Authority which administers the Danish Competition Act. The Danish
Competition Authority has for instance analysed the legitimacy of the power generator Elsam's
purchase of NESA30 (www.ks.dk/publikationer/konkurrence/2004/elsam/, 2004-09-14).
Primarily owned by municipalities/consumers
Distribution companies
App. 130 in 2002
Electricity trading companies
App. 25 in 2002
Electricity supplier companies
App. 50 in 2002
Holding company
Power producers
The largest are: Elsam (West-DK &
Energi E2 (East-DK)
Plus small and medium sized CHP
plants and wind power plants (not
necessarily owned by distributions
companies)
Regional transmission companies
1 lcompanies in 2002
System operator companies
Eltra (West-DK) and Elkraft System
(East-DK)
High voltage transmission grid
Eltra (West-DK) and Elkraft
Transmission (East-DK)
EnergiNet Danmark
Figure 8: The general ownership structure of the Danish electricity sector (own figure based on Dansk Energi, 2003 and
Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeriet 2002:5-6).
In spite of the unbundling process of the electricity reform the current ownership structure builds on
the relics of the previous bottom up structure. Therefore the app. 130 net distribution companies are
still fundamental in the structure as owners of generators, regional transmission, systems operator
and high voltage grid companies. The distribution companies are primarily owned by consumers
and municipalities and are often part of a holding company encompassing also electricity supplier
and energy trading companies. The sector is however under continues development, implying that
the above structure is under relaxation.
With the recent energy policy agreements of 29th of March 2004 it has been decided that the two
system operator companies, Eltra and Elkraft System, as of the 1st of January 2005, are to be
merged into one state owned company, EnergiNet Danmark, which will also own the high voltage
grid. As a compensation for the takeover by the state of the high voltage transmission grid, the
30
 In order to approve this transaction the competition authority has required Elsam to establish the Great Belt power
link between Eastern and Western Denmark. This shows that decisions by the Danish Competition Authority may
impact on the sector, e.g. the security of supply.
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owners of the distribution companies will be allowed to sell their assets from the consumer owned
non-profit system (shares in generators and distribution companies) without any restrictions
(Økonomi- og erhvervsministeriet, 2004a). The system operator(s) make up a particular important
stakeholder with regard to the problems being examined in this report since one of their core
responsibilities is to ensure the security of supply
Other major recent changes involve Elsam's purchase in October 2003 of the largest Danish
distribution company, NESA A/S, which among others own app. 36 % of the shares in the second
largest power production company Energi E2 A/S (www.nesa.dk, 2004-02-29). The dotted arrow in the
figure shows this transaction.
With the liberalisation of electricity markets it can be expected that new market players enter the
Danish market. These could for instance be Swedish Vattenfall, German E.ON, Finnish Fortum and
Swedish/German Sydkraft (E.ON owns 55 % of the shares in Sydkraft). E.ON has described the
Nordic market as one of five "target markets". In Denmark E.ON wants to "improve scale by
synergistic acquisitions in distribution and district heating", though the company has no plans of
adding generation capacity in Denmark (E.ON, 2003:12,17). Sydkraft is responsible on E.ON's behalf
for developing energy business in the Nordic countries and the company already has a Danish
department and owns several small Danish CHP plants and a significant share (20%) in the offshore
wind farm (200 MW) at Rødsand (Sydkraft 2004: 9,56) (www.era.se/nvh/nvhQl/0104dan.html, 2004-06-18).
The Danish gas company DONG makes up another potential investor in the power sector.
Other important or potentially important stakeholders include local authorities, counties and
municipalities, which are responsible for physical planning, environmental impacts assessments
(EIAs) of new power plants and heat planning31, (see e.g. Energistyrelsen & Konkurrencestyrelsen 2004:
50ff), research institutions and producers of energy equipment (e.g. wind power manufacturers) and
heat distribution companies. As I will argue for in chapter 7 it will become important to involve
these stakeholders more in the coordination of the decisions for the sector.
3.2.4 Power pricing
In general the pricing of power in Denmark depends on the plant type, time of commissioning and
the fuel used. A general differentiation can be made between: 1) Central power plants 2)
Decentralised CHP plants32 and 3) Wind power plants.
1) The central power plants sell their electricity on the market, either via bilateral agreements with
consumers or electricity trade companies or via a power pool. NordPool is the power pool of the
Nordic countries but the generators can also opt to sell power to e.g. the German power pool
Plus municipalities play a part as owners of many of the distributions companies.
" It is the localisation of a plant (and not its power and heat capacity), which determines if it is to be regarded either a
central or decentralised plant. (LBK 151, 2003: §5 & §10).
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Leipzig Power Exchange. NordPool includes a spot market where the price is fixed in every hour,
depending on supply and demand of electricity. Utility owned power plants using biomass and
utility owned wind power plants also sell to the market but have special arrangements for
compensation with the State (www.ens.dk/swl090.asp. 2004-02-29 and Elreformen, 3. marts 1999).
2) The electricity from small existing decentralised power plants using waste, natural gas or
biomass obtain a price of the electricity, based on the avoided cost principle. This price corresponds
to the long run marginal cost of producing electricity from a central, natural gas based power plant,
including a benefit for producing decentralized (avoids demand for grid extension). The system
operator companies, Elkraft System and Eltra, are continuously updating the exact price.
Furthermore the decentralised power plants receive fuel tax reductions and subsides depending on
fuel type, production and the commissioning date (www.ens.dk/sw2O8.asp. 2004-02-29). With the latest
energy policy agreements it has been decided that new plants and however that large decentralized
plants shall sell their power on market conditions33. As a compensation for the lower prices on the
spot market existing plants will receive a financial subsidy, which is independent of their
production (Energipolitisk redegørelse, 2004).
3) The pricing of power from wind power plants depends on the time of commissioning, the
localisation (on- or off-shore) and how many hours the wind turbine has been operating (measured
in "full-load hours"). Wind power plants erected after the 1st January 2003 obtain the market price
and a 100 DKK subsidy per MWh34. Previously windmills received more favourable conditions,
and older windmills still benefit from this system as these receive fixed prices of up to 600
DKK/MWh and have prioritised access to the system35
(www.ens.dk/gi-aphics/ENS Forsyning/Priser/Afregning vind 2OO5O3.pdf. 2004-02-29). Furthermore in
accordance with the recent energy policy agreements new wind power plants may receive 120
DKK/MWh if replacing existing small-scale wind power plants with a rated capacity below 450 kW
(decommissioning certificates). New offshore wind power plants (in areas selected by the DEA) are
to compete in tenders for a lowest possible subsidy to the market price
(www.ens.dk/graphics/ENS Forsyning/Vindmoeller/Havvindmoeller/Udbudsbekendtgoerelse 020704.pdf. 2004-09-
14)36.
33
 Plants exceeding 10 MW power capacity from 1st of January 2005 and plants exceeding 5 MW from 1st of January
2007.
34
 + 23 DKK/MWh as a compensation for balancing costs.
35
 Special rules apply to wind power plants that have been es tabl ished by the former electric utility monopol ies
(mandated unde r the previous Electricity Supply Act) , and for small-scale househo ld wind power plants , wh ich still
receive 0 .60 D K K / k W h (L 236 B)).
36
 As a starting point the offshore wind farms will also receive the 100 D D K / M W h subsidy for R E plants . The tenders
will show if they can do with less or if they need a greater subsidy.
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In Table 4 I have summarised how subsidies in general are given to RE and decentralised CHP
plants. It should be noted that the subsidy system is quite complex with many exceptions - all of
these are not taken into account of in the table below.
Wind power Decentralised natural gas CHP Other RE (excl Biogas
biogas, wind)
New plants
Previously
(still applies
to some
existing
plants)
Market price + 100
DKK/MWh subsidy
+23 DKK
compensations for
balancing costs (+
possible 120
DKK/MWH from
decommissioning
certificates)
Fixed price:
Up to 600
DKK/MWh
Market price.
Three tier tariff (fixed prices), which
depends on time of the day
(peak/high/low load) and transformer
station level. This is app.38: 320
DKK/MWh (East-Dk) + additional 80
DKK/MWh production subsidy (applies
to small plants)
or
Market price + financial subsidy which is
independent of generation (now applies
to existing large decentralised plants)
Market price +
100 DKK/MWh
subsidy
Fixed price:
Up to
600 DKK/MWh
Fixed price: 600
DKK/MWh (first
10 years) after
this fixed price of
400 DKK/MWh.
Fixed price:
Up to
600 DKK/MWh
Table 4: Power pricing of renewable energy plants and decentralised power plants. Small decentralised plants (<5 MW
power capacity) will still receive the three-tier tariff and plants in the range of 5-10 MW can voluntarily continue under the
three-tier system until January 2007 (L 236 B, 2004).
For comparison the hourly Nordpool system price in the 2001-2003 period are shown in Figure 9. It
appears that the price over the period have risen from a level of around 150-200 DKK/MWh to app.
250 DKK/MWh The high price level at the end 2002/beginning of 2003 was primarily due to very
low hydro inflow to the hydro power plants in Nordic system in the second half of 2002 (Nordel,
2003c: 3).
37 This pricing may also apply to other RE plants than biogas plants if the minister finds these important for the future
utilization of renewable energy power (L 236 B, 2004: §57).
38
 See for instance Elkraft System (2002d: 10).
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Figure 9: Nordpool hourly system price 2001-2003 (Own figure based on data obtained from Elkraft System)
3.3 The heating market
Currently districts heating supply does not take place on a liberalised market. It works as a non-
profit business both with regard to distribution and production of heat; and distribution companies
are required to have a majority of representatives from the affected municipalities or consumers in
their boards (LBK 772,2000: §20, §23). Nevertheless production of heat for the central heating system
to a large degree (75 % in 2001/2002 according to Danske Fjernvarmeværkers Forening: 7) takes place on CHP
plants that act on competitive markets (electricity and gas), which according to the Danish
Government, give incentives for commercial management of heat production plants (Økonomi- og
Erhvervsministeriet, 2002: 26)39.
3.4 The gas market
The gas market has also undergone a process of liberalisation. For a description of this I refer to
Appendix 1.
39
 Due to this circumstance, and the fact that the central heating grids are not coupled systems in the same way as
natural gas and electricity grids, the government has looked at news ways of creating competition and streamlining the
system. These involve free choice of supplier in areas with large coherent systems, inviting tenders for district heating
producers, introducing cost-saving requirements and comparison of key economic figures for heating plants
(Energipolitisk Redegørelse 2003, Danish Government, 2002: 27).
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3.5 The Danish climate strategy
The largest amount of GHG emissions in Denmark comes from carbon dioxide, (CO2, 78 %)
followed by nitrous oxide (N2O, 13%) and methane (CH4, 8%)40. In 2001 total emissions amounted
to 69.4 Mt CO2 equivalents41 (DEPA 2003:58)42. The most significant part of the CO2 emissions
comes from the combustion of coal, oil and natural gas at power stations and in residential
properties and industry, but the transport sector also contributes with a significant share of the
emissions.
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Figure 10: Denmark's total emissions of GHG 1990-2001 and projected 2002-2017 (own figure based, on data from
DEPA, 2003: 174)
Figure 10 shows historic and projected Danish GHG emission. The fluctuations in CO2 emissions
from year to year should be seen in the light of the electricity trade with other countries and varying
demand for energy for heating. Since 1997 the general trend has been falling CO2 emissions. This is
among other things due to increased use of combined heat and power and fuel change at many
power stations from coal to natural gas and renewable energy (DEPA 2003,55ff).
40
 To this should be added the industrial gasses HFCs, PFCs and SF6s, which make app. 1 % of Danish GHG emissions.
This figure does not include removals in connection with Land Use Change and Forestry (abbreviated LUCF). Under
the Kyoto protocol only removals due to afforestation occurring since 1990 are included and such removals have so far
been marginal (app. 0.1 Mt) (DEPA, 2003: 62).
42
 The largest source of both nitrous oxide and methane emissions is agriculture. Furthermore energy production
contributes to an amount of the methane emission due to the use of gas engines, which have large emissions of methane
compared to other combustion technologies. HFCs, PFCs and SF6s are industrial gasses and thus not related to the
energy sector (DEPA, 2003:55ff). For further details on the results from the GHG inventories I refer to Denmarks Third
National Communication on Climate Change (DEPA 2003).
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3.5.1 Denmark's international greenhouse gas commitments
Due to its commitment under the Kyoto Protocol and the following burden sharing agreement in the
EU Denmark must reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 21 % in 2008-2012 compared to the
level in 199043. In the base year, 1990, Denmark's emissions amounted to 69.7 Mt CO2 equivalents.
If the Danish commitment is not corrected for electricity import, the emissions may not exceed 55
Mt CO9 equivalents per year in the period 2008-12. If it is corrected the figure is 60 Mt CO2
equivalents per year (Finansministeriet et al., 2003:37ff). Denmark has previously had a national
objective as well to reduce CO? emission by 20 % in 2005 compared with 1988. This objective was
decided in 1990 by the Danish parliament (Miljø- og energiministeriet, 2001: 27) but abandoned with the
approval of the current government's climate strategy (Danish Government, 2003: 21).
An official projection of Denmark's emissions of GHGs, indicate that the yearly emissions in 2008-
12 will be app. 80 Mt CO2 equivalents. The projection is based on existing measures. This means
already adopted policies and probable private initiatives. The effects of the EU emissions trading
scheme has not be included in the calculations (Energistyrelsen, 20031": 9,43). The obligation to reduce
GHG emissions in Denmark will then necessitate a reduction of between 20-25 Mt CO2 equivalents
a year, which corresponds to 25-30 % of the total Danish GHG emission in the period 2008-2012.
Of the expected emissions in the period 2008-12, 10 Mt are caused by a rising electricity export.
(Finansministeriet et. al., 2003:37ff). It is increasing electricity market prices over the years and relatively
low coal prices that are anticipated to cause the power plants to export more (and thereby emit more
GHG's) over time (Energistyrelsen, 2OO3f: 55-56).
Figure 11 shows expected Danish
greenhouse gas emissions distributed on
sources and compared with the Danish
reduction commitments for 2008-2012.
Note the significance of the basis year
problem and the expected electricity
exports.
Figure 11: Expected emissions in 2008-12
compared with Kyoto commitments (Danish
Government 2003: 3)
M i l
50 -.
80 •
70 -
60 -
50 -
40 -
3Q .
2D •
10 -
tonnes COj equivalents per year
increase In 1 | 1 0 | * * „ . . ,
electmty ' ^ H ^ t f ~-\"^
exportE
Expeasl
anua
emBsters
2DO3-2C12 <
escl. hssesse
Helecttlt j
esports
Hi
^l I
• Energy prsclietlon tor enport
• Energy prediction
• HoussnoUs
DTrarsport
rj Agrtcutire a « ibnesty
10
10
mon
55
1 siriBsæs
J Bassyea-
proOlefn
Kyo-,2
carrmSTiens
It should be noted that for the industrial gasses the base year is 1995.
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3.5.2 Danish Climate Strategy
In March 2003 the Danish Parliament endorsed the government's new national climate change
strategy (DEPA, 2003: 7), which aims at meeting the Kyoto target by achieving "more environment
for the money". The strategy builds on combining cost-effective national measures with the use of
the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms (Regeringen, 2003:19).
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potential
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Figure 12: Selected initiatives analysed in the proposal for a Danish climate strategy to fulfil the Kyoto Protocol
commitments (Danish Government, 2003:16)
The CO2 abatement costs of some 30 domestic initiatives have been examined, including the
expansion of offshore windmills and the change from coal to natural gas and biomass (see Figure 12,
for the full list see Finansministeriet, 2003:121). The Government's conclusion is however, that most
national initiatives will be more expensive compared to the use of the flexible mechanisms.
The power sector is expected to contribute considerable to the reduction of CO2 through the
allocation of few quotas in the EU emission trading system (Regeringen, 2003: 21)44, which will thus
be the primary means of regulation for the activities encompassed by the directive. In the following
Note that there are two emissions trading scheme: the emission trading system between governments under the Kyoto
Protocol, and the system between companies under the European Union, see chapter 4.
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chapter I will examine on the effects this will have on the sector. For activities outside the ETS the
government has defined 120 DKK as the maximum value that can be attributed to reducing one ton
of CO2 (Regeringen, 2003: 19).
The choice of means is based on the assumption that the price on CO2 quotas and credits (from JI
and CDM projects) will not exceed 100 DKK per ton CO2 in the period 2008-12, and more likely
will be 40-60 DKK per ton CO2. On this basis the annual cost is estimated at between 1-2 billion
DKK with the combined use of cost-effective national measures and the flexible mechanisms and 4-
5 billion DKK if merely using national initiatives (Regeringen, 2003:18). 935 million DKK has been
granted or is planned granted for governmental purchases of quotas (Miljøministeriet, 2004a: 16).
In spite of the above it need to be mentioned that the recent energy policy agreement from 29th of
March 2004 includes a decision to invite tender for two off-shore wind farms (200 MW each) in
2007 and an arrangement for replacement of 175 MW old wind power capacity with 350 MW new
capacity (Økonomi- og erhvervministeriet, 2004b).
As pointed out by critics, following the publication of the climate strategy, an approach based on
reductions in foreign countries will conflict with the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords,
which as previously mentioned state that the flexible mechanisms should be supplement to domestic
actions. The government has however argued that the many domestic initiatives carried out since
1990 will make up for this (see for instance Miljøminsteriet, 2004:15). It is probably to early to say if there
will be a conflict, as this will also depend on the extent to which Danish companies encompassed by
the ETS will cover their demand for quotas with credits from JI/CDM credits.
3.6 Discussion and roundup
The electricity reform of 1999 entailed essential changes in the regulation of the electricity sector.
This development was enhanced with the change of government in November 2001 to a liberal
conservative coalition, opposing central planning and having strong believes that the market is
capable of delivering results in terms of more competitive energy prices and cost-efficient
achievement of environmental goals (Danish Government, 2002: 5).
With regards to the problems examined in this thesis the most important consequence of the
liberalisation of the energy markets is that decisions on new power plants now (in principle) lie with
the market players. This change implies a new major challenge for the electricity system: ensuring
the security of power.
The changed set-up for the power sector has created new stakeholders. Important are of course the
market players, but also the system operators, which have the responsibility of ensure the security
of power supply in the liberalised market. This role of the system operators will be elaborated on in
chapter 6.
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The EU emissions trading scheme is to be the main instrument used to tackle the commitments of
the Kyoto protocol. Incentives for renewable energy have been reduced, and extended use of CHP
is not considered in the government's climate strategy (Finansministeriet, 2003:121). According to
calculations made by the Danish government acquiring pollution rights in other countries it will be
more economic to fulfil the GHG commitments by the use of the flexible mechanisms. This is a
major change compared with previous energy regulation where the arguments for supporting
domestic initiatives, like renewable energy and CHP have been multifarious, such as avoiding
resource depletion, improving the balance of payment, supporting local development, economy and
employment as well other environmental issues etc. (cf. for example the argumentation for supporting
biomass in the energy supply in 1993: "Aftale om øget anvendelse af biomasse i energiforsyning og til industrielle
formål").
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4 Evaluation of the EU Emission Trading Scheme
The main purpose of this chapter is to assess the adequacy of emission trading as means to deal with
GHG emission reductions in the energy sector and to come up with proposals for improvement of
the scheme. This involves looking at the theory that lies behind emissions trading as well as
concrete analyses of the implications of the EU ETS on the Danish energy sector.
The chapter aims at answering the following work questions: What are the theoretical arguments
for introducing emissions trading?, What are the implications of introducing emissions trading in
the energy sector? and How will the EU emissions trading scheme impact on the issues of security
of supply?
The purpose of the latter question is to examine how the implementation of the scheme may affect
the other important challenges of the sector, which are to be elaborated on in chapters 5 and 6. This
will be done once the scheme's general impact on the sector has been clarified.
Initially I will introduce to the EU directive on emissions trading, and the theoretical arguments for
applying emissions trading will be elaborated on. Subsequently the market for CO? quotas will be
described in order to provide information on the expected cost of quotas. On this background
concrete analyses of the scheme's impact on the sector will be made based on the general emission
reduction options outlined in chapter 2.2. Particular emphasis is put on the scheme's effects with
regard to instigating fuel change by the promotion of low carbon technologies, and its incentives
with regard to encouraging improved fuel utilization by the means of CHP. Furthermore I will
through light on the scheme's environmental integrity and its distributional effects.
Finally the connection between emissions trading and the security of supply issues will be examined
on.
4.1 The directive establishing an EU emissions trading scheme
The directive on a European scheme for greenhouse gas emission trading was finally agreed upon in
July 2003 and came into force the 25th of October 2003 (2003/87/EC).
Contrary to the current Danish emissions trading scheme (running from 2000 to 2004) the EU
scheme covers not only the power sector, but also other industrial sectors such as the mineral
industry (cement, glass, ceramics), pulp and paper and board industry, mineral oil refineries and
plants for the production and processing of ferrous metals (EU 2003/87/EC, Annex 1). Regarding energy
activities all combustion installations (including heat only production) with a rated thermal input
exceeding 20 MW are, as previously briefed on, covered by the scheme (hazardous or municipal
waste installations are excepted).
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As a starting point the system only covers CO2, but the directive is prepared to regulate all six
greenhouse gases encompassed by the Kyoto-protocol (EU2003/87/EC, Annex 2). The reasons for these
limitations (with regard to plant size and number of GHG's covered) are that the tools/systems to
measure and monitor other GHG are not as developed, and furthermore that "Allocating
allowances, monitoring emissions and enforcing compliance of small mobile emitters, such as
private cars, raise complex technical and administrative issues " (according to the Green Paper on
greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union, EU COM (2000) 87: 10). All in all app. 46 % of EU
CO2 emissions and 38 % of EU total GHG are covered by the scheme (Danish Government, 2003:13).
Every company encompassed by the directive receives an amount of quotas each year and by the
30th of April the following year (EU 2003/87/EC, Art. 12), the companies have to submit quotas to the
member state corresponding to the emissions of the original year. By placing the deadline for
submission of quotas four months within the following year the liquidity of the system is increased
because companies by this time have received quotas for the subsequent year. One quota equals the
right to emit one ton of CO2 equivalents in a given period. The system operates with phases; the
first is a trial period going from 2005-2007, i.e. before the commitment period under Kyoto. The
second phase runs from 2008-2012 (EU 2003/87/EC, Art. 11), see Table 5.
If a company does not have enough quotas to cover its emissions, it has to pay a penalty of 40 Euro
(app. 300 DKK) per ton CO2 in the period from 2005-2007 and 100 Euro (app.750 DKK) per ton
CO2 in the forthcoming periods. Importantly the payment of the penalty does not release the
company from surrendering the missing amount of quotas the following year (unlike in the Danish
ETS) (EU 2003/87/EC, Art 16). With penalties this high one should expect the system to prevent any
speculation in exceeding quotas.
One of the crucial questions of the emissions trading scheme concerns the allocation of quotas.
Each member state has to develop a national allocation plan (NAP) for every period "stating the
total quantity of allowances that it intends to allocate for that period and how it proposes to
allocate them " (EU 2003/87/EC, Art. 9). The deadlines for the submission of the NAPs appear from
Table 5. Both from an environmental and a company perspective the allocation is very important.
The Commission has developed 11 criteria, which the national plans have to comply with. The
criteria of the Directive have furthermore been specified in a guidance document from the
commission (EU COM (2003) 830 final). Two circumstances are of particular interest:
• The total amount of quotas handed out
• The method behind allocation to the different activities and individual installations
The directive states that in 2008-2012 the total quantity of quotas shall be consistent with the
Member State's Kyoto obligation according to the burden sharing agreement of the EU countries
(see EU 2002/358/EC), and prior to 2008, "shall be consistent with a path towards achieving or over-
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achieving each Member State's target under decision 2002/358/EC and the Kyoto Protocol" (EU
2003/87/EC, Annex III). According to the guidance document this "path is intended to be a trend line,
not necessarily a straight one, but one that is leading towards or goes beyond the reductions and
limitations called for by the Kyoto Protocol and Decision 2002/3'58/EC" (EU COM (2003) 830 final, p.
5) From an environmental point of view it is important that the activities covered by the scheme do
not obtain disproportionately large amount of quotas. This would increase the pressure for finding
reductions within activities not covered by the scheme and could potentially cause countries to
abandon the fulfilment of their Kyoto Protocol commitments. Therefore the Directive states that the
allocation of quotas should be "taking into account [...] the proportion of overall emissions that
these allowances represent in comparison with emissions from sources not covered by this
Directive" (EU 2003/87/EC, Annex III).
The other significant aspect concerns the method behind the allocation for the individual
installations. The directive states that at least 95 % of the quotas should be allocated for free in the
first period and 90 % free of charge in the second period, 2008-2012 (2003/87/EC, Art. 10). The
framework set up by the directive opens up for many possible methods for allocation, which could
highly impact economic conditions and to some extent investment incentives for existing and new
companies.
The allocation methods involve among others grandfathering where allocations are provided to
sources based upon historical information, or updating where allocation is based upon information
updated over time. Then again within these two categories the choice can be made between three
metrics for allocations: 1) input-based 2) output-based and 3) emission-based (Harrison and Radov,
2002: 2). Input could for instance be fuel, output could be electricity and emissions tons of CO?.
In the following sections I will go more into detail with the implications of applying the different
methods of allocation, and the Danish NAP will be dealt with in chapter 4.7.
EU 1. phase
EU 2. phase
(+Kyoto)
Review of EU ETS
2004
NAP
2005 2006
NAP
X
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Table 5: Overall time schedule of the EU emissions trading scheme. The deadline for the submission of the NAP was the
31s' of March 2004 (1st of May for the new member states) for phase 1 and 18 months before the start up of phase 2 (30th
of June 2006)(EU 2003/87/EC: Art. 11)(own table)
In July 2003 the Commission made a proposal for a directive concerning the linking of the project
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol with the EU emissions trading scheme. The new linking
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directives, which was agreed on the 20th of April 2004, allows for project credits (Certified
Emissions Reductions, CERs, from CDM-projects and Emissions Reductions Units, ERUs, from JI-
projects) to be converted to quotas to be used in the EU emission trading system. CDM credits from
2005 and JI credits from 2008. This so-called Link Directive build on the principles of the Kyoto
Protocol and the project rules approved by this system. It has been decided however that the Kyoto
Protocol does not have to enter into force for CER and ERU credits to be valid in the EU scheme
(European Parliament, 2004).
Some analysts see that decoupling of the EU scheme from the Kyoto process, could open up for two
parallel climate process alternatives for the future: 1) The traditional top-down Kyoto Process
which is dependent on the Kyoto Protocol entering into force and 2) a so-called bottom-up climate
process, where the EU systems grows horizontally, joining forces with similar systems in Japan,
Canada and perhaps US states (Baltrel, 2004a: 28).
A major topic of the discussion with regard to the linking directive has been how to handle the
supplementary principle of the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords. A 8 % limit of credits
to the total number of quotas was originally proposed by the Commission (EU COM(2003) 403), but
according to the final linking directive it is left with the member states to take account of the
supplementary principle through their NAPs (European Parliament, 2004).
4.2 The theoretical argument for applying emissions trading
The economic, theoretical argument for the use of emission trading is that the emission of GHG is a
cost to society, an "environmental externality", which ought to be given a monetary value.
Economic theory says that external costs occur when A) an activity by an agent causes a loss of
welfare to another agent and B) this loss of welfare is not compensated for. If the loss of welfare is
compensated for, the effect is said to be internalised. According to economics there exists an
optimal of externality, i.e. an optimal level of pollution. The optimal level of pollution occurs where
marginal benefits of pollution (e.g. the benefit of low cost electricity from a coal power plant) equal
marginal external costs (e.g. costs stemming from flooding due to climate change, which was
triggered by the CO2 emitted from among others coal power plants). And therefore society should
according to economics aim at maximising the sum of benefits minus the sum of costs (Pearce and
Turner, 1990: 61-62).
4.2.1 The Coase theorem
R.H. Coase (Coase, 198845) has argued that the market should in principle be able to approach this
social optimum it-self. His argument is that if property rights are well-defined, the polluter and the
sufferer would have an incentive to bargain towards the optimal solution (i.e. the sufferer of
pollution would pay the polluter to decrease his pollution if the polluter had the property right, or if
45
 Reprint of the article "The Problem of Social Cost" in "The Journal of Law and Economics 3" from October 1960 (p.
1-44).
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the sufferer had the property right, the polluter would compensate the sufferer to be able to pollute).
According to Coase; "Iffactors of production are thought of as rights, it becomes easier to
understand that the right to do something which has a harmful effect (such as the creation of smoke,
noise, smells etc.) is also a factor of production. Just as we may use a piece of land in such a way as
to prevent someone else from crossing it, or parking his car, or building his house upon it, so we
may use it in such a way as to deny him a view or quiet or unpolluted air" (Coase, 1988:155).
Corrective measures (i.e. state intervention) should according to Coase be approached very
carefully, "Analysis in terms of divergences between private and social products concentrates
attention on particular deficiencies in the system and tends to nourish the belief that any measure
which will remove the deficiency is necessarily desirable. It diverts attention from those other
changes in the system, which are inevitably associated with the corrective measure, changes which
may well produce more harm than the original deficiency" (Coase, 1988: 153). The production of
"more harm" refers to the problem of devising "practical arrangements which will correct defects
in one part of the system without causing more serious harm in other parts" (Coase, 1988: 142). For
instance a too low or too high tax on pollution could cause economic distortions.
Coase' argument for a bargaining solution seems to be inspired by a juridical approach to the
problem, and his arguments for negotiations between polluter and sufferer also relate to a wide
range of court decisions .
This so-called "Coase theorem", which should in principle remove the demand for government
regulation of pollution, has nevertheless been criticised from many sides. The main point of
criticism is the lack of many observations of such bargains taking place. This suggests "that there
are either obstacles to them, or that the Coase theorem is not rooted in real-world economics "
(Pearce and Turner 1990: 74). High transaction costs associated with the bargaining process could be
one of the reasons why such bargains do not occur very often. Let alone the necessary organisation
of the bargaining parties.
The transaction cost problem I think is a strong argument against self-regulation, because often it
may be so that government intervention is cheaper, and therefore a favourable way of dealing with a
problem (and this seems obvious in relation to the GHG problem, which has global effects).
Furthermore, when pollution affects many parties, the bargaining requires a cooperative approach
from the suffering part, but from the individual point of view there "will be a temptation to 'break
ranks' and seek maximum private gain" Questions arise such as: How should free-riding be
avoided? And who should bargain on behalf of future generations? (Pearce and Turner, 1990: 77).
46 R.H. Coase has been associated with the University of Chicago Law School.
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Therefore regulation of the market is required, I think. In relation to the emissions of GHG the two
market instruments which have attained most attention so far are GHG taxes and tradable permit
systems (OECD, 1993: 8), but other approaches could also be used to solve the general pollution
problem, such as standards for products and machines, subsidies or tax benefits for environmentally
friendly products or technologies etc.
4.2.2 Introducing emissions trading
The idea of trading pollution rights was introduced by Dales in 1968, with inspiration from, among
others, the property rights discussion introduced by Coase in 1960 (Dales, 2002:93,110). Applying
Coase' thoughts to climate change, the emissions of CO2 uses the service of the public good, the
atmosphere. There is no property right over the atmosphere, and therefore no opportunity for people
to demand for it to be left alone. The point is that, as with the property right of ground, polluters
needs permission from the owner to pollute, which usually requires extra payment (Chichilnisky and
Heal, 1995: lOff). By issuing quotas a central authority can introduce this right.
In short, emission trading begins with a limit or cap on total emissions and translates "allowed
emissions" into permits/quotas and then creates a market in which the quotas can be traded (IEA and
OECD, 2001:24ff; OECD, 1993:14). Theory suggests that a trade takes place when a source faces higher
marginal costs in reducing its emissions than another source. The one who faces the least costs
should be willing to reduce its emissions below its own limit in order to generate permits for sale.
The greater the difference in the marginal costs of reduction among agents, the higher should the
benefit of a trading system be (IEA and OECD, 200l:25ff).
4.2.3 Emissions trading vs. pollution taxes
Applying emissions trading and pollution taxes (suggested by A.C. Pigou already in 1920 according to Coase,
1988:133) are equivalent in many regards. Both taxes and emissions trading end up with a monetary
value on emitting GHG to the atmosphere thereby informing responsible agents of the
consequences of their actions. There are however also distinct differences between the two systems,
which will be elaborated on in the following.
An advantage of the emissions trading approach compared to employing a tax is that by using a
well-designed emission trading system the total amount of pollution is ensured at a certain level.
This property of emissions trading schemes make them particularly attractive for policy makers,
because it enables them to "fix" pollution at a certain level, where some physical threshold value is
not exceeded (for instance to limit GHG emissions at a level, which can be expected to maintain the
global temperature level at no more than 2 degrees above pre-industrial level - as proposed by the
EU)47. Furthermore since the Kyoto Protocol dictates an ETS with GHG caps for countries and
If prices on quotas in an ETS become intolerably high this can of course turn into a political issue as well - and in the
end result in a redefinition of the system, including e.g. a higher cap.
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options for trading emissions, a company based ETS would fall in line with this (as capping
companies' emissions would help ensure the compliance of the individual countries).
The cost of reducing emissions is on the other hand settled by the market for quotas, which makes it
more difficult for companies to plan ahead under an emissions trading scheme than under a tax
scheme48.
These basic differences are depicted in the table below:
Emissions trading scheme Pollution Tax
Pollution amount
Pollution cost
Fixed
Variable
Variable
Fixed
Table 6: Emissions trading vs. pollution tax (own table)
In principle an ETS furthermore has the advantage of avoiding what is termed technological "lock
in". Using a tax system there is a risk that the authority uses a too low charge, so that polluters
prefer to pay the charge rather than investing in abatement equipment. This is particularly a problem
if abatement expenditures are lumpy (which they tend to be) and companies do not have assurance
about the future tax level (Pearce and Turner, 1990:115). Under an ETS low investment levels should
force the price on quotas up and thereby create the necessary incentive for investments. In the EU
ETS it is likely though that JI/CDM credits or cheap quotas from Russia will determine the price of
quotas in the EU. This could lead to a technological lock-in in the EU if it is cheaper to buy quotas
outside the EU. If the flexible mechanisms are working properly, this should however result in
technological change in the selling countries instead.
Furthermore in an ETS, pollution can be kept at the same level even when new entrants enter an
emissions trading scheme or if existing companies expand their production. The requirement is of
course that no more pollution permits are handed out than before the production expansion. In a tax
system on the other hand, increased production would most likely result in additional emissions
(Pearce and Turner, 1990: 113).
An important point to make in relation to both emissions trading schemes and taxes is that none of
the means guarantee the compensation of sufferers (agent A compensating agent B), which as
mentioned, is a requirement for externalities to be properly internalised. Coase also noticed this
with regard to taxes: "As it is not proposed that the proceeds of the tax should be paid to those
suffering the damage, this solution is not the same as that which would force a business to pay
compensation to those damaged by its actions, although economists generally do not seem to have
noticed this... " (Coase, 1988: 151). For compensation to take place between agents it would be
48
 Since CO2 taxes are politically determined, these may of course also be changed and therefore also contain elements
of uncertainty.
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necessary to distribute the collected means between the suffering agents - which would be a quite
complex task in connection with an environmental problem like global warming. Whether the ETS,
like a tax scheme would provide an income for a regulating authority, which could distribute the
collected funds, would dependant on whether quotas are allocated for free to installations (no
income) or auctioned (income).
In chapter 4.7 the distributional effects of the emissions trading scheme will be examined.
4.2.4 From theory to practice
The economic theory on emissions trading builds on a number of assumptions. The questions are
whether the assumptions are correct and whether agents behave as theory suggests?
The theory of emission trading implies a perfect market with full knowledge and the inclusion of all
GHGs and sectors. This is not the case today with the EU scheme as it only operates with CO2
currently and not all sectors are included. It is unlikely all sectors ever will be, due to among others
things transaction costs and the availability of monitoring systems (IEA and OECD, 2001:46). A
problem in this regard could for example arise if production was increased significantly on small
inefficient power plants on behalf of large power plants, because the small plants are exempted
from the ETS. The solution, as it is recognized in the EU Commission's Green Paper on Emissions
Trading, would be to introduce other measures if such loopholes are exploited in an unsuitable
way 4 9 (EU COM (2000)87: 13).
The price of the CO2 quotas is to be set by the bundling of the supply and demand for quotas. A
trade should take place when a source faces higher costs in reducing its emissions than another. The
point is that all sources should consequently aim for a reduction strategy that results in a marginal
cost equal to the permit price (IEA and OECD, 2001: 25ff). This assumes that market agents
(companies) calculate their cost of abating CO?. Since the scheme covers relatively large plants it is
probably reasonable to assume that market agents are well informed about the options for reducing
emissions within their scope of action. This assumption was confirmed in an interview with
Flemming Nissen, head of Elsam's development department, who verified that such analyses are
standard for Elsam (Appendix A).
Another factor, which might affect the "rational behaviour" of market agents, is uncertainty. The
agents need to have confidence in the system. If the companies fear amendments of the system or
more restrictive demands from regulatory authorities distrust to the market could develop. The
uncertainty element of future CO2 costs is particularly important with regards to decisions on
building new power plants because of their long technical lifetimes. In this regard it is a problem
49
 This could be carbon taxes on the fuel for small plants, or the introduction of emission standards. The effect of
exempting e.g. small-scale power technologies from the scheme may however not necessarily be negative if this
increases the competitiveness of e.g. small-scale CHP technologies.
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that the Kyoto Protocol does not set targets beyond 2012, and furthermore that the NAP's only look
3/5 years ahead. For comparison the record of existing Danish power plants shows that many plant
30 to 40 year old are still operating (Energistyrelsen, 2003h, see also Figure 41, p. 110). If investors do not
believe in the long-term viability of the scheme this may lead to investments, which are not in the
interest of the society. This is however a general "problem" with allocating powers to the markets,
and the situation would be similar with pollution taxes (which may also be changed).
The uncertainty element, as I see it, makes up the biggest problem of relying on the scheme as a
long term means for GHG reductions.
4.3 The market for quotas
The market size of the EU ETS is important because the extent to which the companies of the EU
are given access to the global market for CO2 quotas is expected to highly influence the cost of
quotas. On the EU level around 38 % of total GHG emissions will, as mentioned, be covered by the
scheme °. The major element of uncertainty, regarding market size, concerns to which degree it will
be possibly to trade with countries and companies outside the EU emissions trading scheme.
The emissions trading directive (including the directive on linking with JI and CDM) opens up for
trade in two ways:
1) Through mutual recognition of allowances from emissions trading schemes of other
Annex B countries (EU 2003/87/EC: Art. 25).
2) Through the appliance of the project based mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, JI and
CDM (EU 2003/0173: Art. lla).
It is however still uncertain to what extent EU companies will be able to benefit from using JI and
CDM as this will be decided on in the individual NAPs. And similarly there is great uncertainty
whether emissions trading schemes in other (important) annex B countries like Russia will be
recognized.
Nevertheless the EU ETS will to some extent, with the adoption of the linking directive, be linked
to the international market for allowances, which will be described below.
4.3.1 The international market for quotas and credits
As previously mentioned the US and Australia do not intend to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and it is
still questionable, whether Russia will ratify. Looking at the US and Australia these two countries
together have obligations that imply considerable less quotas than their projected emissions in the
first Kyoto commitment period. This means that there would be a large demand for quotas with
their participation. Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union on the other hand have
M)
 But the total amount of emissions will not be solved before the final publication of national allocation plans for the
trading periods and the following endorsement of the European Commission
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obligations, which give them considerable larger amount of quotas than their projected emissions.
This excess in quotas is termed "hot air".
In a case where the US and Australia ratify Kyoto, there would be a large deficit in quotas, but this
scenario does not seem very likely. Projections show that in scenarios with low- and medium
economic growth in the Annex B countries, without the US and Australia but with the participation
of Russia, the sum of available quotas is larger than projected emissions. Only in a scenario with
high economic growth in the world economy the signatories to the Kyoto Protocol on a whole will
be short of quotas (Holtsmark and Alfsen, 2003: 33)5'. This circumstance could undermine the adequacy
of the international quota system to achieve actual reductions in the period 2008-12. The supply and
demand situation is illustrated in Figure 13 with data used in the connection with the Danish climate
strategy.
Demand Supply
EEU-15 BThe rest of OECD • Eastern Europe DThe US H Australia
Figure 13: Average deficiency of Annex B parties per annum in 2008-2012 (own figure based on data from
Miljøstyrelsen, 2003: 15-16). The figures only include CO2.
Figure 14 illustrates the global market for quotas and credits. During the Kyoto commitment period
the EU ETS involves allocating part of the member states' Assigned Amount Units (AAU's) to
companies52. This is illustrated in the figure by splitting the EU box into two parts, "government"
and "ETS". The AAU's are the international emission allowances, which annex B countries are
allocated in accordance with their commitments of the Kyoto Protocol (Finansministeriet, 2003: 73). As
the EU companies do not have access to trade with other countries' governments, their market is
The figures from Holtsmark and Alfsen are based on projections from the US department of energy's (DOE)
International Energy Outlook.
52
 In practice the companies are not allocated the AAU's, but EUA's (European Union Allowances). The member states
will store their AAU's, but every time a transaction takes place between two companies in different EU countries the
transaction of EUA will be tailed by a parallel transaction of AAU's between member states. The reason for this is that
in the end the member states are responsible for honouring their international commitments (Finansministeriet, 2003:
60).
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restricted compared to those of governments. Particularly the companies are restricted from the
Russian "hot air", which could provide the scheme with cheap reduction options. One of the
important questions, with regard to the cost of emission, is therefore whether we will see a
connection between the EU scheme and a similar emissions trading scheme for Russian companies.
Such an opening should be able to decrease market price in the EU scheme considerable.
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Figure 14: The market-links for JI/CDM and emissions trading (ET) between the potential major players in 2008-2012 in
the international market for greenhouse gases (likely links are shown by full-drawn lines, less likely links with dotted-lines
-unlikely links are not shown). US demand could either driven by ratification for the first Kyoto period 2008-2012 or by
companies demanding quotas to be used for possible later commitments (Finansministeriet et al., 2003: 96). ETS in US
states with high environmental profiles could also be a source of demand53 (own figure).
4.3.2 The cost of quotas
Analyses made for the EU's green paper on emissions trading indicate that the price of emissions
allowances would amount to app. 33 € (240 DKK) per ton CO2 in 2010 if European energy supply
companies and energy intensive industries were to find reductions by internal measures (EU COM
53
 In fact, according to the linking directive "Following entry of the Kyoto Protocol the Commission should examine
whether it could be possible to conclude agreements with countries listed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol, which have
yet to ratify it, to provide for the recognition of allowances between the Community scheme and mandatory greenhouse
gas emissions trading schemes capping absolute emissions established within those countries"(European Parliament,
2004)
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(2000)87: 27) (NB: the price is based on the EU-15; the enlargement is likely to lower the price). This
is a rather high cost compared to the expected cost on the global market54
Assuming Russian ratifications and the US and Australia staying out of the scheme for the first
period, a perfect market should in principle yield a CO2 market price of zero. This price however
only appears under the assumptions that:
• The major sellers do not exert market power55 and
• There will not be any further commitment periods
According to Springer and Varilek (2004, in Energy Policy) a CO2 quota cartel including Russia and
Ukraine is a very plausible scenario. Restricting their sale of quotas (often termed "banking")5
would enable them to raise prices and save excess quotas for a possible second commitment period.
Credits from CDM projects will have the effect of lowering the impact of banking by the former
Soviet Union, because extra supplies would be added to the market.
On the face of it, exertion of market power by the former Soviet states reduces the efficiency of the
emissions trading scheme - undermining the minimisation of the costs in the system. On the other
hand one might argue, that given the current conditions (the US and Australia out of the first
commitment period and Russia having plenty of hot air), the cartel formation, by raising prices,
contributes to ensuring that some reductions will take place in the first Kyoto commitment period.
In the longer perspective, as new international commitments are hopefully agreed on, this can also
help increasing the efficiency of the Kyoto scheme, since reductions are carried out more gradually.
For the purpose of the recent Danish climate strategy the consultants Copenhagen Economics have
analysed the cost of quotas on the international market for emissions trading in 2008-2012 period57.
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 240 DKK/ton is close to the cost of changing from coal to natural gas or biomass firing at existing plants (see
Appendix 3).
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 According to the IEA and O E C D (2001:88) two kinds of market power can be identified in relation to emissions
trading. First "capacity to influence the transaction price of traded permits ("cost minimising" or "profit maximising
manipulation"); and secondly "exclusionary manipulation " by which a commodity producer hoards permits to prevent
market entry by competitors''. The second form of market power is not relevant in an international emissions trading
scheme, but the first is (cf. the Russia/Ukraine ohgopoly) . Exertion of market power by companies in the E U E T S does
not seem very likely. With the inclusion of different sectors in the trading schemes the risk of "exclusionary
manipulation" should be reduced, since a new entrant would have the possibility to buy permits from other sectors than
its own (IEA and OECD, 2001:88). Furthermore the connection to JI and C D M reduces companies ' options for exerting
market power. Whether there are companies under the E U trading scheme with a dominant position on the market will
in the end depend on the concrete allocation of quotas to the companies.
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 Cartel formation among major selling countries is also expected by the largest Danish power producer Elsam,
according to Flemming Nissen, head of the department for development. (Appendix A).
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 For the Danish Environmental Agency.
55
Emissions trading and security of supply
Their basic analysis assumes that the US does not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and consider the
remaining countries as trading on one common CO2 market, i.e. no differentiation between the
market for EU companies and EU governments (Miljøstyrelsen, 2003: 33).
The starting point for the modelling of Copenhagen Economics is country based marginal
abatement cost (MAC) curves. It is recognized that there is a high degree of uncertainty associated
with these curves, which presumably represent the most uncertain factor in the analysis
(Finansministeriet et al., 2003: 97-98).
Beyond the uncertainty associated with the MAC curves three particular factors are expected to
influence the price of quotas, and these are estimated in the model by attaching different
probabilities to their outcome (so-called Monte Carlo simulation):
1) The supply of Russian quotas (i.e. the degree of banking)
2) The supply of CDM-projects
3) The US demand for quotas
(Finansministeriet et al., 2003: 96)
The Copenhagen Economics report concludes that the cost of quotas most likely will be in the range
of 20 - 80 DKK/ton CO2. If, however, the market for CDM is considerable less attractive than
expected (for instance due to high transaction costs) and Russia banks heavily the price could go up
to 130 DKK/ton. The study furthermore includes an overview of other modelling results according
CO
to which seven out of eight suggest a quota price below 100 DKK/ton . Including the demand from
the US in the analysis by Copenhagen Economics yields a price of app. 150 DKK/ton (-20 €/ton)
(Miljøstyrelsen, 2003: 36,38,43).
It is obvious from the above that there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the future price of
CO?. In addition to the three factors mentioned above and the uncertainty regarding the MAC-
curves comes the question if there will be one common market for EU allowances, international
emissions trading, JI and CDM. If the EU ETS cannot rely on trading with Russian companies I
think prices could probably end up somewhat higher than the above results of Copenhagen
Economics suggest.
A further element which will impact allowance prices are the national allocation plans in which EU
member states are to allocate quotas to their companies. A tight allocation will drive qutoa prices up
whereas as a more generous allocation should give lower prices. As previously mentioned these
plans are to be approved by the European commission. If a member state allocates generously to the
sectors encompassed by the ETS, the member states will have to make more reductions in other
sectors (transport, households, agriculture etc.) not part of the trading scheme, or through the
58 The last study yields a price of app. 260 DKK/ton (35 €7ton).
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flexible mechanisms. If the latter strategy is applied a generous allocation of allowance, will not
necessarily lead to lower allowance prices as governments would be entering the same market as
the incumbents of the ETS. Since CO2 reduction initiatives within transport and agriculture are
generally relatively costly (according to the Danish Government, see Finansministeriet, 2003: 81 or Figure 12)
compared with e.g. JI/CDM credits it is probable that governments will pursue international
reduction strategies.
I find it out of the scope of this project to enter a more thorough analysis of the accuracy of the
models used to predict the CO2 quota price, particular given the high impact of exogenous factors
on the final outcome (US ratification, Russian banking, linking of the EU ETS to other schemes, the
strictness of the CDM executive board in the approval of projects etc.).
In the rest of this project 100 DKK/ton is used as a best guess of the quota price for 2008-2012,
however bearing in mind that adding or subtracting 50 % from this figure is not at all unlikely. This
will be taken account of through sensitivity analyses. In the 2005-2007 period the carbon price is
likely to be at lower level since EU companies will (probably) be allocated allowances more
generously.
In Table 7 I have summarised some of the main parameters, which can be expected to impact on the
cost of allowances in the EU ETS in the first Kyoto commitment period.
Factors to decrease quota prices
If BAU emissions are lower than anticipated
(caused by e.g. low economic growth)
If member states put no or loose limits on
companies appliance of JI/CDM credits.
Linking with Russian, Ukrainian ETS
If countries in deficiency of quotas (i.e. the
EU) pursue domestic actions like RE and
energy savings (as this would lower demand
for quotas and thereby lower international
quota prices)
Factors to increase quota prices.
If BAU emissions are higher than anticipated
(caused by e.g. high economic growth)
• If approval procedures for Jl and CDM
projects are slow, strict and complex (high
transaction costs) or EU member states
handle the supplementary principle strictly.
• The US ratifies or Russia does not ratify as
expected
• Russian banking
Table 7: Factors to impact on the CO2 allowance price in 2008-2012 (own table)
According to the carbon market consulting company Point Carbon EUAs for the 2005-2007 period
are at this time (9th of September 2004) traded at price of app. 8.5 €/ton, i.e. 65 DKK/ton.
(www.pointcarbon.com/vvimages/Carbon Market Indicator 9 September 2004 l.pdf, 2004-09-15).
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4.4 The general impact of the ETS on the energy sector
This section examines the general impact of the EU ETS on the energy sector. Firstly the scheme's
emission reductions effects are elaborated on and secondly the impact of the emissions trading
scheme on the electricity market price will be assessed.
Analysing the impact on power prices of the ETS is important because this is generally how the
scheme gives incentives for optimising the energy chain through lower energy demand and
incentives to invest in low carbon technologies.
4.4.1 Emissions reduction effects of introducing emissions trading
In principle introducing emissions trading should interact positively to optimise all three main
emission reductions measures described in chapter 2.2, i.e. 1) Fuel switching, 2) Improvement of
the fuel utilization rate 3) Energy savings and efficiency.
The driver behind all three measures is the extra costs operators of CO2 emitting plants are imposed
and the corresponding increase in the power market price caused by the scheme (see the following
section). As the price on the power market increases less emitting technologies, like wind power,
will become relatively more attractive. The increased power prices will of course also benefit CO2
emitters, like coal power plants, but this effect will to some extent - depending on the specific
technology and fuel - be compensated by the increased costs for buying quotas. The total effect will
be an incentive to switch to fuels with lower carbon content (from coal to gas to wind etc.). In
section 4.5 I will closer analyse the fuel switch options.
As CO2 costs are added to fuel costs the ETS should also give incentives to improve the fuel
utilization rate of all fossil fired power plants - both through optimisation of the operation of
existing plants and with regard to new power plants. Furthermore the scheme should in principle
encourage CHP plants. Owners of heat only plants (or potential investors) should observe higher
electricity prices and thus find greater incentive to combine the production of heat and power.
Similarly it would become more attractive for investors in a new power plant to produce heat for a
district heating system as well59.
59
 Because district heating has not (yet) been liberalised and because the market is already encompassed by CO2
taxation of fuels the situation is however quite complex. A more thorough examination of emissions trading and CHP
will follow in chapter 4.6.
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Energy savings and efficiency measure should become more attractive as well because the cost of
final energy increases. Other things being equal higher prices would give an incentive to reduce
demand and invest in energy efficient end use technologies. Relatively the effect in Denmark will
be largest for the industrial customers, because consumer electricity prices are already high in
Denmark, app. 1.79 DKK/kWh due to among others energy and CO? taxes. For comparison the
final electricity price for large industrial customers was 0.49 DKK/ton in 2002 (incl. energy taxes,
excl. VAT - Value Added Tax) (energy prices from Energistyrelsen, 2003a: 40). A requirement for the
raised electricity prices to be an environmental benefit is of course that it does not result in a shift
towards more polluting energy sources, not covered by the scheme, or industrial production moving
to countries with a lower level of environmental regulation.
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Figure 15: Effects of an emissions trading scheme on the energy sector (own figure)
In Figure 151 have summarised the general effects on the energy sector of introducing emissions
trading, i.e. how the introduction of permits affects the marginal costs of fossil fuel plants (FF),
causing higher heat and electricity prices and this way benefiting renewable energy and low carbon
technologies. Also increased heat and electricity prices makes CHP plants more profitable.
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4.4.2 The impact of C02-quotas on the cost of power
The cost of producing electricity (and heat) traditionally depends on three basic parameters: fuel
costs, operating and maintenance costs (variable and fixed), and fixed capital costs (see Figure 16).
Many power markets, including the Nordic, rely on a day-ahead auction (-spot market) where
generators submit individual bids of quantity and price and these together with consumers' demand
determine the market price60. The market supply curve is found by summing the individual plants'
supply curves horizontally - this means ranking the individual generators by their marginal cost.
The spot price is therefore determined by the marginal supplier61 (IEA, 2003:17).
Assuming perfect competition power plants will bid at a price corresponding to their short run
marginal cost (SRMC). The SRMC is basically the cost of producing one extra unit - for a power
plant this means fuel costs and variable operating and maintenance costs. If companies bid above
their marginal cost they risk not producing at all, because the market price is settled below their bid
price - and thereby they miss a potential income (see chapter 6.3, on how companies get their long
run marginal cost (LRMC) covered in the market).
[ Fuel costs (incl. CO2 quotas)
SRMC -S
Variable operating and maintenance costs
W_ LRMC
Fixed operating and maintenance costs
Fixed capital costs
Figure 16: The cost structure of power plants, SRMC (short run marginal costs) and LRMC (long run marginal costs)
(own figure).
By introducing a CO2 emissions trading scheme, the cost of CO2 quotas are added to the SRMC
cost, as the costs of quotas are directly related to the fuel input. It is important to note that this extra
cost should be added to the SRMC regardless of the amount of quotas handed out to the specific
plants. The reason for this is, that even if the plant has excess quotas, these quotas have a value
determined by the market for quotas. If power is not produced and no COi emitted the quotas could
otherwise be cashed for money62.
60
 Though trades can of course also take place through longer contracts, at the Nordic market Nordpool for instance via
the so-called Eltermin market. Beside Nordpool also includes the Elbas market, where trade can be made up to one hour
ahead (not implemented in Western Denmark), and a real time regulating power market.
61
 In the case of a lack of capacity in the market, the spot price could also be determined by a maximum spot price or a
consumer who is willing to refrain from consuming at a certain price level (demand response) (se chapter 6.3).
2
 The following assumes a well functioning liberalised market. If power prices are still regulated or the sector is not
sufficiently unbundled the effect of an emissions trading on power costs could be significantly different. If consumer
and producer have the same ownership the cost of power would (most likely) only be raised by the cost of buying
quotas beyond what is grandfathered to the company.
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The degree to which the cost of quotas will be passed onto the SRMC could however be minimised
if companies expect their future allocation of quotas to be impacted by their current level of
production or emissions. I will return to this "problem" in the end of this section.
Figure 17 shows a hypothetical merit order based on total installed European power capacity
(assuming identical SRMC within different categories of technologies and fuel). The pink line
shows the SRMC with no cost of carbon, the blue line the SRMC including carbon costs. The cost
increase per MWh is dependent on the fuel (emission factor), the utilization rate of the plant
(electric/heat efficiency) and the cost of CO2 (DKK/ton), which in this illustration is set at 20 €/ton
(150 DKK/ton). This is probably in the high end of expected CO2 prices (cf. chapter 4.3.2).
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Figure 17: European merit order and impact of a CO2 quota price of 20 € (150 DKK) per ton (IEA, 2003: 19)
In the above case coal and CCGT (natural gas) would change places in the merit order because CO2
cost are added to the SRMC.
To illustrate how the CO2 related costs have been deduced I have included Table 8, showing the
impact of electricity costs on four hypothetical plants at a carbon price of 100 DKK/ton CO2. For
reasons of simplicity I have assumed they are all condensing plants (producing only electricity),
implying that all CO2 related costs have to be borne by an increase in the cost of power.
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As indicated by Figure 17 and Table 8 particularly coal power will have its SRMC cost increased,
whereas this will be less pronounced for natural gas fired plants. Oil based peak power plants could
also see significant increases in SRMC costs assuming they have relatively low electric efficiency.
As the spot market price is determined by the SRMC of the marginal plant in each hour (or
whatever time interval the power exchange applies) it is the cost increase of the marginal plant,
which will determine the rise of the spot market price. One can see from Figure 17 that there would
be no price increase in hours where hydro, wind or nuclear plants determine the price, whereas the
increase is quite pronounced in hours where coal power is marginal.
It ought to be mentioned in this context that hydro power plants do not always bid into the market
on the basis of their marginal costs, but also on their opportunity cost. Hence if hydro facilities have
storage capacity and a limited energy resource available it would often be more profitable to bid at a
higher price than zero meaning for instance that they only produce in peak load hours (Interview w.
Peter Meibom, RISØ, Appendix F). And this bidding price is likely to be impacted (upwards) as the
marginal cost of competing fossil fired power plants increase.
Coal
GasCC
Gas engine
Oil
Table 8: The impact on the electricity cost assuming a CO2 quota price of 100 DKK/ton (own calculations).
The DEA has estimated that the average increase of electricity prices in Europe (EU-15 including
Norway) will be app. 40 DKK/MWh assuming a CO2 quota price of 100 DKK/MWh.
Unfortunately this result is based on the average carbon emission of European power plants (app.
370 kg/MWh) and not a marginal plants approach (Energistyrelsen, 2003f: 73-74). This leads to an
underestimation of the power price increase.
Elkraft System, the TSO of Eastern Denmark, has analysed the effect on a CO2 quota scheme on the
Nordic market. Based on a model (Balmorel) of the Nordic power system a price increase of app.
70 DKK/MWh is expected when a CO2 quota price of 100 DKK/ton is used (Elkraft System, 2003: 40).
This result takes into account that it is the emissions of the marginal plants (here app. 700 kg/MWh
on average), which decides the price increase. Taken into consideration that the Nordic electricity
system is highly dominated by hydropower (and nuclear power) (cf. Figure 40, p. 108) the increase in
spot market prices is likely to be more pronounced in the rest of Europe.
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As mentioned it has been speculated that the effect on the power price might be less than concluded
in the above. I believe that the arguments for this roughly can be divided into two groups. The first
has to do with the competition on the market and the other with the allocation of quotas.
Impact of competition on the price increase
Firstly it has been argued that fierce competition on the electricity market could cause power
producers to bid at prices lower than their SRMC in order to gain market shares. Regarding CO2
costs this could imply that only costs resulting from possible purchase of extra allowances beyond
what is grandfathered would be passed on to consumers (TEA, 2003: 28). Meaning in other words that
generators would only increase the cost of power by their average carbon emission cost instead of
increasing it by the opportunity cost of the grandfathered allowances. I do however not find this
argument very convincing, because the companies in this situation would make a greater profit from
not generating at all (by selling their surplus quotas)63.
If on the contrary we assume that market power is exerted today it means that the current spot prices
do not resemble the SRMC of the marginal plant, but instead some higher level, reflecting that
companies on purpose are bidding above their SRMC (i.e. lack of competition)64. If this is the case,
it is not justified to say that the spot price will increase corresponding to the rise in the SRMC of the
marginal plant. Instead prices would increase by some arbitrary level reflecting the companies'
options for exploiting the possibility of increasing power prices additionally65. This adds
uncertainty about the expected power price increase, but as I see it, it does not mean that the price
increase should with certainty be either higher or lower than originally expected.
All in all I do not find that the above arguments significantly alter the conclusion that power
generators should have incentives to raise power prices by the opportunity cost of the CO2-quotas.
Impact of allocation principles on the price increase
The second argument, concerning allocation of quotas, requires a more detailed explanation. The
problem originates from the fact that the EU emissions trading directive requires almost all quotas
to be allocated for free. As mentioned, if quotas cannot be auctioned, two methods of allocation are
generally available: Allocation based on grandfathering (i.e. historic figures) and allocation based
on updating over time (Harrison and Radov, 2002: 22). The EU directive does not state which principle
In certain situations one could imagine that it would be profitable for companies to bid below their short run marginal
costs, e.g. as a means to prevent new market players from establishing, but not in the long-run.
64
 This is not unlikely taken into consideration, that the Nordic market is dominated by large players (see for instance
Konkurrencestyrelsen, 2004 for description of the bidding strategies of Energi E2 and Elsam)
6s
 Another argument in this category concerns international competition, e.g. Russian and Ukrainian power plants
bidding at lower prices in the EU power markets because they are not constrained by CO2 costs. However as
international competition is limited by interconnection capacity the effect will probably not be very profound (IEA,
2003: 29)
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to apply (EU 2003/87EC, annex III). It is however not possible to update quotas within the 5-year-
phases (three in 2005-2007) because the amount of quotas for each installation is to be decided in
advance (EU 2003/87EC, art. 11).
For the companies, which take part in the trial period 2005-2007, it is on the other hand a highly
relevant question whether their production output (MWh-power, GJ-heat, cement-tonnes etc) or
emissions (CO2-tonnes) in this phase of the scheme will impact on their allocation in the period
running from 2008 to 2012 (and similarly for the following periods). This could either take place as
a deliberate use of the updating principle (though with some delay) or as a new grandfathering
process, where the new historic period corresponds to the trial period. The result will be the same.
Actually the Danish NAP for 2005-2007 allocates allowances to power generators based on their
electricity production in the historic period 1998-2002 (Miljøministeriet, 2004a: 23) in spite of the fact
that the power sector in three of these years (2000-2002) was covered by the national emissions
trading scheme. In retrospect, knowledge of the allocation principles for the upcoming EU scheme
could have changed (i.e. reduced) the incentives for the Danish power companies to cut down
production (and thereby emissions) in the 2000-2002 period. What appears like a grandfathering
approach has in reality elements of updating.
If the future Danish allocation, e.g. for the period 2008-2012, is still based on 1998-2002 figures it
would be a real grandfathering approach. This could on the other hand have some other negative
effects related to the distribution of quotas (=money). Take for instance a plant, which worked as a
base load power plant in the historic period but gradually has descended to peak load. Why should it
collect much more quotas than it needs for its operation? This imposes a risk that plants are kept
alive, although they are due for decommissioning, in order to be able to collect new quotas. These
absurdities speak in favour of some kind of updating (or alternatively auctioning of all quotas).
The effect of applying updated allocation will depend on the specific metric for allocation. If for
instance the owners of the previously analysed power plants (cf. Table 8) assumed they would be
given 0.5 extra quotas per MWh (corresponding to 500 kg/MWh) in the next trading period, it
would reduce their final cost for quotas by 50 DDK/MWh (cf. Table 9), simply because they could
anticipate an extra 0.5 quota worth 50 DDK each time production is increased by one MWh.66 The
cost of a CO2 quota is assumed to be 100 DKK in both periods.
66
 This analysis does not take into account that the value of the future quotas ought in principle to be discounted to
present day value. This would somewhat reduce the "updating effect". If on the other hand the cost of CO2 were
expected to increase over time it would be even more attractive to produce in the first place.
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Coal
GasCC
Gas engine
Oil
Table 9: Effects of "updating" on the CO2 quota induced power price increases (COs price: 100 DKK/ton, expected extra
quotas per MWh: 0.5)(own calculations).
It appears from Table 9 that the result of applying some kind of updating would be lower electricity
market prices than by the use of a strict grandfathering allocation. On the conditions applied in
Table 9 updating could even lower the SRMC of an efficient gas power plant (gas CC) compared to
a situation with no ETS.
If market players act in the assumption of updating this would lead to lower power price increases
and thereby a less efficient ETS, which would tend to encourage reductions through low carbon
fossil fuel technologies and the flexible mechanisms - on behalf of renewable energy and energy
savings. The updating effect could, however, be somewhat diminished in a small country like
Denmark with only two major producers, Energi E2 and Elsam (perhaps on the point of a merger).
With one fixed pool of quotas for the Danish power sector the advantage of increasing production
from one power plant in order to gain more quotas in the following period would be less if these
quotas were in principle taken from the common Danish pool (i.e. from another plant owned by the
same company)67. Particularly in countries with many competing companies updating could
however be a real problem, I think.
A simple way to approach the problem with updating could be to allocate quotas to renewable
energy plants as well, based on their power production68. This would level the playing field for
technologies as RE technologies this way could acquire an income that corresponded to the lower
power market prices which updating would induce. This way of allocating quotas will however not
solve the problem that electricity prices will not be raised by the scheme.
4.5 Fuel switch
Fuel switch in the power sector can be induced by the emissions trading scheme through changed
dispatching and fuel use at existing power plants (short term perspective) and through changed
The Danish allocation plan is based on a bottom-up approach. Quotas have first been allocated to heat production and
industry, and the residual amount has been given to the power sector (Miljøministeriet, 2004a: 21).
The directive (EU 2003/87/EC) is aimed at activities emitting greenhouse gases, but according to article 24 individual
member states may from 2008 extend it to additional activities. While not explicitly stated I suppose these activities
could include RE plants though this is obviously not the intention of the directive.
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investment conditions (long term perspective). Since the reduction of GHG emissions is a long
term-term issue the most interesting, and the focus of this section, is the changed investment
conditions. In this regard I will also show light on the consequences of the liberalization on
investment decisions.
In Appendix 3 I have enclosed a preliminary estimation of possible fuel changes at existing plants.
The conclusion is that we are not likely to see any dramatic changes in the generation patterns (nor
fuel switch) at existing plants unless CO2 quota prices or fuel prices (e.g. the gas price) develop
unexpectedly.
4.5.1 Changed investment conditions
Economic theory tells that investments in a liberalised power market should take place when the
(wholesale) price of power exceeds the long run marginal cost of producing power from a new
power plant (IEA, 2003: 33). From an investor point of view many uncertainties are to be faced when
considering investing in a new plant: How will fuel prices develop? Heat prices? CO2 costs (and
other environmental costs)? And most importantly, how will the power price develop over time?
In the previous non-profit system the guaranteed market for power, and the pre-paid power plants
provided a very high degree of security for the economy of new plants. Investors in the liberalised
market on the other hand are faced with the risk that e.g. power or fuel prices develop in a way,
which make their investments uncompetitive. As a consequence it can be assumed that the risk
associated with investments will urge investors to require higher risk premiums than in the previous
regime. This could for instance manifest it self in a demand for higher rates of return, when the
feasibility of different investments are analysed (Elkraft System, 2003b: 35-36) - thus giving preference
to technologies with low capital costs where fewer resources are risked. The many elements of
uncertainty could also, as I will go more into detail with in chapter 6, give reason to believe that
investments may not be made in due time to ensure the security of power supply
The focus here is to examine which technologies are the most attractive to invest in when/if
investments will take place. This will be done through a two stringed approach. First by some
simple calculations of LRMC of different technologies under different CO2 quota prices, next by
reporting analyses and modelling on the subject made by Elkraft System and BEA.
Analysis of LRMC of power producing technologies
I have elected five technologies for comparison of their LRMC under different assumptions: An
advanced coal power plant, a combined cycle gas turbine plant, a small scale biomass cogeneration
steam turbine plant using wood and two types of wind turbines (off- and onshore). The three RE
plants represent the most cost efficient plant available today. Other more sophisticated technologies
such as biomass gasification plants, fuel cells, photovoltaic cells, wave power etc, have not been
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included in this analysis because they are not (yet) competitive. Data on investment costs, power
and heat efficiency, operation and maintenance costs (fixed and variable) from the selected
technologies is acquired from the DEA and the TSO's catalogue on technology data for power
plants (best available technology commissioned in 2004) (DEA et al., 2004).
Electric capacity (MW)
Capital cost (1000-DKK/MW)
Fixed O&M Cost (1000-DKK/MW)
Variable O&M costs (DKK/MWh)
Technical lifetime (years)
Total theoretical efficiency (CHP
mode)69
Electric efficiency (condensing mode)
Total average efficiency (CHP mode)
Electric efficiency70,
(CHP mode - total avr. Eff.)
Annual production (MWh/MW)71
Fuel price (DKK/GJ) - reference
Coal
400
8,250
150
15
30
93%
48%
70%
45%
6,000
12.5
Gas CCGT
100-400
3,938
105
11
30
89%
56%
70%
54%
6,000
30
Biomass
(wood)
5-10
22,875
457.5
53
20
105%
25%
85%
25%
6,000
33
Wind-
onshore
1.5
6,188
0
67
20
100%
2,400
Wind - off-
shore
2-3
12,000
49 (DKK/MWh)
49
20
100%
3,900
Table 10: Data on selected technologies for comparison of LRMC (Data on total average efficiencies are estimated,
Fuels prices are estimated using rounded off figures from Elkraft System'2(Elkraft System 2003b: 69), all other data from
73the DEA catalogue energy technology data (DEA et ah, 2004))
-74 .The comparison relies on many variables and elements of uncertainty. How these are handled is
described below. A reference analysis will be made and the significance of some of the most
important parameters will be examined by the use of sensitivity analyses (see below).
Rate of return. 10 % is used as the reference for the rate of return investors on the power
market would require. Furthermore rates of 5 % and 20 % will be examined on through
additional sensitivity analyses. The 5 % rate I believe is representative of a rate of return applied
in the previous non-profit regime. A discount rate of 5 % is for instance recommended for EU
69
 The reason why the total efficiency of the biomass plant may theoretically exceed 100 % is because the plant runs in
condensation mode meaning that it is capable of regaining the energy from the moisture in the fuel, when it is vaporized
during combustion. The net calorific value does not take account of this.
70
 Electric average efficiencies have been deduced from the estimated total average efficiencies of the plants and
information about their Cv - coefficients from the DEA catalogue on energy technologies.
71
 Corresponding to the number of full-load hours.
72
 The fossil fuel prices have their basis in IEA projections. In addition they take into consideration fuel transport costs.
73
 Prices in € have been converted DKK using the following exchange rate: 1 € = 7.5 DKK.
The different technologies are here compared by their levelised cost. It should be mentioned that more advanced
financial techniques are available to help quantify the many risks that investors face (particularly on a liberalised
market). Investments in peak power plants for instance would require a different approach taking into account the
expected occurrence of price spikes in the market (see OECD/IEA 2003: 34-37).
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co-financed energy projects (European Commission75: 35), whereas a 20 % rate of return is not an
unlikely requirement by investors in a very risky market (cf. e.g. Elkraft System 2003b: 36)76.
Fuel price. Fuel prices are estimated using rounded off figures from Elkraft System77 (Elkraft
System, 2003b: 69). However because fuel costs make up a very large share of total costs for
natural gas fired plants, and gas prices have proved to be quite volatile (see e.g. IEA, 2003: 22) I
have found it of relevance to examine on two alternative cases of natural gas prices through a
sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity analysis will include a high and a low case where 50 % has
been either subtracted or added to the reference price of natural gas.
Annual production: 6,000 full-load hours per year is assumed for combustion plants, 2,400 for
onshore wind power plant and 3,900 for the off-shore wind power plant (the latter two based on the
DEA catalogue on energy technologies, DEA et al. 2004). The number of full-load hours for wind power
plants is of course site dependent - similarly the number of full-load hours for thermal plants
will depend on the marketing conditions for power (the development in market prices).
Heat market. It is assumed that the small-scale biomass plant is designed to serve a heating
market, whereas the two larger thermal plants are built with the primary aim of producing
power. Therefore it is estimated that the small plant over the year has a total average efficiency
of 85 % whereas the large plants only have total efficiencies of 70 %. It is assumed that
investors expect the 125 % heat efficiency method to be used to distribute fuel and CO2 costs
between heat and power . A sensitivity analysis is made of the LRMC with the plants running
either in full CHP mode or in condensing mode.
Cost of CO2 quotas. The cost of CO2 quotas will be the variable parameter in all the analyses
(0-300 DKK/ton will be illustrated).
75
 EU, DG Regional Policy: Guide to cost-benefit analysis of investment projects (no publication year stated). The
Danish Ministry of Finance recommends a "calculation rent" of 6 % when economic estimations are made of public
initiatives (Finansministeriet, 1999: 36)
76
 If consumer ownership solutions become prevalent this may reduce the risk premium of new investments as investors
provide their own "market" thereby benefiting investments with high initial costs. For consumers investments in
generation capacity can be seen as a price hedging. As previously mentioned consumer ownership has been a driver for
the recently decided Finnish nuclear power plant, and could potentially become a driver for investments in wind power
plants, which share this cost structure.
77
 The fossil fuel pr ices have their basis in I E A projections. In addit ion they take into account fuel t ransport costs.
78
 Since the marke t for heat has not been l iberalised the power generator may only charge consumers wi th the necessary
costs for heat product ion , i.e. the genera tor may not make a profit on heat consumers . T h e pr ices have to be approved by
the Energy Regula tory Authori ty (Energistyrelsen & Konkurrencestyrelsen, 2004: 10). In reality the principles for
defining the cost of heat are settled in negotiation between heat consumers and power companies, according to Lars
Gullev, VEKS (Appendix D). Other basis for distribution could therefore have been used. The 125 % heat efficiency
method is used for tax purposes at small Danish power plants to allocate fuel between heat and power. At larger plants
more plant specific methods are used to allocate costs between heat and power. (Interview with Lars Gullev, VEKS.
Appendix D). For environmental statements the DEA recommends 200 % heat efficiency method (see www.elkraft-
system.dk, 2004-07-20). Alternatively the heat sale could have been accounted for by estimating a fixed price for the
heat (DKK/GJ) - district-heating prices do however vary much depending on the specific district heating area.
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Depreciation period. A depreciation time of 20 years is chosen for all plants, based on the
79assumption that this is the maximum time frame of investors
Other environmental costs. For simplicity other environmental costs are not included.
The calculations will be made without including the current subsidies for renewable energy power
plants. A discussion of the impact of including these is made in the end.
Reference analysis
Figure 18 shows the LRMC of the five selected technologies under the reference conditions. It
appears the combined cycle gas turbine plant is the most competitive of the technologies without
CO2 costs and only with CO2 costs above 280 DKK/ton does wind power become more
competitive. Coal is very close to being competitive with gas without including CO2 cost, but at
higher CO2 prices coal becomes increasingly costly - at app. 140 DKK/ton on-shore wind power is
more competitive than coal. The biomass plant has significantly higher LRMC than any of the other
technologies. This is due to several circumstances: low electric efficiency, relatively high fuel
prices and high capital costs. Offshore wind power is more expensive than on-shore wind power -
primarily because of higher capital costs. In Figure 19 the composition of the LRMC are specified
on capital, fuel, O&M and CO2 costs using reference conditions.
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Figure 18: Reference analysis of LRMC under an ETS (own figure, see Appendix H)
Judged by the reference analysis the gas power plant is without question the most attractive
technology to invest in, as it stays most competitive in the very large CO2 quota price interval from
0 to app. 280 DKK/ton.
79
 Note that the technical lifetime of the larger power plants is app. 30 years. It should be noted that changing the
depreciation times so they match the lifetime of the plants does not appreciably change the results (the gas and coal
power plants become slightly more competitive, see Figure 48 in Appendix 4).
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Coal GasCC
• Capital cost BO&M cost - ref BFuel cost - rel BC02 cost -100 DKK/ton
Figure 19: The composition of the SRMC of the different technologies using the reference factors and 100 DKK/ton as
the CO2 quota price (own figure, see Appendix H).
Sensitivity analysis assuming a 5 % rate of return
If the internal rate of return is changed to 5 % (see Figure 20) the situation changes significantly.
The LRMC of all plants are lowered but it is of particular benefit to the plants with high capital
costs. On these conditions the coal power plant becomes the most competitive technology in the
interval from 0 - 7 0 DKK/ton, after which wind power becomes the most competitive technology.
At app. 80 DKK/ton the gas power plant has lower LRMC than the coal power plant.
150
CO2 quota price [DKK/ton]
-Coal « ™ Gas CC • —Wind - onshore ^"""Wind - off-shore
Figure 20: Sensitivity analysis (5 % rate of return) of LRMC under an ETS (own figure, see Appendix H)
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Sensitivity analysis assuming a 20 % rate of return
Similarly applying a discount rate of 20 % raises the LRMC of all technologies - particularly
technologies with high capital costs - thereby benefiting the competitiveness of the combined cycle
gas turbine plant (see Figure 21). On this condition the gas-fired plant has the lowest LRMC of all
plants in the CO2 quota price interval up to 300 DKK/ton, thus indicating that this would be the
preferred technology in a risky market. The wind turbines are far from being competitive under
these assumptions.
150
CO2 quota price [DKK/ton]
Coal **—GasCC • Biomass Wind - onshore——Wind - off-shore]
Figure 21: Sensitivity analysis (20 % rate of return) of LRMC under an ETS (own figure, see Appendix H)
Sensitivity analysis with alternative gas fuel prices
Figure 22 explores the consequences of alternative gas prices (the yellow line indicating high gas
price, 45 DKK/GJ and the red line low gas prices, 15 DKK/GJ). It appears that the high gas price
level will significantly deteriorate the competitiveness of the gas technology- causing coal to be the
most economic alternative in the CO2 price interval up to 150 DKK/MWh.
Uncertainty about gas fuel prices increases the risks of investing in a gas fired plant. It can however
be expected that a high gas price level would also lead to higher electricity market prices, because
the gas power plants would become the marginal plants. The assumption here is that the market
needs the gas fired plants to satisfy demand. If the market is in excess of e.g. coal power capacity
increasing gas prices may simply cause the gas power plants to become uncompetitive. Analyses
have however shown a strong correlation between gas and power prices80 (OECD/IEA, 2003: 39, see
also Swisher et al, 1997: 79).
According to an IEA study it is, based on analysis of gas and power spot prices in the 1998-2002 period, reasonable
to assume a positive correlation coefficient of 0.88 (OECD/IEA, 2003: 39)
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Therefore though rising gas prices may pose a significant risk to consumer prices, the risk may not
be as serious from an investor point of view. Low gas prices can on the other hand be a risk to e.g.
renewable energy technologies, which are dependent on a certain power price level.
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Figure 22: Sensitivity analysis (alternative gas fuel prices) of LRMC under an ETS (own figure, see Appendix H).
Sensitivity analysis (heat market) of LRMC under an ETS
To examine on the advantage of co-producing heat and power Figure 23 has been included. Two
situations are explored, a situation where plants run in condensing mode and one where they can
produce to the full of their heat capacity. It appears from Figure 23 that it is a clear benefit to have a
heat market - and the benefit increases with increasing CO2 prices. Particular the biomass plant is
dependent of a heat market, because of its low electric and high total efficiencies.
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Figure 23: Sensitivity analysis (heat market) of'LRMC under an ETS (own figure, see Appendix H)
Summary on LRMC calculations
Judged by the above calculations the CC gas turbine technology would seem like the preferred
option for potential investors in the power market. It is the most competitive technology in the
reference scenario within the likely CO2 quota price interval of 50-150 DKK/ton, and it requires
less capital at stake than any of the other technologies. In a highly risky market its advantages
become even more evident. Only if a low rate of return is applied or fuel prices changes
significantly other technologies become competitive. At a 5 % rate of return a combination of coal
and wind power could become an alternative to a gas fired plant in the above-mentioned CO2 quota
price interval. This underlines the differences of the choice of technology in the liberalised market
and in the previous non-profit system where a 5 % rate of return would have been a likely rate to
apply. As recognized at the EU level, the internal market for electricity has improved the efficiency
of the electricity system, but "it has made investments which require large capital input or which
have long pay back periods less attractive" (Commission Européenne, 2000: 21)81.
The impact of other subsidies - is it profitable to invest in wind power?
The comparisons above do not take into consideration that in the Danish system new renewable
plants receive a 100 DKK/MWh subsidy and wind power plants additionally 120 DKK/MWh if
decommissioning certificates are available (limited to 350 MW of new capacity, c.f. L 236 B: §56d).
With these subsidies wind power would become competitive with coal and gas and more so in the
reference analysis even without including any cost of emitting CO2. Whether the 100 DKK/MWh
subsidy in it self is sufficient to drive new wind power plants is more uncertain and will depend on
among others investors risk perceptions. On reference conditions the 100 DKK/MWh subsidy
When companies, as it is the case in a liberalised power market, have no certainty about future sales they will be more
likely to prefer technologies with low capital costs, because the risk associated with this type of investment is lower.
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makes wind power competitive even without including the effects of the ETS. However according
to Jakob Lau Hoist from the Danish Wind Industry Association (Appendix C) private investors in
wind power plants most often require a time of return of only 10 years - this would lead to a LRMC
of wind power of app. 450 DKK/MWh according to Lau Hoist (487 DKK in the my reference
scenario, including 10 year depreciation time). Applying a depreciation time of 10 years it would
still require high CO2 quota prices of more than 200 DKK/MWh for wind power to become
competitive with e.g. gas power, when the subsidy of 100 DKK/MWh is taken into account of (cf.
Figure 49 in Appendix 4).
The experiences of recent years show that the 100 DKK/MWh subsidy is not enough to stimulate
new investments in wind power - no plants have been built with this subsidy only according to
Jakob Lau Hoist, Danish Wind Industry Association (cf. Appendix C)82. This does however not
necessarily indicate that the subsidy is inadequate. Another explanation could be that market prices
are currently at a level, which does not make any investments lucrative. In the 2001-2003 period,
spot market prices have, most of the time, been well below 300 DKK/MWh (cf. Figure 9), which
seem to be the long run marginal cost requirement for new plants excluding subsidies (cf. Figure 18).
It can be concluded that investors' risk aversion and requirements to the rate of return will
determine whether investments in wind power could become competitive with coal and gas
technologies given the current subsidies.
Additional analyses
As a supplement to the above calculations I will in this part briefly report on analyses of
investments in the power market made by Elkraft System and the IEA.
Using the modelling tool Balmorel83 Elkraft System has analysed the possible impact of the ETS on
the Nordic electricity system. Two development scenarios up to 2018 are put forward, one with low
CO2 allowance prices (peaking at 50 DKK/ton in 2008-2012) and one with high prices (rising from
100 DKK/ton in 2008-2012 to 200 DKK/ton in the following five year period). In the case of a high
CO2 price, the calculations show increased investments especially in new efficient CHP-plants
based on natural gas. In the scenario with low CO2 allowance prices there are fewer investments,
and both investments in natural gas and coal plants are optimum (Elkraft System, 2003b:7ff). Unlike the
my calculations the analysis takes account of the improvements in the performance of technologies,
which can be expected over time.
82
 For plants commissioned before the 1st of January 2005 the 100 DKK/MWh subsidy is reduced if the subsidy plus
market price, exceeds 360 DKK/MWh (this restriction is now being cancelled) (L 236 B, 2004: § 36). This
circumstance may previously have reduced the incentive to invest in wind power.
See www.balmurcl.com
74
Chapter 4 - Evaluation of the EU Emission Trading Scheme
The analysis supports the conclusions from the previous calculations that gas powered technologies
manage well in situations with low as well as high CO2 quota prices - a conclusion, which is also
supported by the IEA in the report "Emissions trading and its possible impacts on investment
decisions in the power sector" (IEA, 2003). According to this report "CCGTplants are likely to be
the option for new capacity additions in the future EU environmental context where gas is
available". (IEA, 2003: 37)
Other technologies, which Elkraft System sees could become attractive, are small-scale
technologies, because of less demand for capital, and perhaps multi-fuel plants because of their
potential flexibility to adapt to fluctuating CO2 quota prices (Elkraft System, 2003b: 11), though
relatively large capital costs of the latter could become impediment to their success.
4.5.2 The impact of CO2 quota allocation on fuel switch in the power sector
The previous analyses have built on the assumption that CO2 costs are fully overwhelmed in
marginal cost (short as well as long run) of power plants. As elaborated on in chapter 4.4.2 there is
however a risk that the effect of updating will diminish the effect of the EU ETS by providing
incentives to produce more power in order to gain more quotas in the next allocation period. This
effect on the SRMC of selected technologies is depicted in Figure 24 (LRMC curves will show the
same pattern assuming investors "believe" in the updating), showing how the inclination of the
marginal cost curves drop when updating is applied. In the calculations forming the basis for Figure
24 it is assumed that 1 MWh production provides 0.5 quotas in the following period (the value of
the quota is not discounted). Since RE plants are not encompassed by the scheme, updating of
quotas does not affect their marginal costs.
100 150 200 250 300
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Figure 24: The impact of "updating" on the SRMC of selected technologies (own figure, see Appendix L).
Another allocation issue, which may impact investment decisions, is the allocation of quotas to new
entrants. According to the emissions trading directive "The [National Allocation] plan shall
contain information on the manner in which new entrants will be able to begin participating in the
75
Emissions trading and security of supply
Community scheme in the Member State concerned" (EU 2003 87/EC: Annex III). Many countries,
including Denmark have, according to their proposed NAPs for 2005-2007, used this circumstance
to open up for allocation of quotas free of charge to new plants (Baltrel, 2004a:), presumably in order
to attract investments and to put new plants on equal terms with the existing plants. According to
the proposed national allocation plans of Northern European countries there are considerable
differences in the envisioned amount of gratis quotas to new plants (see the graphs in Appendix 2).
According to the proposed Danish NAP power plants commissioned in the first phase of the ETS
(2005-2007) will be allocated 1,710 quotas annually per MW power capacity and 350 quotas
annually per MW installed heat capacity, whereas new heating boilers will only be allocated 205
quotas per MW installed capacity (L 216,2004: §19 )84. Assuming the CO2 price is 100 DKK/ton the
subsidy would be worth app.: 1,710 quotas/MW * 100 DKK/quota * 3 = 513,000 DKK/MW over
the three year period (the value of possible heat capacity not included, future income not
discounted). Compared with the capital costs of for instance a new combined cycle power plant,
which is app. 4,000,000 DKK/MW (cf. Table 10) the subsidy could make up a substantial economic
contribution. As with updating, free allocation of quotas to new power plants will have the effect of
encouraging fossil fuel power plants on behalf of renewable energy technologies, and thereby
reduce the economic efficiency of the scheme83. Furthermore differences in allocation principles
can affect the geographical localisation of new plants, which again may impact on the security of
supply and the functioning of the market.
4.6 CHP and emissions trading
The previous subchapter has already to some extent accounted for the benefits of co-producing heat
and power - a benefit which will increase with increasing CO? quota prices. This subchapter will
point at some of the possibilities for extending the use of CHP in the Danish heat and power sector
and estimate the role of the ETS in this regard.
The Danish CHP system is already well extended. In 2002 53 % of domestic power supply was
produced in combination with heat, and of a total of app. 2.5 million Danish heat installations 59.1
% were district-heating installations (Energistyrelsen, 2003a: 11,28).
I see that the options for extending CHP can be categorised in three groups.
1) Conversion of existing heat boilers in district heating system to CHP
2) Extension of or establishment of new district heating systems (renewed heat planning)
84
 These quotas are granted from a special pool for new entrants on a first come first served basis (Miljøministeriet,
2004a). The size of this pool is 1.0 million per year (L 216, 2004: §15) corresponding to the yearly emission of gas-
fired power plant of app. 430 MW.
85
 Note that, total compliance costs are likely to become higher because the effects of two control options (renewable
energy and energy savings) are reduced. Companies would of course still have to comply with the their quotas meaning
that the overall emissions reduction targets would not be jeopardised.
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3) Increase the appliance of small-scale CHP plants not connected to district heating system -
so-called mini/micro CHP or block CHP.
In the following I will brief on the three options.
1) Conversion of heat boilers to CHP
During the 1990'es all small- and medium-sized district-heating plant were to convert to either
small-scale CHP or to biomass86 (Energistyrelsen 1998:12-13). As a result of the latter option there is
today a considerable amount of heat only boilers, which could potentially be converted to CHP.
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Figure 25: Danish heat boiler capacity (own figure, based on data from Energistyrelsen 2003h, see Appendix J)
Figure 25, shows the connection between accumulated heat boiler capacity (X-axis) and their load
duration factor (Y-axis) in 2002 of all Danish heat only boilers. It appears from the figure that app.
600 MJ/s of heat production capacity has load duration factors above 50 %. A heat capacity load
factor of 50 % is reasonable compared with existing small CHP plants (see Energistyrelsen, 2003h), and
shows that the plants have not been used as reserve capacity, but rather as base or intermediate load.
App. 55 % of this amount of capacity use different forms of biomass as fuels and the remaining 45
% are fired with municipal waste.
There are therefore a significant potential for increasing power capacity here in an environmentally
friendly way87. As the previous sub-chapter showed it is however not at this point of time profitable
86 According to the general criteria of the conversion programme biomass was particularly an option in areas were
natural gas supply were not available and in areas not in the vicinity of existing district heating systems
(Energistyrelsen, 1998: 13)
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to invest in new biomass CHP technologies - particularly since the subsidies for new plants have
been reduced considerable - and the plants will have to compete on market conditions88.
2) Extension of or establishment of new district heating systems (renewed heat planning)
The Danish Heat Supply Act divided the market for district heating into three supply areas: for
district heating (mainly large towns), for natural gas supply and for individual supply in rural areas.
The state defined the general framework for the planning at the regional level (counties), which
together with municipalities had to carry out the more detailed planning at local level. Since 1990
the responsibility of heat planning has been at municipal level, controlled by the state
administration (Energistyrelsen 1998: 12,16).
It is out of the scope of this project to make any general conclusions as to whether the current
division into supply areas is appropriate from an environmental and economic point of view.
Different literature sources have however pointed out that a revitalization of heat planning carried
out by municipalities could be needed. A comprehensive case analysis of the possibilities for heat
savings and change of supply in the Copenhagen suburb of Glostrup from year 2000 revealed
among others that the preconditions for the local heat planning had changed, and that there would
be large economic benefits of converting supply forms in a range of buildings. The project report
recommended among others that it would be advantageous to expand the district heating area on
behalf of natural gas supply (Elkraft System, 2000: 22,30). Similarly an analysis of the energy planning
in Vestsjællands Amt (county) showed that none of the 23 municipalities in the county had made
any considerations about their energy planning during recent years. In most municipalities the
employees either considered heat planning a thing of the past or were not aware that heat planning
is a municipal task (Dalegaard et al., 2003: 90). The possibilities for extending or establishing new
district heating systems are dependent on improving the planning at local level.
It should be mentioned, that the EU ETS may pose a barrier for the economy of changing from
individual oil/gas supply to district heating because individual heating units are not covered by the
ETS (< 20 MW thermal capacity). The incentive to change to a collective supply (> 20 MW)
becomes less favourable, unless the individual units are imposed a similar duty .
87
 Assuming replacement with CHP plants with 25 % electric efficiency and unchanged demand for heat capacity a
simple calculation shows that app. 200 MW of new power capacity could be procured (app. 800 MW total new thermal
capacity).
88
 Replacement with gas engines would not be competitive either (assuming gas supply is available) as the LRMC of
this technology is considerable higher than coal and CC gas turbine alternatives even when these plants have no heat
sale and assuming the gas engine plant has no CO; costs because it is below the 20 MW thermal capacity limit (See
Figure 50, Appendix 4) (Comparison based on the following data for the gas engine: Electric capacity: 1-5 MW, electric
eff. 41.5 %, total efficiency in practice: 85 %, investment: app. 7.5 mill. DKK/MW, total O&M: 60 DKK/MWh (DEA
et al. 2004: 34).
m
 A relevant question is furthermore how many quotas heat production can be expected to be allocated free of charge in
the Kyoto Period. As mentioned, in the Danish NAP for 2005-2007 heat production is allocated quotas on a one to one
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The DEA is currently heading a project with regard to making the district heating sector more
effective, including options for "more environment for money". Looking at the conditions for heat
planning and the taxation of fuels for small boilers should be a task of this project (cf. Energistyrelsen
& Konkurrencestyrelsen, 2004: Ch. 3).
In addition the recently adopted EU directive on promotion of CHP (EU 2004/8/EC) provides a good
occasion to initiate a revision of the municipal heat planning. According to articles 6 and 10 of this
directive member states have to analyse the potentials for CHP, including micro CHP, reporting to
the Commission by the 21st of February 2006. The report shall include a separate analysis of
barriers for the promotion of CHP.
3) Increase the appliance of small-scale CHP plants not connected to district heating system -
so-called mini/micro CHP or block CHP.
In areas, which are not very densely populated or areas with individual natural gas supply,
mini/micro CHP is an option for increased fuel utilization. Several technologies (e.g. Stirling
engine, gas engine, gas turbine, fuel cells) and fuel options (e.g. gas,oil, methanol, wood, hydrogen)
are available. At this point of time small-scale technologies are however relatively costly and many
of these are only on the proto-type stage. According to the DGC (Dansk Gasteknisk Center, centre
for gas technology) investment costs and O&M costs would need to be halved and electric
efficiencies increased from app. 20 % today to 40 % for the micro CHP for households to become
attractive for consumers and economic for society (CO2 is valued at 120 DKK/ton). This result is
based on the performance of a currently commercial gas engine (brand name: Ecopower) (DGC 2003:
35,39).
The DGC estimates that sufficiently high electric efficiencies cannot be achieved until new
technologies such as fuel cells are available and economic (DGC 2003: 8). The circumstance that
quotas do not have to be acquired for small-scale technologies will be beneficial for their
promotion, but due to their state of technological/economic development other measures are
required to being with (see chapter 7.1 regarding technological development).
basis according to historic emission - and a recent amendment of the Danish heat supply act will only allow the cost of
heat to be increased by the cost of buying additional quotas, beyond what is allocated to heat production (this act is of
course particularly relevant for heat production from CHP plants which are not owned by heat consumers) (L 216,
2004: § 41). This amendment of the law should be seen in light that a CO2 tax on fuels for heat production is already
applied. Therefore increasing heat prices by the cost of CO2 quotas would imply a double regulation of the sector. If
heat production will continue to be allocated on a one to one basis, and investors in CHP expect that they will come
under this allocation procedure it should remove the disincentives of converting to CHP plants above 20 MW thermal
capacity.
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4.7 National allocation plans and distributional effects
The national allocation plans (NAPs) are interesting to examine for three reasons. Firstly they
define the CO2 cap of the scheme and thereby defines the environmental objectives of the scheme,
secondly they determine how the quotas, which in the essence are sums of money, are to be
allocated to the incumbents (distributional effects) and thirdly allocation plans may impact on the
efficiency of scheme e.g. through the updating effect.
4.7.1 The CO2 cap
At the beginning of June 2004 only 14 out of 25 EU member state countries had submitted a NAP
for 2005-2007 to the Commission (http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/emission.htm, 2004-06-06).
According to carbon market consultants Point Carbon the countries have generally been generous in
their allocation (Point Carbon, 2004b). The proposed Danish NAP for 2005-2007, which is meant to be
a compromise between environmental and business interests, allocates 100.5 Mt to the incumbents90
over the three year period which is app. 15 % less than the BAU projection but still more than the
emissions of the covered plants in 2002 (Miljøministeriet, 2004a: 13).
The Commission has accepted eight national allocation plans so far, including the Danish plan and
those of the UK and Germany. No changes have been required by the Commission with regard to
excessive allocation (http://europa.eu,int/rapid/pressReleases. 2004-08-1891), thus indicating that the
previously mentioned EU requirement of a Kyoto path, which is not necessarily a straight line, is
interpreted indulgently92. The final test of scheme's environmental integrity will however not
follow until 2006 when the NAPs for the Kyoto-period are to be submitted.
A key problem with the free allocation of quotas is that EU member states, particularly in the 2005-
2007 period where they are not encompassed by a CO2 cap, can be tempted to benefit the plants in
their own countries as an indirect state subsidy93 (this may explain the supposedly generous NAPs).
Though the Commission requires the allocation plans for 2008-2012 to be in accordance with the
national reduction targets (cf. annex HI of the ETS directive) it can become a problem that lobbying
by the large European industries could impair the goals of the system.
90
 Including 5 Mt, which are to be auctioned.
91
 Complete address: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/862&format=HTML&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
92
 A conflict has however emerged between Germany and the European Commission (with Germany submitting a
lawsuit against the Commission), because Germany wants to make ex post adjustments of quotas to prevent over-
allocation. The EU does however not allow for such adjustments (which correspond to continues "updating"). (Point
Carbon News, the 21s1 of September 2004, www.pointcarbon,com, 2004-09-25).
93
 In the 2005-2007 period it is without costs for member states to allocate quotas generously. In the 2008-2012 member
states would have to find further reductions in other sectors or rely on the flexible mechanisms to "finance" a generous
allocation (and still comply with Kyoto targets).
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Auctioning of all quotas would solve this problem as the companies' interest in lobbying for more
quotas is eliminated (the auction in one EU country should in accordance with the internal market
rules be open for any person in the community to participate in (European Commission, 2004: 13)).
Thereby the conditions for establishing CCb caps, which are in agreement with the demands of the
Kyoto protocol would be considerable improved I think.
Protection of companies which, unlike power companies, are competing on the world market and
industry lobbyism are probably among the reasons why the EU requires the majority of quotas to
allocated for free94. In this regard it is interesting to see that the Danish power companies are in fact
in favour of a common European auctioning of quotas in the long-term (Dansk Energi et al., 2004: 9),
though they will highly benefit from the free allocation of quotas (see below). The reason for their
stance is according to Flemming Nissen, Elsam (Appendix A) that it is impossible to make a fair
allocation of quotas, and because the companies which are best at lobbying, i.e. the large European
players, risk getting the most quotas with the current set-up. I find this a notable response to the
allocation problem, though it is of course a "cost free" announcement because member states should
be bound to the requirements of the directive until 2012.
4.7.2 Distributional effects
The distributional effects of the ETS are dependent on four main parameters:
The CO2 quota price
Allocation of quotas
The increase in power prices caused by the scheme
Possible changes in production level caused by the scheme
According to the Danish NAP for 2005-2007 power plants will be allocated what corresponds to
0.56 quotas/year per MWh average production in the historic period 1998-2002. Heat production
will be allocated one quota per ton historic CO2 emission (implemented in Law on CO2 quotas, see L 216,
2004: § 17). In Table 111 have included some simplified calculations, to give an impression of the
economic effect on Danish gas and coal power plant in the 2005-2007 period, assuming among
others that the plants will continue producing as in 200295, a CO2 quota price of 100 DKK/ton and a
corresponding 70 DKK/MWh increase in the power price96.
4
 In fact the EU green paper on emissions trading stresses the advantages of auctioning of quotas to allocation for free
(EU COM(2000)87: 19). I have not examined further on the reasons for allocating quotas as opposed to auctioning.
As the following sections will show this is probably not an unrealistic assumption.
96
 To determine the carbon cost and thereby the relative emissions (ton/MWh) for the two plant types 125 % heat
efficiency, 40 % electric efficiency and 70 % total efficiency has been assumed. It is assumed that power producers will
not benefit from the quotas allocated for heat production. For simplification the table assumes that allocation is based on
2002 production and that future production will also correspond to the production of 2002 (Energistyrelsen, 2003h).
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It appears that coal as well gas power plants are likely to benefit greatly from the emissions trading
scheme, in total more than 2 billion DKK per year. Though this figure is surrounded by much
uncertainty there seem to be no doubt that owners of fossil fuel plants will profit from the scheme,
because of the allocation of gratis quotas and the power price increase. Owners of existing wind and
biomass plants will also benefit from the scheme (to the extent they sell to the market) because of
the power price increase, and so will nuclear and hydro power plants in Denmark's neighbouring
countries. Furthermore the Danish state will have extra revenue from auctioning of 5 % of the
quotas in the area of 170 million DKK per year 97.
Value of Expense for CO2 Income from Total surplus Production 2002 Total benefit
allocated quotas emissions increasing App. (TWh) App. (Mill.
(0.56 / MWh) power prices DKK)
Coal 56 DKK/MWh 65 DKK/MWh 70 DKK/MWh 61 DKK/MWh 21.4 1,305
Gas 56 DKK/MWh 39 DKK/MWh 70 DKK/MWh 87 DKK/MWh 10.7 931
Table 11: Distributional effects of the ETS-allocation on Danish coal and gas fired plants (own calculations).
The losers in this game will be the consumers, who will have to pay higher power prices. That
consumers will have to pay more for their power is in agreement with the "polluters pay principle"
since it is in the end the consumers, which require an energy service. That producers receive most
of this money does on the other hand conflict with the principles proposed by Coase that polluters
should compensate sufferers. This shows the inappropriateness of allocating the quotas for free to
companies. Had the quotas been auctioned this would compensate the society (the state) instead of
the power generators (power generators would of course still benefit from the increasing power
prices). The state could in principle use these means to mitigate or adapt to climate change.
It can be concluded that the emissions trading scheme has some unsuitable distributional effects,
which to a high degree are linked to the fact, that quotas are allocated to power producers, and not
auctioned. In the end it can be assumed that the income from consumers' increased power prices
disappears out of the sector as dividend to shareholders of the new commercial market players.
4.8 The possible impacts of emission trading on the security of supply
The emissions trading scheme is likely to impact on both security of fuel supply and the security of
power supply. The analysis of chapter 4.3 showed that there is a considerable uncertainty about the
future CO2 quotas prices - in the short term particularly because of the uncertainty regarding
Russia's ratification and on the longer term because of possible US ratification, as well as decisions
on future climate commitments. This creates a risk element, which can be added to the many
elements of uncertainty, which are already associated with the decision on building a new power
plant in a liberalised power market. According to Elkraft System it is probable that the introduction
97
 App. 1.7 million quotas will be auctioned per year (L 216, 2004: §15). The quota price is assumed to be 100
DKK/quota.
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of the EU ETS leads to postponement of new investments and thereby will impact negatively on
security of supply (Elkraft System 2003b: 11).
Gas power plants are likely to be the dominant technology if/when investments are made on the
liberalised market. This is not only reasoned in the incentives from the ETS but also in the
circumstance that natural gas technologies are advantageous in a liberalised market because of their
low capital costs. In the long term it can therefore be expected that the Danish power sector will
become increasingly dependent on gas as the energy source. Compared with a reduction strategy
building on a combination of e.g. coal and wind power this is unfavourable from a fuel security
point of view (this will be further elaborated on in chapter 5).
4.9 Discussion and roundup
This chapter has analysed the theoretical aspects of emissions trading as well as the concrete
impacts of implementation in the energy sector.
The EU ETS has some very flattering characteristics. First of all it puts a cap on emissions from the
encompassed plants. In the current situation where emissions are expected to rise both on European
(EEA, 2004a: 31) and national level (see chapter 3.5) some degree of self-regulation of the sector I
believe can be advantageous to ensure environmental integrity. Alternatives, such as CO2 taxes and
subsidies for specific technologies, could require continuous fine-tuning of the specific measures, in
order to comply with Kyoto-targets. In this process factors, such as lobbyism from the major CO2
emitters combined with political weakness, could risk getting the Kyoto-compliance off-track.
Fixing the CO2 cap for companies in advance should have the benefit of avoiding emergency
regulation. The possibility of lobbying for free quotas could however potentially harm the
environmental integrity of the scheme, and I would therefore recommend, that the EU require
quotas to be auctioned (at least to power and heat plants because these are not competing on the
world market) as soon as possible. Auctioning of quotas would furthermore strengthen the
economic efficiency of the scheme because the problems connected with updating and free
allocation for new entrants would disappear, and in addition improve the scheme's distributional
effects. Moreover auctioning of quotas will put new entrants on equal terms with existing
producers.
Secondly the ETS has the advantage of working EU wide. This does not only ensure cost efficient
reductions, but it also to some degree prevents national solutions, which conflict with each other.
For instance strict measures (CO2 caps, taxes etc.) in some member states could cause production to
move to less ambitious member states that in the end would not be able to comply with Kyoto-
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targets98. This advantage would be even more pronounced if quotas were auctioned instead of
allocated, as this would remove the state-aid incitements, which are still with the current ETS set-
up.
Nevertheless the EU ETS seems to be defective with regard to encouraging technological
innovation in the power sector, including promotion of RE technologies that are close to being
competitive such as wind power. Much indicate that power companies will meet their cap mainly
through acquisition of JI/CDM credits and international emissions trading to the extent this will be
possible. Fuel switch will probably not play an important part though the merit order of power
plants will be sensitive to changing fuel prices. CCGT plants, an already mature technology, will
probably dominate capacity extensions in the liberalised markets in Europe. It is likely to require
quite high CO2 prices before any significant investments in RE technologies will take place.
Similarly though the ETS should benefit CHP production this is offset by the abandonment of
production subsidies and the three-tier-tariff system.
To the drawbacks of the scheme should also be mentioned the additional uncertainty which
investors are faced with relation to fluctuating CO2 prices, and the increased dependence on natural
gas which the scheme is likely to cause.
By relying exclusively on the EU emissions trading system as a means to ensure CO2 reductions,
there is risk that the technological development which is needed in the long-term, does not take
place in due time. Additional measures are therefore needed to support RE technologies that are
close to being competitive as well as to develop new technologies that are required for the long-
term technological change.
98
 E.g. Danish power producers have complained that the current national CO2 ETS does not ensure global reductions
because foreign power plants (with lower efficiencies, environmental equipment etc.) replace generation from Danish
plants (Dansk Energi et al., 2004: 14-15) (See also footnote 29, p. 33).
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5 Security of fuel supply
In the 1970'es and 1980'es security of fuel supply was an important issue in Danish energy policy
but it seems to have been neglected in recent years, as other drivers such as the environmental and
the market has come to the fore.
This chapter aims at answering the following work question:
"How do energy supply concerns affect the energy sector? "
This will be done by done by examining whether there will be problems with the fuel supply in the
short- and long term, with a view to the Danish and European as well as the global situation. In
addition the chapter will include brief discussions of the socio economic consequences of heavy
reliance on imported fossil fuels, and a mapping of the current utilization of the different fossil fuels
in the Danish energy sector.
5.1 Three types of concern
Judged by the problems raised in the EU Green Paper on security of supply (European Commission,
2000), the corresponding technical document (Commission Européenne, 2000) and the historic Danish
energy policy I see that the security of supply challenges can be grouped into three general
categories or concerns. These are:
1) Depletion of energy resources (global perspective)
2) Stability of supply (regional perspective)
3) Balance of payment (national perspective)
The first category concerns the fact that, when using fossil fuels, we draw on limited geological
resources. There is a risk that for instance oil production will peak within the next generation or
two. This poses a physical risk for the energy supply.
The second concern deals with the geopolitical aspects - the inappropriateness of being politically
and economically dependent on other countries and regions. Oil and gas resources are distributed
very unevenly thus creating risks of supply disruption and sudden price fluctuations, which can be
particularly harmful for the economy of consumer countries. Political tensions in supplier countries
will be able to impact on security supply in the European Union (Commission Européenne, 2000: 44), and
vice versa, I would argue, issues of security of supply may cause political tension (c.f. the US led
interventions in Middle East countries). The uneven distribution of resources poses a primarily
political risk for the energy supply.
The latter concern deals with the economic disadvantage of depending on foreign resources beyond
the risks associated with disruption of supplies. This primarily involves the negative effect on the
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balance of payment (a main topic the Danish energy policy in the 1980'es, see Table 3, p. 29),
which depends on the local extraction and of course on the fuel price.
This chapter will be structured around these three main issues of concern, and end up with a
discussion where the findings of the chapter are discussed and put into perspective.
5.2 Global resource depletion
The terminology used to describe fossil fuel deposits is not clear. Different institutions and authors
have various meanings for the same terms (IPCC 2001c: 235). A distinction is often made between
reserves and resources. "In the oil business, the term reserves denotes proven + probable quantities
of oil which are deemed economically profitable to produce at the expected future oil prices,
implying that the oil can be recovered by the means of known technologies. In addition to reserves,
resources comprise quantities known or assumed to exist but, for technical or economic reasons not
presently recoverable, and additional amounts deemed to be likely to be found in promising
geological structures" (Teknologirådet & IDA, 2004: 35). Figure 26 illustrates these energy resource
concepts (adapted from Linderoth, 1992: 115).
Resource basis
Never
economic
Economic in the
future
Economic now Recoverable
reserves
Recoverable
resources
i Price up +tech. dev
Known Unknown
Exploration
Figure 26: Energy resource concepts (own figure, adapted from Linderoth 1992: 115)
Furthermore a distinction is usually made between conventional and non-conventional resources
the difference is either the nature of existence (e.g. being solid rather than liquid for oil) or the
geological location (e.g. coal bed methane) (IPCC, 2001: 235).
The following deals first with the conventional resources. Since future fossil fuel resource
availability is a controversial issue - 1 will attempt to account for the findings of both so-called
optimist and pessimists.
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5.2.1 Conventional resources
The ultimate reserve for a particular oil province or region, i.e. total production from the opening of
fields till they finally close, can be described as:
Ultimate oil reserve = past production + present reserves + future reserve additions
In order to examine the issue of global resource it is therefore necessary not only to estimate present
reserves, but also potential future reserve additions
Past production and present reserves
Table 12 shows past production of oil, natural gas and coal together with different estimates of
reserves. There seems to be a good degree of accordance between different official literature
estimates of proved global oil and gas reserves99'100:
Natural gas
[1018J]
IPCC*
B p * *
IEA***
DEA****
Past
production
5.34
Present
reserves
5.90
6.43
5.87
6.32
Past
production
2.73
Present
reserves
5.36
5.93
6.31
Past
production
5.99
Present
reserves
42.0
21.6
Table 12: Global fossil fuel reserves (estimates from 1998 (IPCC) or end 2000/2001) in 10 J. '(Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2001c 236), **(BP, 2002:4, 20), *" (IEA, 2002b: 97, 114) * * " (Danish Energy Authority, i.e.
Energistyrelsen 2003:42, quoting the Oil and Gas Journal).
These reserve figures correspond to reserve to production values (R/P-values) of 35-40 years for oil,
around 65 years for gas and more than 200 years for coal (based on the BP-estimate. Total
conventional oil production up till 2000 was 5.34*1018J (872 billion barrels) (Teknologirådet & IDA,
2004: 91). Similarly total gas consumption has been app. 2.73*1018 J (71.3 Tera m3) up till year 2000.
This means that almost half of all oil reserves identified so far, and nearly a third of natural gas
reserves, have been used. Since coal reserves are plentiful the following will focus on the depletion
of the hydrocarbons.
It should be noted though that for instance the independent analysts Colin J. Campbel l has est imated remaining oil
reserves (at year 2000) somewhat lower at only 5.41 *101 8 J (884 billion barrels) (Teknologirådet og IDA, 2004: 67).
100
 The reason for the large discrepancy between coal reserve estimates should probably be found in the dist inguishing
be tween reserves and resources.
101
 T h e energy contents of the reserves have been shown Joule in order to make the fossil fuel reserves comparable . I
have applied average energy conversion factors of the US D O E for the conversion of barrels , m and tonnes (which
most of the figures have been stated in) into Joules, (www.eia.doe.gov/kids/units .xls , 2004-04-28) .
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Expected future reserve additions
Estimates of ultimate reserves are obviously associated with more uncertainty than known reserves.
As stated by the European Commission "Ultimately, the future of world oil supplies will be driven
by the rate of availability, as well as by the size of the total resource. The uncertainty factors
include level of investments in technology and infrastructure, physical availability and geopolitics "
(Commission Européenne, 2000: 24).
The US Geological Survey (USGS) has estimated the ultimate global oil reserve102 at between
13.76*1018 J (2,248 barrels, 95% likelihood of finding) and 23.84*1018 J (3,896 billion barrels, 5 %
likelihood of finding), with an expected mean value 18.38*1018 J (3,003 billions barrels, 50 %
likelihood of finding) twww.eia.doe.gov, 2004-04-28103). This corresponds to expected future reserve
additions of between app. 2.30 *1018 J and 12.5*1018 J, when past production and known reserves
have been deducted. The IEA finds, that undiscovered resources have the potential to double the
known oil reserves, i.e. undiscovered resources of app 5.9* 1018 J (IEA 2002: 97,114).
According to some critical experts, like Colin J. Campbell of the Association for the Study of Peak
Oil (ASPO) and Jean Laherrére, who have carried out independent analyses of reserves and
discovery rates, the ultimate global oil reserve is however likely to end up considerable lower than
the mean estimate of the USGS. At 11.6*1018 J (1,900 billion barrels) according to Campbell, or
app. 12.2* 1018 J (2,000 billion barrels) according to Laherrére (Teknologirådet & IDA, 2004: 66-67).
The same controversy accounts to natural gas resources. According to the IEA undiscovered natural
gas resources have the potential to treble gas reserves - this corresponds to undiscovered natural gas
resources of app. 12.6* 1018 J (330 Tera m3)(IEA 2002: 97,114). R.W. Bentley, from the Oil Depletion
Analysis Centre in London, in an article in Energy Policy from 2002, on the other hand finds that
undiscovered gas resources are in the range of 3.67 *1018 J (96 Tera m3). According to Bentley the
(very large) disagreement between geologists primarily concerns whether it is possible to find a lot
more, by putting a particular effort into looking for gas in contrary to only looking for oil. Bentley
is of the opinion, that the big fields determine the total quantity, and most of these have according to
Bentley already been found (Bentley, 2002).
102
 In fact the USGS makes an estimation of undiscovered resources to become reserves before 2025 (Teknologirådet &
IDA, 2004: 63).
103
 Full address: www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/-presentations/2000/long_term_supply/, 2004-04-28
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ZHigh ultimate reserve estimate
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• Past production
Figure 27: Summary of oil and gas resources (10 J). Own figure, ultimate reserve estimates are based on the USGS
figures for oil and the estimates of the IEA (2002) (high) and Bentley (2002) (low) forgas. (Campbell's 11.6*1018 J
estimate for the ultimate oil reserve is very close to the figure for known reserves + past production.)
In Figure 27 I have summarised the resource estimates of natural gas and oil. Expected future
reserves additions are framed by dotted lines in order to show the uncertainty that goes with these
figures.
When do global oil and gas production peak?
The time when production will peak depend most notably on the ultimate reserves and how
consumption/production will develop. Both factors are very uncertain.
Figure 28 shows two projections made by the Energy Information Administration of the US
Department of Energy showing future oil production assuming an ultimate reserve of 18.38 *10 J
(3,003 billion barrels) (USGS-data). The full-drawn line shows a scenario where oil production
increases by 2 % per annum and decreases by 2 % per annum, the dotted line a scenario with 2 %
growth and a decline, which corresponds to maintaining a reserve to production ration (R/P) of 10.
It appears that production in the first case will peak in 2016 and in the second case in 2037.
(www.eia.doe.gov, 04-04-28103). The 2037 peak scenario is however problematic because it is
questionably whether production capacity will in fact be able to follow demand up till 2037 in the
dotted line scenario. Analyses have shown that peak oil production for geological reasons is likely
to occur when app. 50 % of the estimated resource has been produced. (Teknologirådet & IDA, 2004: 9).
Furthermore the steep rise and decline in production around 2037 would most likely be very
difficult to handle for the world economy - and one should think that the market price of oil up till
2037 up should reflect the coming shortage of conventional oil through higher energy prices
(because oil producers reduce production in expectation of higher prices in the future) and thus
lower consumption. Therefore a situation closer to the 2016 peak scenario seems like a more likely
outcome, though this projection is of course subject to much uncertainty as well, regarding the size
of the ultimate oil reserve as well as the projected increase in consumption.
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Therefore even though the R/P factor would indicate oil reserves left for several decades, BAU
demand could exceed supply within little more than a decade. As R. W. Bentley has put it; "It is
declining production, in other words unsatisfied demand, that is the key factor about future oil
supply. " - and not the R/P relationship (Bentley, 2002). A workgroup of the Danish Board of
Technology, having representatives of both industry (incl. the Danish oil and gas industry) and the
academic world, has recently concluded that within a time horizon of 10 to 20 years (maybe earlier)
the access to cheap conventional oil resources will decrease considerable (Workgroup of the Board of
Technology and IDA, 2004). Though Figure 28 applies quite optimistic data on undiscovered resources,
according to some of the critical experts, it supports the conclusion that we could see a shortage of
oil supply already within the next 10-20 years. One of the crucial questions is whether non-
conventional sources of oil (see below) will be able to expand in a way, which covers declining
production rates in other countries and satisfies increasing demand.
Annual Production Scenarios with 2 Percent Growth Rates and
Different Decline Methods
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Figure 28: Oil depletion scenario of the Energy Information Administration of the US Department of Energy using USGS
data (obtained from www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/presentations/2000/long_term_supply/, 2004-04-28)
Conventional natural gas production is likely to reach its peak point when between 60 % and 75 %
of the resource has been exploited, though the peak point is not as well known as for oil (Bentley,
2002). Compared with oil the global prospects for gas supply are relatively attractive in the short
term. Assuming an annual consumption growth of 2 %, and the peak point occurring when 70 % of
the ultimate reserve has been used, production would peak between app. 2040 (low ultimate reserve
estimate) and app. 2065 (high ultimate reserve estimate) (own calculations, see Appendix M). The
following decline is likely to be fairly steep.
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5.2.2 Non-conventional resources
In the future, as conventional oil and gas reserves are depleted, they will probably be supplemented
by non-conventional fossil fuel resources to some extent. The non-conventional oil resources
include extra heavy oil (e.g. bitumen from tar sand), enhanced oil recovery, oil shale and synthetic
oil from coal or natural gas, and non-conventional gas resources encompass coal bed methane, tight
gas and high pressure brine (Bentley, 2002)l04. Though their resource base is huge, app. 50 * 1018 J
from recoverable resources105 (to this comes an enormous amount of resources which are not
currently recoverable106) they are costly to exploit compared with conventional oil and the energy
use and other resource use, such as water and land, associated with their exploitation is generally
great (Teknologirådet & IDA, 2004: 35, Linderoth 1992, 137-140). This makes the non-conventional
resources particularly unattractive from a climate change and environmental point of view.
Furthermore, according to Bentley (2002), a main question is whether these resources can be made
available at a satisfying rate, when conventional oil production begins declining. According to
Bentley this is unlikely, but others e.g. Linderoth (1992: 137) do not express these concerns.
5.2.3 Global fossil fuel resources and climate change
Figure 29 shows the connection between the carbon content of fossil fuel reserves/resources and
different scenarios for the atmosphere's concentration of CO2. As mentioned in the introduction it is
an environmental objective of the EU that the CO2 concentration is kept below 550 ppm (cf. the
WRE107 550 scenario). It appears that fossil fuel scarcity is not a " significant factor in considering
climate change mitigation" (IPPC, 2001c: 28). It is noticeable however that the carbon content of
conventional oil and gas reserves is considerably less than the cumulative carbon emissions in the
low emission scenarios. To reach the high level scenarios it is therefore necessary to convert to
increasing coal use or to utilize non-conventional oil and gas resources.
104
 Bentley here terms enhanced oil recovery, by using tertiary recovery methods, as a non-conventional oil resource.
105
 These stem from oil potentially available to enhanced oil recovery (21 *1018 J), shale oil (18*1018 J), heavy oil and
tar sands (6*1018 J), high pressure brine (3*1018 J) and tight gas (1.1 *1018 J). All figures are rough indicators (Bentley,
2002).
106
 Most notably clathrates (frozen ice-like deposits of natural gas, which probably cover a significant portion of the
ocean floor), which have a resource base of some 780* 1018 J (IPCC, 2001: 235-236).
107
 WRE is an abbreviation for Wigley, Richels and Edmonds who developed these stabilization scenarios.
(www.grida.no/climate/ipcc tar/wg3/346.htm, 2004-08-06).
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Figure 29: Carbon in oil, gas and coal reserves and resources compared with historic fossil fuel carbon emissions 1860-
1998, and with cumulative carbon emissions from a range of SRES (Special Report on Emissions Scenarios) scenarios
(these build on different scenarios for the world development - economy, environmental concern etc.) and stabilization
scenarios (WREs) up until 2100 (ppm) (gas hydrates are not included) (IPCC, 2001c: 29).
5.3 Stability of supply
Much indicate that the EU and Europe as a whole (excl. Russia) will need to import progressively
more fossil fuels in the coming decades, due to domestic production declines of coal, oil and natural
gas.
5.3.1 Oil and gas
Both natural gas and particularly oil reserves are distributed very unevenly geographically.
As can be seen from Figure 30 and Figure 31, Europe only holds approximately 2 % of total oil
reserves and app. 3 % of natural gas reserves. Two thirds of proven oil reserves are located in the
Middle East and almost three quarters of proved gas reserves are placed in the Former Soviet Union
and in the Middle East.
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Figure 30: Distribution of proved oil reserves (billion barrels, %)(own figure, based on data from BP, 2002).
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Figure 31: Distribution of proved natural gas reserves at end 2001 (Tera cubic metres, %)(own figure, based on data
from BP, 2002)
The European Commission estimates that the total proved oil reserves of the European Union would
only be able to cover 8 years of consumption at the current level (European Commission, 2000: 19).
Europe already imports around 80 % of its oil, and it is expected that this figure will rise to nearly
90 % by 2020. The Middle East is and will probably remain the most interesting source of oil for
Europe (Commission Européenne, 2000: 24, 26), and as noted by the EU "OPEC exerts a strong influence
on oil trading markets, and can put the EU, as buyer, in a weak position". This obviously puts the
EU in a very unattractive position; "The capacity and political will must exist in exporting countries
to satisfy growing demand world-wide. This is perhaps the most uncertain aspect and could have a
significant impact on price" (Commission Européenne, 2000: 26).
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The EU natural gas reserves correspond to 20 years of consumption at the current level (European
Commission 2002:19). The main European natural gas reserves are found in the Netherlands (36 %),
Norway (26%) and the UK (15%) (BP, 2002: 20). Danish reserves make up app. 1.6 % of total EU
natural gas reserves (IBID). As the figures indicate the main part of European production stems from
the North Sea, which is a mature oil/gas region, peaking in these years. Over the coming decades
production from the North Sea is expected to dwindle (IEA, 2002:187), and import of gas will
enhance. Already in 2000 Europe imported 36 % of the consumed natural gas, and according to the
IEA this figure is expected to rise to 63 % in 2030 (IEA, 2002:117)108. Russia, together with the other
former Soviet Union republics, is expected to remain the largest single supplier to Europe, but also
Algeria, Latin America and the Middle East could play increasingly important roles as suppliers -
the latter two as suppliers of liquefied natural gas (LNG) (IEA, 2002:116,188). According to the EU
"In the long run, the supply of gas in Europe risks creating a new situation of dependence, all the
more so given the less intensive consumption of carbon. Greater consumption of gas could be
followed by an upward trend in prices and undermine the European Union's security of supply"
(European Commission, 2000: 42).
5.3.2 Coal
European coal reserves are comparatively larger than those of oil and gas, and on a global scale they
make up 13 % of total proved reserves. The R/P ratio for Europe is app. 167 years, indicating that
coal is a vast resource even at European level (based on figures from BP (2002: 30)). Nevertheless some
33 % of the coal consumed in Europe was imported in 2001, a figure which has been increasing
over the last decade (in 1991 only 21.9 % of the coal was imported, in spite of consumption being
more than 30 % greater at that time). The decline in European self-sufficiency is due to higher
production costs than those of competing countries, among others because of difficult geological
circumstances (deep mines) (Commisssion Européenne, 2000: 31). Furthermore subsidies for coal
extraction, which are much prevalent in the EU, have been reduced or ceased in some member
States (EEA, 2004b: 14).
Compared with oil and gas, coal reserves are extensive and well distributed worldwide (cf. Figure 32)
and this has led to a well-supplied market with relatively low and stable prices. From a security of
supply point of view coal is a relatively attractive resource. The recent increases in oil and coal
prices are not shown.
' This forecast of the IEA assumes an annual growth in natural gas consumption of app. 2.1 %.
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Figure 33: The historic development in energy prices 1970-2002 (Own figure based on data from from
www, bp. com/centres/energy, 2004-06-20, Prices in barrels, ton and Btu has been converted to GJ using conversion
factors from Energistyrelsen 2003i: 6. Crude oil prices: 1970-1985 Arabian Light posted at Ras Tanura, 1986-2002 Brent
spot)
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European natural gas prices have traditionally been linked to the price of oil although the two
markets have little in common. The reason for this index-linking is the frequent geological
proximity of oil and gas fields, which have placed gas fields in the hands of oil companies having
an interest in controlling the competition that gas will provide for oil109. This is illustrated in Figure
33, showing the development in gas, oil and coal prices.
It should be mentioned, that the introduction of the EU emissions trading scheme may to some
extent imply extra costs connected with the utilization of energy resources located within the EU.
Mineral oil refineries are thus encompassed by the EU scheme, and to the extent combustion
installations above the 20 MW thermal capacity are applied for extraction e.g. within coal mining,
this will also involve an extra cost. The consequence should be increased import of energy
resources to the EU.
5.4 Domestic resources and consumption
National resources are important to assess not only from an economic (balance of payment)
perspective, but also from a stability of supply point of view, the above challenges taken into
consideration.
109
 According to the Commission the gas market liberalisation, with a European gas spot market, and demand-side
pressure because of natural gas' favourable CO2 potentials can be expected to bring an end to the index linking of gas
(European Commission, 2000: 40-41). Compared with coal and oil natural gas is relatively costly to transport. This
makes local markets or a good infrastructure important for the economy of natural gas utilization (IPCC 2001: 137).
Because European reserves are limited, the EU Commission expects that transportation costs in the future will make up
an increasing part of total natural gas cost. It has been estimated that the cost of importing natural gas to the EU from
certain parts of Russia (Siberia) could have a serious impact on the market price - perhaps doubling the price. At
distances beyond 4,000-6,000 km LNG could become a more attractive solution than pipeline transportation
(Commission Européenne, 2000: 30)
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Figure 34: Historic and expected production and consumption of Danish oil and natural gas (Own figure, based on data
from Energistyrelsen, 2003g: 35: Energistyrelsen, 20031: 18; www.ens.dk, 2004-03-31; Spreadsheet from Søren
Frederiksen, DE A (2003-10-21); Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeren, 2003: 4).
Since 1997 Denmark has been self-sufficient with energy. The reason for this is first and foremost
the production of oil and gas from the North Sea, but the production of renewable energy plays an
increasing role as well. In 2002 the energy content of the total Danish production of oil, gas and RE
was app. 45 % greater than total Danish energy consumption (Energistyrelsen, 2003a: 4). In Figure 34 I
have summarised historic and expected future developments of consumption and production of
natural gas and oil.
The full-drawn lines in Figure 34 show the development in production of Danish oil and gas since
1975. The dotted line shows expected future production110, which of course will always be
associated with a significant level of uncertainty. For oil the expected development in production is
based on an official medium recovery scenario (assuming one new medium-large oil strike) used in
connection with the recent negotiations with Maersk - A.P. Møller on the future rights for the
Danish oil and gas reserves (figures from Søren Frederiksen, DEA, 21.10.2003). For gas a similar projection
is not available111. Instead I have applied planned production data for 2003-2007 (Energistyrelsen,
2003g: 46), and distributed the residual probable reserve"2 over the remaining period assuming a
linear reduction in production (corresponding to a decline in production of app. 14 PJ per year).
110
 Both historical and planned natural gas data show the net production of natural gas, taking into account that some 25
% of extracted gas is re-injected to increase oil production and other gas losses at platform (10-15 %)(Energistyrelsen,
2003g: 19,35)
111
 Personal communication with Jan Reffstrup, DONG (2004-03-31) and Søren Frederiksen, DEA (2003-10-21)
112
 129 billion Nm3 by the end of 2002, minus planned production in 2003-2007 (Energistyrelsen, 2003g: 36). This
includes expected possible recovery.
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Furthermore I have included columns showing gross consumption of oil and gas in Denmark in the
historic period (www.ens.dk, 2004-03-31) and expected consumption levels in 2005 and 2010 based on
data material used in projections for the Danish climate strategy (Energistyrelsen, 2003f: 18).
From Figure 34 it can be concluded that around 2010 gross gas consumption will exceed Danish
gas production and around 2018-2020 gross oil consumptions equals Danish oil production (if
consumptions remains at expected 2010 level). Within 25 years it is likely that Denmark will be in a
situation similar to that of the early 1980'es where almost all oil (and gas) will have to be imported,
this in spite of Denmark having been a net exporter of oil for app. 25 years (1993-2018).
This is likely to impact considerable on the balance of trade. In the first half of the 1980'es the net
foreign exchange expense for fuels corresponded to the total deficit in the balance of payments
(Energistyrelsen, 2003a: 37).
Figure 35, showing Danish consumption of oil, natural gas and coal distributed on different
purposes, has been included to give a survey of the sectors, which are exposed the most to the fuel
supply challenges. It appears that gas and coal is primarily used by the conversion sector"3,
whereas most of oil consumption is within the transport sector (in addition more than a third of
consumption within "production business" goes to the transport dominated sectors fishery and
agriculture). The latter must be seen on the background that oil has gradually been phased out as a
fuel within the conversion and household sectors (cf. Figure 7, p. 30). Security of oil supply is
therefore not a significant threat to the conversion sector. Today oil consumption in the conversion
sector almost only goes to peak power plants (Energistyrelsen, 2003h), and within the household sector
oil has to a great extent been replaced by district heating and natural gas supply (causing Danish
households oil consumption to fall from 120 PJ in 1980 to 34 PJ in 2002) (Energistyrelsen 2003a: 26).
The key challenge regarding oil dependence is therefore within the transport sector, among others
the development of new transport technologies, which do not rely on oil.
113 The conversion sector in this regard means the production of power and district heating, plus town gas (negligible).
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Figure 35: Danish consumption of oil, natural gas and coal (Own figure, based on data from Energistyrelsen, 2003a:
4).
If/when society succeeds in promoting technological development within the transport sector
towards hydrogen/fuel-cell technologies, electric vehicles, bio fuels, compressed or liquefied gas
etc. this is however likely to increase the interplay between the transport sector and the conversion
sector. Depending on which technology track(s) will succeed, the conversion sector could become a
supplier of power, hydrogen or even biofuels (in combination with the production of biomass as a
fuel for the production of heat and power, see e.g. Energistyrelsen, 2004a: 15) for the transport sector.
Therefore future oil supply still pose an important driver for the development of cost effective
renewable energy technologies.
Coal made up 44 % and natural gas 28 % of the energy consumption in the conversion sector in
2002 (Energistyrelsen, 2003h). With the liberalization of energy markets and the introduction of the EU
ETS the share of gas can be expected to increase (cf. chapter 4). Due to the declining Danish gas
production this will in the coming years lead to increased dependence on foreign gas resources. At
first this supply could probably come from Norway, which is expected to be a significant supplier to
the EU in the future (Pers. Communication with Jan Reffstrup, DONG, 2004-03-31), and in the longer term
either Russia or the Middle East (see Figure 31).
With a view to the relatively large global natural gas reserves Kaj Stærkind from the DEA (Interview,
Appendix E) primarily sees the supply of natural gas as an infrastructure/transport problem, though
examining the security of supply situation will apparently be an important part of DEA's work with
Oil and gas used at refineries, and for the extraction of oil/gas, is not included. This creates a minor gap between the
figures presented here and the figures of Figure 34.
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the development of the previously mentioned infrastructure plan. Whereas the current government's
focus up till now has been at achieving "the most environment for the money", the new plan will
primarily deal with delivering "the most security of supply for the money", according to Kaj
Stærkind (Appendix E).
5.5 Discussion and roundup
It appears from the previous sections that the energy sector may face some serious security of fuel
supply challenges in the years to come. In Figure 37 I have summarised some of the key challenges
on a time scale.
Due to the uneven distribution of oil and gas reserves I assume that the geopolitical aspect, stability
of supply, is likely to continue being a critical issue (as it has been more or less since the first oil
crises in the 1970'es) - and worsen as European resources are depleted over the coming decades. In
the EU natural gas is at present used to diversify energy supply, but with increasing gas
consumption, e.g. within the power sector (cf. also chapter 4.5), one can fear, that a new structural
weakness will appear with regard to EU energy dependency, according to the Commission (EU KOM
(2002)- 488).
From a national perspective the current high Danish primary energy production has reduced the
significance of the economic issues (balance of payment and fluctuating energy prices). In fact
Denmark profits considerable from exporting energy today, but from around 2010 when Danish oil
production has peaked and natural gas consumption is exceeding Danish production this problem
will come to the fore again. At the same time (or some 5-10 years later) global depletion of the
conventional oil could probably come on the agenda as well, as global oil production, and some 20-
30 years later global conventional gas production, is likely to reach its peak.
1970 1990 2010 2030
•4 •
Balance of payment Balance of payment
Global depletion of oil - gas
• '• •
Stability of supply - Geopolitics - Price Fluctuations
Figure 36: Key security of fuel supply challenges (own figure).
For security of supply as well as environmental reasons it will be beneficial for the energy sector to
divert away from the current fossil fuel dependence. On a global scale I see two unpleasant long
time scenarios emerging: A world with a fuel scarcity problem (high energy prices) if non-
conventional energy sources are not made available in sufficient amounts or a situation where fossil
fuels are still available in sufficient amounts but on the behalf of strongly increased GHG emissions
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and other environmental problems associated with the exploitation of non-conventional resources.
The latter scenario is supported by projections of the EEA, according to which, we are not going to
see any significant rises in energy prices, even in the long-term, because new resources (including
unconventional) and extraction technologies will become available115 (IEA 2001: 67,170, 392-4).
The key question is how we should react to these challenges? Will the market (in combination with
emissions trading) be able to solve these problems? Will alternative clean technologies
"automatically" develop as (/if) fuel prices increase? Though there is not full agreement between
the fuels, which are the most problematic from a security of supply point of view (natural gas and
primarily oil) and from a CO2 reduction perspective (coal), rising energy prices caused by shortage
of energy combined with the pricing of CO2 from emissions trading should in the long-run make
renewable energy and energy efficiency initiatives more attractive.
However, as pointed out by the EU, fierce competition in global energy markets "could make
investment in research and development and other projects with a long pay back period less
attractive. This would be to the detriment of supply security which will probably, in the long term,
depend on the availability of innovative, renewable energy and energy efficient technologies ". As
the EU approach the issue in its technical document on green paper on security of supply: "The
onus is on companies to respect rules of competition, environmental protection and consumer
rights. The onus is on governments to monitor supply developments and to anticipate and manage
risks for energy supply or society in general. " (Commission Européenne, 2000: 20-21). I agree with the
EU that authorities will have to act proactively to remedy the future security of supply challenges -
with the market as a decisive partner. It is important to act in good time so we do not risk ending up
in of the above-mentioned scenarios.
The required initiatives should focus on the development of RE technologies to replace fossil fuels
and on increasing energy efficiency and fuel utilization rates to make better use of the resources.
Hedging against sudden price fluctuations and supply disruptions by increasing oil stocks, as it has
proposed by the EU (from 90 days of consumption till 120 days) (EU Kom (2002)-488) but not yet
implemented and long-term strategic partnerships with producer countries, such as the one, which
has recently been initiated between the EU and Russia (Europa Kommissionen, 2002: 4), are without
doubt effective for ensuring stability of supply, but they do not contribute to solving the basic
problem of resource depletion and only have limited impacts on the balance of payment issue. This
will on the other hand the directives on among others renewable energy (EU 2001/77/EC), energy
efficient building (EU 2002/9l/EC), CHP (EU 2004/08/EC) and the directive on promotion of biofuels
(EU 2003/30/EC).
113
 For instance, according to the IEA (2001: 69), in a high oil price scenario it is reasonable to expect a price of 30
$/barrel in 2020 (15 $/barrel in the low price scenario).
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It is however also clear from this chapter that it is primarily the transport sector, and not the
conversion sector, which faces the immediate supply problems. Particularly two circumstances
point however toward incorporating security of supply considerations in the power sector. Firstly
the need for developing and improving clean and renewable energy technologies to supply the
transport sector with alternative energy. Secondly because the technical lifetimes of new power
plants are long it would be advantageous to take account of the long-term security of supply
situations of fuels such as natural gas.
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6 Procurement of new power capacity
It is a precondition for investments in new and renewable energy technologies to take place that
they are competitive with the traditional fossil fuel technologies. This circumstance was among
others examined in chapter 4. Another precondition for investments to take place is a demand for
new capacity. This is the focus of this chapter, which examines the conditions for establishing new
power capacity in the liberalised power market.
This issue is related to the challenge of securing sufficient power capacity. In this regard it is
important to notice that procurement of new capacity is only one of three general solutions to the
problem. The other two are:
Extending transmission capacity. May alleviate a power balance problem in a deficit area if
connected to a surplus area. Furthermore increased interconnection capacity may reduce the
demand for reserve capacity and also the total demand for peak power capacity in matching
areas if it is reasonable to assume that consumption does not peak in the connected areas at the
same time. The TSOs are responsible for planning the high-voltage transmission grid in
Denmark - the Minister for Economic and Business Affairs must however approve the
establishment of transmission lines above 100 kV (LBK nr. 151, 2003: §21), and can require a
transmission line built between Eastern- and Western Denmark (§ 30).
Reduced power consumption in peak-load hours. Can take place either by load shifting,
where load is shifted from peak to off-peak periods (for example by moving energy intensive
industry production from day to night hours) or by general energy saving and energy efficiency
initiatives aiming at reducing peak consumption (so-called peak clipping) or consumption in
general (see e.g. Swisher et al., 1997: 111). In the liberalised market it is the intention that comsumers
should adjust their demand in peak-load hours because energy prices increase.
Though the focus here is on the conditions for providing new capacity the interaction with the other
measures will also be touched on. For illustration purposes I have included Figure 37, which shows
the hour-to-consumption of power in Western Denmark in 2003 as well the load duration curve for
the same year. As indicated the demand for peak load power is present particularly on working days
in the wintertime.
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Figure 37: Hour to hour power consumption in Western Denmark in 2003 and the load duration curve for the same year
(based on consumption data from Eltra, available at www.eltra.dk, see appendix O).
The chapter is structured in accordance with the following work questions: How is the current
Danish and Nordic supply and demand situation? How is the liberalised market supposed to
provide for new capacity? How do relevant stakeholders in the power sector relate to the power
balance problem ?
At first the Nordic electricity system will be described in brief. Following this the power balance
problem will be examined in a Danish as well as a Nordic perspective. The Nordic perspective is
interesting not only because of the physical co-operation but also because relevant stakeholders
prefer inter-Scandinavian solutions to the problem.
The chapter will end up with a more general discussion regarding the problems of giving the market
players the responsibility to decide investments in a market, which is very strongly dominated by
social and political interests.
6.1 The Nordic electricity system
The Nordic electricity system, with the exception of Western Denmark and Iceland, is operated as a
synchronous area with the same frequency. Interconnections between Sweden, Finland, Norway and
Denmark are by High Voltage Alternating Current (HVAC) (Nordel, 2002a: 9), whereas connections
to Western Denmark, which is part of the continental electricity system, UCTE (Union for the Co-
ordination of Transmission of Electricity), are by High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) connections
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(Eltra 2003:19). Iceland is not connected to the other Nordic countries. The interconnections between
the different areas appear from Figure 38.
The close interconnection between countries offers several advantages in relation to the security of
supply. In situations with operational disturbances the countries can profit from sharing reserves,
and when regulating power is needed to maintain the balance and frequency of the power system, or
if balance power is required to cover deviations between contracted production and expected
consumption, the co-operation helps lowering costs and improves the reliability of the system
(Nordel, 2003a: 19-25, Elkraft System, 2002c: 16). However a disadvantage is that the individual systems
become more dependent on each other. This was for instance seen in September 2003 when a power
failure in Southern Sweden also caused a black out in Eastern Denmark due to the strong and
synchronous interconnection (Elkraft System, 2003c: 4). In this regard it should be noted that DC (direct
current) connections are more manageable than AC (alternating current) connections, making it
more difficult for a power failure to spread from one synchronous area to another (Elkraft System,
2002c: 26).
For these reasons system security in Eastern Denmark is primarily dependent on the situation in the
other Nordic countries (Elkraft System, 2002c: 16-17), and Western Denmark on the Central European
system (UCTE)116. However in a situation with lack of power capacity in the general system,
consumers are to be disconnected in the area with the greatest deficit in its power balance according
to the operation agreement between the Nordic countries (Elkraft System, 2002c: 17). Therefore from a
system adequacy point of view (cf. chapter 2.2.3) the national policy on security of supply is still
decisive.
116
 In spite of Eastern Denmark being connected to Germany by a DC connection and Western Denmark to Sweden and
Norway by DC connections (see Figure 38).
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Figure 38: Frequency areas of Northern Europe (adapted from Nordel, 2003a: 20).
6.1.1 The Nordic power balance
According to Nordel, the body for co-operation between the TSO's in the Nordic countries, the
Nordic power balance has become more and more strained during the last 10-15 years. During this
period of increasing liberalisation of the sector the growth in production capacity has been quite
limited due to decommissioning of existing plants and because little new capacity has been installed
(Nordel, 2002a: 22).
This tendency is depicted in Figure 39, showing the relative development in consumption and
installed production capacity in the Nordel area since 1990. Whereas consumption has increased by
some 14 %, total installed capacity has only risen by app. 5 %.
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Figure 39: Development in consumption and capacity in Nordel area (Own figure, based on Nordel annual statistics,
available at www.nordel.org).
Nordel has recently given the following description of the power balance situation.
"Nordel is becoming increasingly dependent on imports in order to tackle an extreme winter
situation. The power balance is expected to come under strain in an extreme peak-load situation,
even with high availability in the transmission system between the Nordic countries and on the
interconnections to neighbouring countries. " (Nordel, 2002a: 23).
The quotation indicates that the power balance is a serious problem. Extreme peak-load is estimated
as the expected load if a very cold winter day occurred on a working day in each Nordic country at
the same time. The occurrence probability is estimated at a little less than 7 % per winter. (Nordel,
2003a: 23). A projection of the 2006/2007-winter power balance shows that particular Sweden can
become short of capacity, whereas Eastern and Western Denmark will have small surpluses
assuming the present capacity will be available at that time (Nordel, 2003: 25).
In addition the Nordel area is faced with certain climatic challenges due to the high reliance on
hydropower (cf. Figure 40). According to Nordel a year with extremely low precipitation (happens
app. 1 out of 40 years) can cause a drop in production by almost 40 TWh. For comparison Nordel
reckons 193 TWh as a normal year in terms of hydro production (Nordel 2003c:5)117. The
consequence of lacking hydropower production can be energy shortage. This is basically a fuel
security problem (in Nordel analysed by energy balances) but essentially different from the fuel
security problems to be elaborated on in chapter 5. Here it is the fluctuating nature of hydropower
117 Iceland is excluded in both figures. Note that 40 TWh is more than total Danish electricity production in 2002!
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that causes an extra challenge for the system, namely having enough spare capacity to handle the
dry years (or alternatively rely on transmission or consumer measures)
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Figure 40: Electricity generation in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in 2002 (Own figure, based on data from
Nordel, 2003a: 36).
For the energy balance of 2006 Nordel has estimated that, "If a year with extremely low
hydropower production or a combination of two dry years in succession occurs, the result may be a
very serious balance deficit. " (Nordel, 2003b: 13). Nordel foresees that reductions of consumption will
be necessary, and rationing of power or other means might be needed, depending on how the
situation will be handled by the market. In such a situation both Eastern and Western Denmark
would act as exporters of energy (Nordel, 2003b: 13-14), and should therefore not be hit by the
rationing.
6.2 Power balances of Western and Eastern Denmark
The power balance issue is judged quite differently by the TSO's of Eastern and Western Denmark.
Eltra estimates that their system area will not be lacking capacity for many years (Eltra, 2002: 72) and
the system operator expects all of its central power plants to continue to be in operation until 2010
(Eltra, 2002: 64). Elkraft System on the other hand sees that its power balance could come under strain
in the coming years due to increasing consumption and decommissioning of power plants (Elkraft
System, 2002c: 14).
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Box 1: Directive on limitation of emissions of certain
pollutants into the air from large combustion plants.
(EU 2001/80/EC)
The directive covers plants larger than 50 MW
thermal capacity, setting emission limit values for
SO2, NOX and dust. New plants are to comply with
limits that are more stringent that in previous EU
regulation. Plants built between 1987 and 2003 are to
act in accordance with some (less stringent) limits
right ahead whereas older plants not are to comply
with these until 2008. The directive opens up for the
old plants to continue operating beyond 2008 without
complying if they only run as peak power plants. The
directive was implemented in Danish law the 25lh of
Sep. 2003 (almost one year too late) (LBK nr. 808,
2003).
Following the energy reform of 1999 a so-called
power station agreement was entered into
between the TSOs and the Danish power
generators. These agreements have run from
1999 until 2003 (Energistyrelsen et al, 2002: 10). For
Eastern Denmark the agreement meant among
other things that the main producer (Energi E2)
had to make sure that sufficient capacity was
available, that the capacity was in working order
and that the necessary production would take
place (www.elkraft-system.dk, 2003-12-28). The COSt
of this agreement has been 430 million DKK per
year (Elkraft System, 2002b: 15). With the recent
expiration of the least capacity agreements
uncertainty about the capacity issue has come to
the fore.
Box 2: Power Balance of Eastern Denmark
One of the things, which could impact on the power balance in the years to come, is the requirement
in the directive on emissions from large combustion plants (see Box 1). According to Energi E2
between 600 and 700 MW of their capacity is in a condition, which will make it necessary either to
upgrade the plants or decommission them within the next 10 years (Elkraft System, 2003a: 19).
Box 2 shows the projected power balance of Eastern Denmark for the 2003/4-winter. Though there
is a reasonable surplus at present this situation could easily change given that the above-mentioned
capacity is decommissioned and maximum electricity consumption is expected to increase by
around 40 MW per year. Remarkably, the power
balance problem is particular perceived as a
problem in Eastern Denmark though projections
of the 2006/2007 winter power balance indicate
that the situation is expected to be more strained
in west than in east (80/270 MW surplus on a
ten-years winter day). One of the reasons for the
different perceptions is that Eltra does not expect
the demands of the directive on emissions from
large combustion plants and the pricing of CO2 to
lead to definitive closures of plants. Rather Eltra
expects Elsam to put plants with high emissions
and costs in reserve, in order to let them produce
in dry years or during cold winters where high
energy prices allow this (Appendix B). In addition
Winter 2003/4
Available prod. Cap.
Prod. Cap. for disturbance reserves
Prod. Cap. for regulation power
Prod. Cap. less reserves
Max. Electricity consumption
Surplus
MW
4,104
-625
-150
3,329
2,846
483
The power balance shows that in spite of a breakdown
of the largest power plant (taken into account of by
the 625 MW of production capacity for disturbance
reserves) the electricity system of Eastern Denmark
would have a surplus of 483 MW of capacity
available (www.elkraft-system.dk, 2004-07-27).
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Eltra is in a situation where fitting in the highly fluctuating wind power production is identified as
the principal challenge (cf. Eltra's latest system plan, Eltra 2004).
Furthermore, as Figure 41 shows, the power plants of Eastern Denmark are generally older than
Western Danish plants. As per the 1st of January 2004 the average age of East Danish power plant
capacity, excluding wind power plants, was 23.6 years old, the similar figure for Western Denmark
being only 15.8 years (calculation based on Energistyrelsen 2003h). Taken into consideration that the
technical lifetime of (new large) power plants is estimated at 30 years (Energistyrelsen et al., 2004: 17,
29118) replacement of power capacity in Eastern Denmark will expectedly become a pressing
challenge in coming years.
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Figure 41: Age of power plants versus accumulated capacity (MW) (Own figure, based on data from Energistyrelsen,
2003h, see appendix N).
6.2.1 The role of wind power
Currently wind power is not included in the power balance of Eastern Denmark because statistics
show that, even though wind power production is generally greater during winter time, it is usually
not very windy on the very cold winter days where consumption usually reaches its peak (Elkraft
System, 2002c: 23). Eltra makes a similar assumption on the power balance value of wind power (Eltra,
2002: 66).
The fact that windmills produce more in wintertime is of course an advantage and new offshore
wind farms furthermore have the benefit of a more constant production due to the better wind
conditions offshore. New offshore wind power plants are expected thus to have load factors of
I IS Data for CCGT and advanced PF coal fired plant (steam turbine).
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almost 50 %, compared with app. 20-30 % for on-shore windmills (Energistyrelsen, 1996: 31, and DEA et
al., 2004: 54).
Taking account of the power production of windmills from a larger geographic area would decrease
the likelihood that no or very few windmills would be producing (it should be quite unusual that it
was calm in all Nordic countries and Germany at the same time). At present however hourly-based
measurements of wind power production is only available in Denmark, preventing an analysis of
the Nordic capacity contribution from wind power (Elkraft, 2003a: 22). Besides wind power
production is currently very limited in the other Nordic countries (cf. Figure 40, p. 108).
Implementation of new probabilistic tools to examine the system adequacy can hopefully through
light on the capacity value of wind power119. Wind power does contribute to the energy balance of
the Nordic power system, and with increasing short-term price elasticity in consumption (cf. chapter
6.3.2) the value of wind power to the power system can be expected to increase.
6.3 Ensuring sufficient power capacity in the liberalised market
This section explains how the question of ensuring sufficient power capacity is handled in
Denmark. First the legal set-up is described, and after that the Nordic spot market model will be
elaborated on. Finally different alternative models for ensuring power capacity will be discussed.
6.3.1 The legal set-up
Though energy markets have been liberalised, and market players are expected to provide for new
capacity, the responsibility for maintaining sufficient power capacity in Denmark lies with the
TSOs. The electricity supply act requires that the TSOs maintain sufficient generation capacity in
their system areas and with a view to maintaining security of supply the generators need approval
from the system operators to put plants above 25 MW power capacity out of service (LBK nr. 151,2003:
§27a,b).
Generators can be committed to notify their TSO one year ahead in case they decide to
decommission or mothball a plant (§12). Furthermore the recent EU directive on common rules for
the internal electricity market (EU 2003/54/EC) (repealing the former electricity market directive on
common rules from 1996) requires member states to ensure the possibility to provide for new
capacity or energy efficiency/demand side management measures through a tendering procedure or
a similar procedure if necessary to ensure the security of supply. In Denmark the TSOs have in
agreement with the directive been designated as the body responsible for organising, monitoring
and controlling possible tendering procedures (L 236A, 2004: §27d). Initiation of such measures is
however subject to the approval of the Minister for Economic and Business Affairs, which also
have other powers with regard to ensuring the power supply. According to the electricity supply act
(LBK nr. 151, 2003: §50) the minister can in the concession to power generators require them to
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maintain a minimum amount of generation capacity (by a warning 1 year in advance), and
decommissioning of power plants greater than 25 MW can only take place if the DEA finds that the
security of supply is not reduced considerably. If a generator receives a refusal from the DEA, the
DEA can require the TSO to enter an agreement with the generator regarding future production
(LBK493,2003:§10).
In Eastern Denmark Elkraft System has interpreted the requirement for sufficient generation
capacity as maintaining a positive power balance within the system area (Elkraft System, 2002c: 13).
According to Elkraft System this is necessary from a system point of view because of the strained
power and energy balance of the Nordic area and the uncertainty about the possibilities for import
from the continent120 (Elkraft System, 2002b: 6). Another interpretation is made by Eltra, according to
which it will be acceptable to rely on imports to cover peak load situations (Eltra, 2004:10).
6.3.2 The spot market model
Before liberalisation system adequacy was determined and monitored centrally by an agent, which
also had the means to undertake or influence new investments in power plants. With the
liberalisation of the energy markets it is (in principle, see above) "left to the market players to
establish sufficient capacity" (Nordel, 2002b: 3).
In the spot market model the electricity prices on the market are the primary means to achieve
balance between supply and demand, with regard to the day-to-day dispatching of power plants as
well as the long-term investment perspective. As briefed on in chapter 4.4, the price of electricity in
a perfect market will each hour correspond to the short run marginal cost of the most expensive of
the plants running and all plants which have bid below this price will receive the market price
(where demand and supply curves meet). The relationship between supply and demand is shown in
Figure 42. The supply curve illustrates short run marginal cost associated with production. If all
capacity is activated the curve becomes vertical. The demand curves show the price, which
consumers require to reduce consumption marginally (three different situations are depicted: low
demand, high elastic demand and high inelastic demand).
Problems can arise when demand is high and inelastic. In such a case we risk having a power
deficiency (situation A), which would require disconnection of consumers. If demand were price
elastic (dotted line) there should be no power balance problem. In this case higher prices would just
result in lower consumption (situation B). Experience shows however that consumption of
119
 Such tools are available (cf. Elkraft System, 2003d) but are at this time not the primary instrument to assess system
adequacy.
120
 Both due to possible failure of the interconnections (ocean bed cables) (Elkraft System, 2000a: 13), plus in the case
of Poland that imp<-<1 (e.g. through Sweden) is limited due to bottlenecks of the transmission system and for Germany's
part by a strained power balance, particularly over the years (Elkraft System, 2003a: 21).
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J21
electricity is very inelastic particularly in a short time perspective (Elkraft System, 2003: 20-21) ~ . One
of the reasons for this is that many electricity consumers at present are not settled with on an hourly
basis, and therefore do not have any incitement to react on short term price spikes (Nordel, 2003c: 47).
high elastic demand \
price
low demand
high inelastic demand
A
potential deficit
T
max available
generation capacity
quantity (MWh/h)
Figure 42: Power pricing in the spot-market (own figure).
Price elastic consumption should have the advantage of both: reducing price spikes, limiting the
need for new production capacity and work as an operating reserve to cope with deviations from
forecasts (Elkraft System, 2001b: 14-15). It has recently been decided within the framework of Nordel,
that each Nordic TSO is to develop an action plan for enhancing demand response (Nordel & Nordic
Council of Ministers, 2004).
The economic argument behind controlling capacity extensions by the spot-market model is that
consumers get what "they are willing to pay for" (Nordel, 2002b: 6). Instead of considering electricity
as infrastructure it is considered a commodity, which should give different preferences among
consumers for e.g. reliability.
The following quotation from Nordel describes how plants get their costs covered under a spot
market scheme.
"During low load conditions the price equals the marginal cost of the base load plants. They cover
their running costs, but no more. No other units are running. During medium load conditions the
price reflects the marginal cost of the medium load units. They cover their running costs only, while
' Though some short-term flexibility of consumption can be observed in Sweden and Norway, but not in Denmark and
Finland (Elkraft System, 2003a: 20). Long-term flexibility is likely to be greater among others because sustained high
electricity prices would allow consumers to invest in alternative supply forms, resulting in a change from for instance
electric heating to an oil-fired burner.
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the base load plants also cover part of their fixed costs. During peak load conditions the price
occasionally has to exceed the marginal cost of the peaking units. During these periods all units
cover their running and fixed costs. In an optimal system, the market prices will in theory exactly
cover both the variable and fixed costs of all units." (Nordel, 2002b: 7).
In this way incentive for investments in both base, intermediate and peak load plants should be
given. Situation B in Figure 42 illustrates how the market price can exceed the marginal cost of
peaking units, thus creating an incentive for these plants as well. The requirement for this situation
to take place is elastic consumption so that the spot price in some hours is determined by the
consumers' willingness to reduce consumption. Lack of (i.e. continued lack of) price elastic demand
is perhaps the greatest threat to the spot market model, and could result in involuntary load
shedding (Nordel, 2002b: 11).
Another challenge for the spot market is reserves to deal with operational disturbances. The TSOs
of the Nordic countries have so far handled this question by contracting certain quantities (app.
3,000 MW altogether) of capacity. This capacity is not intended to be used in the spot market - only
for regulating power in the special market for this service (the regulating power market122) - in
order not to disturb price (and investment) signals on the spot market. According to Nordel a so-
called "pure price spike model", with no special arrangement for reserve capacity, does not exist
anywhere in the world and is not realistic (Nordel, 2002b: 11-13) .
Beyond lack of price elastic consumption Energistyrelsen et al. (2002:14-15) emphasises the
following circumstances as being able to lead to a strained power balance:
• Market power. If generators withhold capacity in order to raise prices.
• Uncertainty about political measures. If market players lack confidence in the market this
could prevent them from investing. E.g. the fear of new government supported power plants
that would lower the market price and thereby endanger the profitability of new investments.
The implementation of the CO2 quota market could be mentioned in this connection.
• Climatic conditions (cf. chapter 0). The dry years with less hydropower require extra
demand for flexible consumption or additional capacity, and particularly investments in
peak power plants can be very risky since there can pass years where they will not be
running (Nordel, 2002b: II)124.
122
 Whereas the spot market determines price and amounts one day ahead, the regulating market works real time to take
account of deviations in planned production and consumption.
123
 Furthermore each of the Nordic countries has made additional measures to secure their systems. In Denmark has
been done through the power station agreements between the system operators and Energi E2 and Elsam (Nordel
2002b: 17,21). I will not elaborate on the arrangements of the other Nordic countries.
124
 The following quotation on the Nordic investment perspectives from Vattenfall's Annual Report 2002 illustrates the
problem very well: ''The electricity balance in the Nordic system in a year of normal precipitation is good and, in
Vattenfall's view, this situation will remain the same throughout the rest of the decade. Therefore, in our opinion, in
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• Long lead times for new plants. Impedes the timing of new supply and can thereby cause
lack of capacity and high prices for a long time.
On this background critics of the spot market model claim that the model is not suitable, arguing
among others that consumers will not tolerate the extreme price volatility, which the model is likely
to cause, and furthermore that the model does not account for the Value of Lost Load (VOLL)125
(Besser et al., 2002: 55-56). Both problems are basically related to the lack of price elastic demand.
6.3.3 Alternatives to the spot market model
Different models have been discussed in a Nordic context as supplements to the current spot market
model to ensure sufficient power capacity. According to Nordel the models can roughly be divided
into two categories (Nordel, 2002b: 12):
• Quantity based systems and
• Price based systems
A quantity based system usually means a system where the need for capacity is defined centrally for
instance by the TSO as an obligation on electricity suppliers. This introduces an additional market
for capacity next to the energy market. The capacity requirements could e.g. be based on previous
years' energy sale or peak load, or perhaps forecasts of these. A capacity market model has been
used with relatively success in the Northeast USA in the Pennsylvania- New Jersey-Maryland
(PJM) interconnection. Here the capacity market has not only applied to generators but has also
included demand side measures (load that can be interrupted). This model recognises that "capacity
has value because it represents the capability to deliver energy" (Bowring and Gramlich, 2000: 57). An
advantage of capacity markets should be less volatile energy market prices because more capacity is
brought in. Practical experiences from the PJM-interconnection do however also reveal problems,
e.g. with market power and too low penalties for non-compliance - causing lack of capacity -
which has particularly become present in circumstances where the system has been strained. In such
situations energy prices would often be higher in neighbouring areas with no capacity markets, thus
increasing the incentives for generators to export their power (Bowring and Gramlich, 2000: 65-66).
Fixed capacity payment is the most common price based capacity system. It involves a fixed
payment to owners of generating capacity (per MW) - the purpose being to benefit those peak load
plants, which only operate in the small number of hours with very high prices126. Furthermore the
view of existing market conditions, it is not possible to establish additional large-scale power production facilities on a
commercial terms". (Vattenfall, 2003: 4). If this represents the market players" general risk aversion it can prove a
problem to provide for sufficient "dry-year capacity" on spot market conditions.
125
 That is the cost imposed on consumers in case of involuntary electricity supply interruption.
126
 As mentioned according to the Danish NAP the allocation of CO2 quotas for new fossil fuelled power plants is based
on the plants power and heat capacities and will in fact work as a capacity payment to new power plants
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capacity payment stimulates investment and discourages decommissioning of old plants. The
payment is decided centrally and the market decides the actual generation capacity (in contrast to
the quantity based system). Such payments are used in Spain, Argentina, Columbia and Chile where
they are financed by a general tariff for all consumers. Some of the challenges associated with this
model would, according to Nordel, be to decide on the appropriate level of capacity payment (and
avoid causing either a surplus or a deficit of capacity) and to take account of demand side measures
(Nordel, 2002b: 14-15).
A particular variety, of the quantity-based systems, is a tendering system where e.g. the TSO, based
on the expected developments in capacity and demand, invites tenders for a given amount of
capacity. The generators could for instance compete on delivering capacity for the lowest fixed
capacity payment per MW for a given period (Energistyrelsen et al., 2002: 36).
These alternative models have however been rejected both at the Danish (Energistyrelsen et al., 2002: 37)
and the Nordic level. The fears of Nordel is that the extra capacity, established and paid for by
consumers in the Nordic countries would result in exports to e.g. Germany meaning that "Nordic
consumers pay for increased reliability of the German system" (Nordel, 2002b: 15)127. A problem,
which I see could be reduced if measures, or certain minimum standards of security of supply were
introduced in a greater geographic area e.g. as a EU means. Furthermore according to Nordel the
capacity market model has the basic problem that it "takes us back to the past, where a few
hopefully well-informed people decide on how much capacity to build". (Nordel, 2002b: 16). The same
must account to a tendering system.
In a transitional period it is recognized however that arrangements for new capacity could be
needed until sufficient price elasticity in the market is observed. These arrangements should
however support the market-oriented solutions and avoid distorting the market, e.g. by bidding this
capacity in the regulating market at a clearly higher price than the maximum price in spot market,
according to a common Nordic framework (Nordic Council of Ministers and Nordel, 2002: 1, Nordel, 2004:
19,21).
6.4 Discussion of the spot market model
The Nordic spot market model, as I see it, has some problematic features, which I will account for
in following. My concerns go only toward the investment aspects, i.e. establishing of new plant, and
not the dispatching of power plants.
6.4.1 Society is the customer of the market
Firstly I see it as a weakness of the current discussion about the spot market model that it seems to
be more focused with when/if market players will start investing - and not with what the market
127
 Still however in a situation with lack of capacity in the general system the system areas with greatest deficit are to
disconnect consumers.
116
Chapter 6 - Procurement of new power capacity
will invest in. The market will supposedly decide this. I think it is reasonable to approach this belief
in the market with some scepticism, as it is done by the power generator Elsam. According to
Flemming Nissen, Elsam the market has been very successful in making the current power system
more effective, but there exists no common picture of the future today among stakeholders in the
sector and under these conditions it is not possible for market players to act rationally . He does
not think that the current framework regulation (liberalisation + the EU ETS) can tell us which
technologies; renewable energy, nuclear power or clean coal will shape the future energy system.
Pioneers, entrepreneurs and a political effort are needed to drive the long-term development
(Appendix A).
It is important to notice that the product of the sector, electricity, is very different from most other
goods because product development can only take place with regard to the way production takes
place - the production machinery (different fuels, different techniques etc.)- The product it self has
been standardised many years ago, and with a few exceptions129 it is not possible to improve on it.
Therefore contrary to other products the actual costumers of electricity, those which the product
development is aimed at, are not primarily consumers but society, represented by e.g. the EU and
the Danish state. It is the society, which has different demands with regards to environment,
security of supply etc. According to Flemming Nissen this circumstance is not yet recognized by
some people in the industry - as well as by some politicians who no longer feel responsibility for
the challenges of sector after it has been liberalised (Appendix A).
According to Elsam's annual report 2002, "At present the Danish energy policy in many respects
represents the largest factor of uncertainty with respect to Elsam's development as commercial
company. It is also the most problematic issue; as such uncertainty cannot be handled in purely
commercial manner. A sufficiently stable and long-term framework for the operation of production
companies has not been created" (Elsam, 2003: 5). And furthermore "Denmark needs a long-term
energy policy, which can support the sector's chances to exploit the results achieved through the
Danish environment and energy policies in recent years." (Elsam, 2003: 5). Flemming Nissen, Elsam
thinks that the future energy system should be decided by a democratic debate, which is lacking at
present (Appendix A).
I find it remarkable that the largest Danish power producer is advocating for a long-term energy
policy. As mentioned in chapter 3.1 this requirement may be about to be fulfilled to some extent,
with the government's decision to propose a "Plan of action for the future energy infrastructure up
According to Hemming Nissen, of the conditions which economists set up for a market to be the most efficient
means - many market players, rational behaviour and knowledge of the future - only the first condition is fulfilled in
the long-term. There exist no common picture of the future among market players and therefore they are not capable of
acting rationally (Appendix A).
Units to deliver uninterruptible power supply (UPS) could be one such exception I presume, as this adds a "security
of supply value" to the product of electricity.
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to 2010" (own translation). The plan will contain short to medium term analyses of different electricity
infrastructure initiatives as well as long-term analyses of the strategic challenges for the energy
sector, among these security of supply issues (power as well as fuel), Danish industrial potentials
and technological development (Energistyrelsen, 2004b).
The question is what role a long-term energy plan is to play in a liberalised market where the
decision-making process is supposed to be outsourced to market players. According to Kaj
Stærkind from the DEA, who is contact person on the infrastructure project, the plan can be looked
at as a tool for the politicians. The object is to prepare and present analyses on how the market will
develop so that the politicians are aware of opportunities and threats, and furthermore to examine
whether changed framework conditions would give better or changed opportunities. In this process
different stakeholders such as the TSOs, power generators, environmental organisations and the
industry will be involved (Appendix E). Since different sides of the parliament have different
expectations to the plan it will be difficult to say though, how the political process and the plan will
develop in continuation of the government's presentation of a proposal for the plan130, according to
Kaj Stærkind (Appendix E).
As I see it the current approach to investments suffers from some basic problems with regard to
involving politicians in the decision making process and avoiding ad hoc decisions. It anticipates
that decisions decided by market players are approved by the political system without interferences
- the market will decide. Plants decided by market players have to comply with an authorisation
procedure for new plants (approval by the DEA), but the authorisation procedure does not set up
any requirements with regard to technology, fuel use and GHG emissions131 (BEK 493,2003). Based
on the above discussion I do not believe this is a sound approach.
When a market player decides to establish a new (large) power plant it will inevitable end up as a
political issue with severe discussions. This was the case in the 1990'es when new large power
plants were planned (Appendix A and Federspiel, 2002: ch. 9), and I find it highly unlikely that such
discussions will not take place again merely because of the liberalisation. These discussions will be
fruitful for the democratic debate, but on the other hand unsuitable if discussions are focused on ad
hoc decisions instead of a general strategy for the sector. Furthermore there is a risk that the
decision process for new plants could end up being very long, possibly jeopardising the security of
power supply because plants are not built in due time. The solution, as I see it, is to go toward more
committing and consensus-based planning for sector. In such a planning process it would be
important to have a high degree of stakeholder involvement and to reach long-lasting compromises,
130
 The plan will afterwards enter a discussion and decision process in the Danish parliament (Appendix E).
131
 There are no requirements with regard to greenhouse gases as long as the plants are encompassed by a GHG cap and
trade system (BEK 493, 2003: §6-9).
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meaning among others a wide political support - unlike what we have seen recent years ". To
ensure capacity extensions with the preferred technologies it may prove necessary to apply
tendering procedures as a means to provide for new capacity.
A coordinated strategy for the sector should also help avoiding ad hoc, politically decisions (the
recently decided off-shore wind farms make up an example133), which contribute to increasing
uncertainty for market players, energy equipment manufacturers and transmission planners (see
below).
6.4.2 Coordination with transmission and consumption initiatives
As described in the beginning of this chapter providing for new generation capacity is only one of
three possible measures to provide for a sufficient level of security of power supply. As Table 13
shows the current regulation set-up with regard to ensuring security of power supply implies that
the powers to take decisions are spread on a number of entities, which are not necessarily obliged to
cooperate.
Previously, in the consumer owned companies, a coordinated planning of transmission and power
plant capacity took place. Today the TSOs are, broadly speaking, to plan for new transmission
capacity without sufficient information about where (and whether) the next power plants will be
built, and market players are to commission new power plants without knowing if new transmission
capacity may provide access to e.g. foreign markets potentially improving or worsening the
economy of the plant. In addition politically driven decision in power generation capacity impact on
the demand for new transmission capacity (as well as on the power market). The more information
is available about future generation capacity the better can the transmission system be designed. For
example previous knowledge about the number and location of future offshore wind power plants
connected to the grid will make it possible for the TSO to make a comprehensive transmission
planning, as apposed to extending the transmission grid piece by piece as new offshore wind farms
are decided134.
The above circumstances I think are further arguments for a coordinated planning for new
generation, transmission and consumption measures.
The recent agreement on offshore wind power etc. is an exception (supported by all parties in the parliament apart
from Dansk Folkeparti and Enhedslisten) (Økonomi- og erhvervsministeriet, 2004b).
1
 '
3
 The off-shore wind farm extension were at first decided by the previous government, then cancelled by the current
government, and again decided with the 29lh of March political agreement.
Cf. for instance the different solutions that are available for an extension of the Eastern Danish transmission grid
depending on the number and location of future offshore wind farms (Elkrafts System, 2003e: 25-27).
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Stakeholders Generation capacity Transmission capacity Consumption
TSOs
Market
players
Politicians
Distribution
companies
Security of supply:
Provide reserve capacity,
tender for new capacity,
postpone decommissioning of
plants
Provide for new capacity on
market conditions.
Politically driven decisions on
new plants, postpone
decommissioning of plants.
Transmission planning.
Approve new lines (> 100
kV). Demand a connection
between East and West-DK.
(Distribution grid planning)
Encourage price elasticity.
Demand projections.
(Consumers are expected to
react to price signals).
Initiate energy saving
programmes.
Encourage energy savings.
Table 13: Roles and means with regard to providing security of power supply (own table).
Consumption measures are also relevant to include in a coordinated planning for the sector, but the
importance of this will probably be less pronounced as changes in consumption take place gradually
and therefore do not have the same effect on transmission and power capacity investments.
6.4.3 Ensuring sufficient power capacity - can we do without the central agent?
Finally comes the question if the market will invest in due time. A main argument for letting the
market decide on new investments is to avoid the central agent, but the central agent still plays an
important role in the Nordic spot market model. It is still the responsibility of the system operators
to provide for reserve capacity, and recently common procedures for establishing transitional peak
load resources have been agreed on (Nordel, 2004) - though the vision is that market players will
provide sufficient capacity. Similarly the argument for having the TSO establish the reserve
capacity is that this capacity is only necessary in situations where the commercial plants are not
running properly, e.g. because of break downs at power plant. But in principle - according to
market theories - such a situation, where prices should peak, ought to get the risky investors started.
Furthermore, at least in Denmark135, where the TSOs are given the final responsibility of ensuring
the long-term security of supply, measures are available to e.g. postpone the decommissioning of
power plants. In the longer term I see that this way of controlling sufficient capacity is problematic
as maintaining old, inefficient and often quite polluting plants, could prevent the establishment of
new and better power plants.
135
 The TSOs in the Nordic countries have different responsibilities. In Finland and Sweden the responsibility is for
instance limited to the operating hour (Nordel, 2004: 7).
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According to Hans Henrik Lindboe, Elkraft System, the procedures are not clear if for instance
Energi E2 decides to decommission a critical amount of power capacity. In the first place Elkraft
System could probably take over the old plant and keep it out of the spot market, so as only to use
the plant in situations where the system is strained. By keeping the old plant out of the market
investors should retain incentives to invest in new plants (cf. the framework for transitional capacity
arrangements mentioned in chapter 6.3). Depending on the physical conditions of the
decommissioned plants136, a tender for new capacity could also become relevant. In this regard the
TSO will inevitably be involved in the decision on what kind of plant to invest in, according to
Hans Henrik Lindboe. "When you decide how much to be invested, you also decide what to invest
in" (Appendix G - own translation). A key question would be whether to invest in peak power or base
load capacity. If there is enough peak power capacity in the system, as the case would probably be
in Eastern Denmark, Elkraft System may choose to support projects, which are already close to
commercialisation. In Eastern Denmark these could be projects, which Energi E2 is already keen on
implementing (e.g. a new "Amager 2"). In fact Energi E2 may be gambling on this, according to
Hans Henrik Lindboe (Appendix G).
The lifeline to avoiding the above situation will be to activate consumers. If consumption is made
price elastic, it does not matter how much power capacity is available to the system. In case this is
not possible the market will in reality be annulled, according to Hans Henrik Lindboe (Appendix G),
because the central agent automatically will become involved in the decisions regarding new plants.
A basic problem with central decision-making may be that it will become more obvious that the
political system decides. In the old system there was a drive towards building too much, and in a
centralised system the politicians would be inclined to accept building new plants. "As soon as the
price of power becomes high it would be cried out that the public plans for capacity extensions are
insufficient - that we need more MWs added to the system " (Interview w. Hans Henrik Lindboe, Appendix
G - own translation). Furthermore there is a danger that the decision makers on the generation side
(Energi E2 and Elsam) are dominating to an extent, that they will become too integrated in the
political decision-making. In a situation where the market is not capable of delivering a high level
of security of power supply, it seems probable however that central decision-making would be
required to initiate measures; among others due to the demands made on the TSOs in the electricity
supply act to maintain sufficient generation capacity137.
6.5 Roundup
The Nordic power balance has become increasingly strained since the gradual liberalization of
power markets. From a national perspective it has therefore become more and more important to
136
 If the plant is totally worn-out it may prove in vain (too costly) to keep it ready for operation.
137
 In addition, according to Hans Henrik Lindboe, Elkraft System, it is unlikely, that politicians will tolerate large
blackouts or daily interruptions of the power supply (Appendix G).
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have sufficient power capacity within the borders of the country. In Denmark environmental
requirements to existing power plants, combined with the presence of relatively old power plants
(particularly in Eastern Denmark), will increase the demand for new investments in the years to
come.
At present there is consensus among the Danish TSOs, the DEA as well as in Nordel to support the
spot market model. It is assumed that in the long-term it will be possible to develop price elastic
consumption and create sufficient confidence in the market for new investments to take place.
I see however that the current market based approach to investments in power capacity suffers from
three drawbacks:
1) It ignores that society is the customer of the sector. I think it is necessary to involve the state
early in the planning and decision making for the sector to avoid ad-hoc decisions.
2) It does not take into account that a co-ordinated planning for measures within power
capacity, transmission and distribution is favourable.
3) The role of the central agent is unclear. This may lead to unsuitable decisions e.g. if old
power plants are kept "artificially alive" by the TSOs in order to maintain sufficient power
capacity. The need for the central agent will depend on future possibilities for making
consumption respond to prices.
The above drawbacks require a new approach to the procurement of new capacity. Fixed capacity
payments or capacity markets could in spite of their different drawbacks perhaps be useful in
ensuring the security of supply if designed properly. The problem with these models is however that
they still rely on the market to decide the development of the future electricity system, and for that
reason I do not find them suitable.
The new EU electricity market directive opens up for possible tendering for power capacity or
demand side measures, which may "only be launched if on the basis of the authorisation procedure,
the generating capacity being built or the energy efficiency/demand-side management measures
being taken are not sufficient to ensure security of supply" (EU 2003/54/EC). Tendering has the
advantage that the government may shape the future sector by setting up criteria for new plants. If
this approach is chosen it will however become important to ensure that decisions on tenders for
new plants are made part of long-term plan for sector, in order to avoid the disadvantages of ad-hoc
decisions.
The challenge is to create a regulation model, which ensure the advantages of a coordinated
planning and still make the best possible use of the incitements provided by the market with regard
to making the sector more effective, including the prevention of excess capacity.
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In the following chapter I will further discuss how such a future "system" for procurement of new
capacity may be designed.
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7 New means of regulation
Based on the previous chapters I will draw the following main conclusions:
1) If properly designed the EU ETS can help making the energy sector more carbon efficient,
but it will not instigate the technological development, which is required in the long-term.
Support is needed for new innovative technologies as well for more developed RE
technologies, which are close to being competitive on the market, but are hampered by their
high initial costs.
2) A particular challenge, which the current regulation, does not take care of is the security of
fuel supply. This gives greater impetus to the arguments for promoting renewable energy
technologies, CHP and energy savings.
3) The vision that the market can solve the problems of the energy sector by it-self - provided
the right framework conditions - is not practical. Primarily because society is the actual
customer of the power industry and therefore will always have an in depth interest in the
major decisions. Moreover because of the lack of coordination between decisions in the
sector (generation, transmission, consumption) and the risk which liberalization puts to the
security of power supply.
It will be most important to create a system paving the road for the new technologies necessary to
deal with the climate change and security of supply concerns. Concentrating on the traditional fossil
fuel technologies will involve an innovation loss because capital is directed toward dead-end
solutions. Regulation should take into account that new investments will shape the sector for a long
time. To the extent that fossil fuel technologies are needed it will be favorable to establish plants,
which are capable of applying different fuels (multi-fuel plants) including biomass, in order to cope
with changing security of supply and environmental requirements.
This chapter will examine what regulation of the sector is suitable for promoting the above
solutions in a way, which is in accordance with the intentions of the liberalization of the energy
markets.
The chapter will deal with the following work questions: How should support for new technologies
take place? and How should a new strategic planning for the sector take place?
It should be noted that I do not intend to specify which technologies are particularly attractive to
support. This will depend on among others projections of the future economy of different
technologies (cf. the experience curves in Figure 4, p. 21), the availability of local resources (wind,
solar, biomass, natural gas etc.) and other national concerns. An analysis of this is out of the scope
of the project. I will however strike a blow for taking into consideration the interest of the Danish
energy equipment industry when designing a future strategy for the sector.
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7.1 Technology support
This section examines different approaches to supporting new generation technologies in the power
market. Firstly the process of technological development will be elaborated on drawing primarily on
the conclusions from a recent DEA financed project on the promotion of renewable energy under
market conditions (Skytte et al., 2004). Secondly I will go more into detail with the advantages and
disadvantages of different support schemes that are available for promoting new technologies on the
market. This will be done with a view to the fact that a possible supporting system may also be
applicable for procurement of capacity in general - i.e. not only as a means to advance new and
renewable energy technologies. Finally I will consider how a future support scheme could benefit
from being coordinated with the interests of Danish energy equipment manufacturers.
7.1.1 Theory on technological development
According to Skytte et al. (2004: 85) it can be fruitful to consider the technological development
process of new energy technologies to take place in four different phases. These are pioneer,
introduction, market and competition (summarised in Table 14).
Phases Description
Pioneer The technology emerges as an independent technology. This phase is characterised by a
small number of companies developing the technology primarily through radical innovations.
The first barrier is to create a workable and reliable product. The greatest risk is
technological.
Introduction Introduction of the product on markets (most often niche markets). Known technology -
many companies. Innovation becomes incremental. The greatest risk is financial.
Market The technology has become reliable and standardised and established on the market.
Competition has resulted in a smaller amount of companies. The greatest risk for investors
is the market risk - i.e. achieving sufficient market share.
Competition The product is mature and has the opportunity of competing on equal terms with
conventional technologies. Few companies.
Table 14: Phases of the technological development process for RE technologies. For a more thorough description of the
four phases see Skytte et al. (2004:85-91)13S.
In each phase the technologies will have different needs for public support. Generally a distinction
can be made between two types of support, technology push support and demand pull support. In
the first phases, particularly in the pioneer phase, the technology push support is most important.
This involves R&D for finding the right technology concept (basic research), support for
demonstration plants (applied research) as well as so-called triple helix initiatives which support
138
 Based on a similar RE technology phase description developed by Kjær & Andersen (1993: 8), it should be
mentioned that before reaching the pioneer phase, it may make sense to introduce a phase called "future technology".
At this stage, before any market exists, the R&D effort should primarily be aimed at showing scientifically that the
technology has technical and economic potentials. The terminology developed by Kjær & Andersen to a greater extend
emphasises the technological steps up till the market introduction.
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networking between industry, research institutions and authorities to create synergies in product and
process innovation (Skytte et al. 2004: 81-82). In the later phases the market pull becomes the more
important. In these phases innovation increasingly takes place incrementally and cost reduction is
stimulated by learning-by-doing and learning-by-using. Market pull can take place as price or
investment support or by establishing separate markets for new technologies - e.g. via RE
certificate markets or tendering procedures. In addition to these support forms the conditions for
establishing new plants are important, this involves the physical planning, and grid connection
conditions (Skytte et al., 2004: 99-100).
Research and development
(Technology push)
Market development
(Demand pull)
Plant conditions
Basic
research
***
**
*
Applied
research
***
**
*
*
Triple
helix
*
***
**
-
Investment
support
**
***
*
-
Price
support
*
**
***
-
Separate
markets
*
***
*
Physical
planning
*
**
***
*
Connection
conditions
*
**
***
*
Pioneer
Introduction
Market
Competition
Table 15: Effect of support measures and plant conditions in the different phases (translated from Skytte et al., 2004: 99).
Table 15 shows how Skytte et al see the importance of the different support types in the different
phases of technological development. Three stars refer to a great effect of support, two to a
moderate effect and one to a little effect - a minus refers to an insignificant effect. My only point of
criticism towards the table is, that I see, the physical planning playing a great role in the
dissemination of RE technologies even in the final stage of technological development where they
are competitive with traditional technologies (competition phase). Dissemination of the wind power
technology for instance is totally dependent on the conditions for physical planning I would argue-
regardless of the plants' economic performances139.
In Denmark the public R&D support for energy production technologies140 is administrated by four
entities: the Danish Energy Authority which administers the Energy Research Programme
(Energiforskningsprogrammet, EFP), a committee under the Danish Research Agency and the two
system operators Eltra and Elkraft System through the PSO system (Public Service Obligation)
(www.energiforskning.dk, 2004-08-10). Recently cooperation has been initiated between the above
entities to coordinate the research effort, and research strategies have been developed within six
139
 Furthermore one may criticise the approach of Skytte et al. for assuming that RE technologies must eventually
become competitive with conventional technologies. I think their model somewhat ignores that some RE technologies
could be fully matured and industrialised, but still would require separate markets or subsidies to be able to compete
with the conventional technologies (and that politicians may choose to support them in spite of this for security of
supply or environmental reasons).
140
 To this c o m e s research in energy efficient end-use technologies administered by the organizat ion of p o w e r
distribution companies, Elfor.
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prioritised areas: biomass, photovoltaics (PV), fuel cells, wind power, hydrogen technologies and
energy efficient energy technologies. In addition to this R&D is supported on the EU level, among
others through the 6th Framework programme and at the Nordic level (Nordisk Energiforskning)
(www.energiforskning.dk, 2004-08-10). It should be noted, that since the change of government in
Denmark in 2001 the development programme for renewable, UVE (Udviklingsprogrammet for
Vedvarende Energi) has been closed and the Energy Research Programme of the DEA has had its
funds cut by almost two thirds141. The UVE supported RE technologies in their whole development
process from research over demonstration to market dissemination (Skytte et al., 2004:105).
In the following I will examine on the different forms of demand support (demand pull) that are
available.
7.1.2 Market promotion incentives
In chapter 6.3.3 different proposed alternatives to the Nordic spot market were accounted for -
quantity based system as well as price-based systems. Similarly it makes sense to categorise the
market based support schemes for prospective technologies in quantity- and price-based systems.
The basic difference between the systems is, that whereas the pricing system establishes the price
and lets the market decide capacity and generation, the quantity based systems set the targets and let
the market decide the price. The competition instigated in the quantity based systems make them
particularly interesting in a liberalised market.
The quantity-based systems encompass separate markets, so-called quota systems or green
certificate markets, where governments mandate a certain share of capacity or generation to come
from renewable energy sources (Sawin, 2004: 6) or tendering systems where project developers
compete for a subsidy, which could be either a fixed price, a subsidy to the market price or an
investment subsidy.
Price-based systems include subsidies for renewable energy plants connecting to the grid. The
support can have the shape of either a fixed (high) price or a subsidy to market prices - with
financing coming from either the government out of the general taxes or from power consumers
(Sawin, 2004: 5). A variant of the price-based systems is investment support - a financial subsidy or
tax deduction given to persons or companies investing in renewable energy plants. In Table 161
have summarised pros and cons of the different systems.
A green certificate market has the disadvantage that it will promote only the most competitive RE
technology thereby making it an unsuitable tool for "pulling" technologies in different phases.
141
 The budget for EFP - energy research has dropped from 114 mill. DKK in 2001 to 40.7 mill DKK in 2003 according
to the Finance Acts (http://www.oes-s.dk/bevilImgslove/doctopic?book=BEVPUBL.FFL01T&topic=23&searchtype=3,
2004-09-15 andhttp://www.oes-cs.dk/bevillingslove/doctopic?book=BEVPUBL.FL03T&topic=8&searchtype=3,
2004-09-15)
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Establishing several separate markets for different technologies would alleviate this problem, but
could on the other hand create a problem of liquidity. Furthermore a green certificate market does
not of its own accord work as a means to ensure sufficient power capacity. Therefore additional
measures could be needed, which may lead to a quite complex regulation of the sector (capacity
market/capacity payment/tendering + green certificate market + spot market).
Seen in combination with the problems of ensuring sufficient power capacity I see that the
tendering system has some advantages compared with the other systems. Firstly it may ensure, that
an appropriate amount of capacity is added to the power system in line with the decommissioning of
older plants and possible rising power consumption (see chapter 6). Secondly it ensures economic
efficiency - as the tendering procedure should vouch for competition. Thirdly the possibility of
applying different criteria in the tendering procedure allows for the promotion of many different
technologies. On this background I recommend that tendering systems become the primary means
to promote new technologies. As mentioned in chapter 3.2, in Denmark, tendering systems are at
present used to provide for new offshore wind farms (Energistyrelsen, 2002b: 14).
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(investment support, fixed price etc.)
Appropriate for ensuring a fixed amount of
capacity to the power system.
Market principles ensure competition (high degree
of efficiency).
Appropriate for providing a fixed amount of
renewable energy in the power system (if properly
designed, see cons).
Gives investor safety about future revenues =>
ease of financing.
Low transaction costs.
Have been the most successful means up to now
in developing renewable energy markets.
In Denmark investment support has been used to
support technologies in their early phases of
development where it is difficult for investors to
gain financing on ordinary conditions.
May result in stop-and-go cycles (if improperly
designed).
There can be substantial preparation costs for
projects submitted for bids, resulting in additional
risk and uncertainty, thus making it less suited for
small investors and small projects.
Price fluctuations in "thin" markets can create
instability and gaming.
One uniform market for RE risk leading to
technology specific lock-in, because one
technology (e.g. wind power) is more competitive
than any other RE technology.
In an international system where the certificate
obligation is imposed on consumers, the system
does not necessarily imply that new plants are built
in Denmark.
Inefficient if the subsidies are not reduced as the
technology improves.
A unified subsidy per kWh risk leading to a
technology specific lock-in if one technology (wind
power) is much more competitive than any other
RE technologies.
Because the support is not provided per
production unit (DKK/MWh) there is a risk that
such a system may easily be abused.
Table 16: Pros and cons of different technology support schemes (sources: Sawin (2004) and Skytte (2004), plus own
considerations)
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The most essential drawback of the tendering system is that the procedures could become somewhat
troublesome and complicated for small projects. Therefore I do not see the tendering system as the
only demand pull instrument. Pricing systems have proven useful to promote small-scale
technologies/projects (Sawin, 2004:16) and might therefore prove a good supplement to tendering
systems. Their drawbacks regarding economic efficiency and lacking control about future market
share could be somewhat alleviated by regular adjustment of subsides and by defining a cap on the
amount of capacity valid for support.
A further option could be so-called integrated programmes where objectives are set for specific
technologies (MW installed capacity). Here potential investors in new small-scale technologies such
as micro CHP or PV are offered a "package" containing a financing model, a significant subsidy
and installation of the plant. This could help technologies in the introduction phase and may lower
transaction costs according to Skytte et al. (2004:113). These programmes I believe could benefit
from supporting niche markets, where certain technologies have increased value for the market (e.g.
PV for supplying off-grid locations). Such markets are important because they, as the IEA has put
it, support technologies with, "access to self-propelling, commercial markets, which provide the
learning investment for the further ride down the experience curve" (IEA, 2000: 67).
Physical planning, heat planning and connection conditions
Different surveys have shown that physical planning has been decisive for the extension of
renewable energy plants. Lack of planning has thus been used as an explanation for the scanty
deployment of wind power plants in England (see below), The Netherlands and Sweden (Skytte et al.
2004:115). The physical planning has been relatively successful in Denmark (Skytte et al., 2004:115) and
will still be very important to further enhance the contribution of RE sources. Different studies have
indeed pointed toward the need for reviving the physical planning for new on-shore wind power
plants (Dalegaard et al. 2003: 86-87 and Lybæk & Møller, 1999).
It is the hope of the Danish Wind Industry Association that a renewed planning for onshore wind
power has a long perspective, up to 20 years, and considers new sites (e.g. in connection with
transport facilities such motor way approach systems and harbour fronts or in the outskirts of
industrial districts), which could be particularly attractive for the new multi MW wind power plants
(Interview w. Jakob Lau Hoist, Danish Wind Industry Association, Appendix C). Similarly, as showed in chapter
4.6, there seems to be a need for a revision of the Danish heat planning.
Access to the grid for RE producers can be a problem in some countries as well, but is not perceived
like this in Denmark (Interview w. Jakob Lau Hoist, Danish Wind Industry Association. Appendix C).
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7.1.3 Designing a tendering system
It will be advantageous to learn from the UK experiences with tendering when designing a similar
Danish scheme. In the UK tendering has been used with questionable success as the central means
to promote RE technologies in the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) scheme. A basic problem
with the NFFO scheme, which operated during the 1990'es, has been that only a limited share of the
contracts, which were offered to generators, were taken up (Mitchell & Connor, 2004:1938). Part of the
reasons for this is linked to an unsuitable set-up of the scheme. For example the NFFO lacked a
penalty for companies, which did not take up their contracts, and it has been suggested that
unfeasible bids may have been made by some market players to ensure that competitors did not
have a contract (fake bids) (Mitchell & Connor, 2004: 1937).
Other reasons have to do with insufficient planning. For instance the coordination between the
NFFO scheme and the physical planning has been lacking. An official planning guidance for
determining sites for wind power plants, was thus issued very late in the course142, and subsequently
widely criticized by planning officers for being insufficient (Mitchell, 1995:1089). Furthermore the
general uncertainty with regard to the policy for renewable energy, the number of future bidding
rounds and future goals for RE, have been accused of resulting in stop-and-go cycles, preventing
local stakeholders from investing in and developing a local renewable energy industry (Mitchell 1995:
1083).
The experiences from (among others) the UK NFFO scheme should be taken account of when
designing a future Danish support scheme. Particularly relevant in the Danish context may be the
importance of long-term stable framework conditions for renewable energy extension, in order to
give investors and developers confidence about their investments.
In a future scheme it will also have to be decided to what extent the central agent is going to
concretise the tender. A scheme could be imagined where the central agent (e.g. the TSO) decide
specifically on the technology to be tendered for (e.g. a biomass gasification updraft plant),
determines the plant's specific power and heat capacity, find suitable locations for the plant (in
cooperation with municipalities and counties), obtain a planning permission, prepare the
environmental impact assessment etc., and subsequently invite for tenders (see e.g. Dalegaard et al.,
2003:129). This approach enables the central agent to pinpoint the most prospective technologies
(e.g. biomass gasification technologies as opposed to steam turbine plants). Furthermore this
approach reduces the risk that contracts are not taken up because of lacking planning permissions
(as it was a problem with the NFFO scheme).
On the other hand one could also picture a system where the central agent plays a limited role -
tendering e.g. for 100 MW of biomass (or simply RE) letting it be up to the market players to
42
 Only in 1993. For comparison the first bidding round was established in 1990 (Mitchell, 1995: 1077,1089).
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decide on location, the specific technology and so forth. This was the general approach in the UK
scheme though invitation for tenders were made within different "technology bands" such as wind
power, hydro, landfill gas etc. Market players were to find locations and the specific technology,
and planning permissions and licence were only obtained once the contract had been achieved
(www.dti.gov.uk/energy/renewables/policv/origins operatoin.shtml, 2004-09-10). By letting the market players
take part in decisions on e.g. location and technology this type of tender could make better use of
their knowledge and innovative capacity.
On the face of it, I think it should favorable to let the central agent play a considerable part in large-
scale projects, like offshore wind farms for example, in order for example to coordinate the
localisation of new plants with extensions of the transmission grid. With regard to smaller projects
it would probably be advantageous to let market players take over, but guided by technology bands
as in the UK to provide for some degree of diversification with regard to technology choice.
I will however not make any specific proposals on which approach(es) to choose but point to
towards the importance of ensuring proper planning, diversity in technology choice and making use
of the knowledge and ideas of the market players. Avoiding a rigid system and ensuring
coordination with stakeholders will be key.
Subsidies
Designing the subsidies for new plants, implemented under for instance a tendering system,
contains a special dilemma. If market players compete for a (lowest) fixed price, they will have
certainty about their future income. This should result in a low risk premium demand and thus in
low subsidy requirements (cf. chapter 4.5)143. The problem with fixed pricing is however that
generators will have no incentive to change the dispatching of the plant in accordance with the
demands of the market - i.e. increase/decrease production when market prices are high/low.
Letting the market players compete for a (lowest) subsidy (DKK/MWh) to the market price, and
subsequently let them produce according to the market price, will on the other hand increase the
demand for a risk premium, because of the uncertainty regarding future power market prices. The
same will a one-off (lowest) payment; though the payment would reduce investor's demand for
borrowed capital and thereby the risk - the effect hereof will of course depend on the size of the
payment.
A solution to the dilemma could be to let the plants, which are capable of adjusting their production
operate on market conditions, and let them receive a financial subsidy, which depends on the
141
 In fact one of the success of the previously mentioned UK NFFO was the offering of 15 year long contracts in the
later bidding round (e.g. the NFFO 3 from 1994) which were able to give investors a high degree of certainty about
future income once a contract had been signed. This lowered bid prices (Mitchell, 1995: 1083).
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market price. If market prices are high in a given period the financial subsidy, which is independent
of the plant's generation, will be reduced and if market prices are low the financial subsidy is
increased144. This should give plants a high degree of certainty about their future income as well as
an incentive to react to market prices. Furthermore contracts obtained through tenders should be
long-term and legally binding in order to reduce uncertainties for investors.
Wind power plants whose low SRMC automatically put them first in the merit order could compete
for fixed prices. Unfortunately it has today been chosen to support new on- and offshore wind
power with subsidies to the market price (cf. chapter 3.2.4).
7.1.4 National considerations
When designing a strategy for supporting new technologies special national considerations need to
be taken account of, with regard to deciding on which technologies to support - and how these
technologies should be supported. Such considerations could for instance involve remedying
problems within other sectors, such as disposal of waste products from the agricultural sector and
improvement of these products' manurial value (biogas plants).
Particularly important will it be to coordinate the support for technological development with the
interests of the Danish manufacturers of energy technology equipment. In many respects it will of
course be necessary to rely on international expertise, but Denmark has several strongholds within
energy technologies - most notably wind power, but also within co-generation technologies
(particularly firing with coal and straw), energy savings and control and technologies related to
district heating - among others (cf. Energistyrelsen, 2000: 52,74,71, 84). Furthermore there can be
considerable future industry potentials within technologies such as certain PV technologies
(polymer cells), certain fuel cell technologies (solid oxide (SOFC) and polymer cells
(SPFC/PEMFC)), hydrogen energy carrier technologies and advanced biomass technologies (Risø,
2002: 39,31, 35 42). According to Risø it is probable that several of these technologies will contribute
on a commercial scale within some ten years (Risø, 2002: 4-5).
One of the objectives of the co-operation on the development of Danish R&D strategies, described
in chapter 7.1.1, is to pinpoint the most promising fields of action taking into consideration the
development effort of the Danish industry. In order to support technologies through all the
development phases previously outlined, I recommend that the above proposed demand pull
incentives are coordinated with the national R&D strategies. This will, among others, require
industry stakeholders to be consulted with in the planning for procurement of new capacity.
In this regard I find it relevant to mention that the demand pull seem to be a very important
instrument for creating a domestic energy industry, probably more important than public technology
1+4
 This approach will be used to settle with the large decentralised power plants, which are no longer to receive the
three-tier-tariff from the 1st of January 2005 (L 236 B, 2004: § 58).
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push support. For instance, as Figure 43 shows, the Danish public R&D funds have only made up a
relatively small share of total public IEA/OECD funds for wind power during the 1975 to 1998
period - in spite of the Danish industry dominating the market. The explanations for this can be
numerous, but the effects of having an early and stable Danish home market should not be
underestimated. According to Birger T. Madsen, BTM Consult the Danish wind power industry
would never have experienced its success if the Danish RE support schemes had not been available
(interview in Teknologi-rådet 2003:13-16:). A well-designed Danish research effort including a close
dialogue between authorities, research institutions and the industry has also been used to explain the
Danish success (Energistyrelsen et al., 2003: 6).
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Figure 43: Public research and development funds for wind power in OECD/IEA countries compared with Denmark
(Energistyrelsen et al., 2003: 6, based on IEA data, no international figures available from 1999 and onwards).
Therefore if Denmark wants to develop energy technologies and also benefit from the industrial
spin-offs I see that the creation of the right demand-pull incentives will become imperative.
Supporting wind power
It is out of the scope of this report to go into a detailed examination of which of the many available
technologies that are particularly relevant to support from a Danish business promotion point of
view, but as an example I will in the following briefly elaborate on circumstances that would have
to be taken account of when designing a strategy for supporting the Danish wind power cluster
(which has recently been pointed out as one of the most important business clusters in Denmark)
(Energistyrelsen et al. 2003:5).
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The Danish wind power cluster consists not only of wind power manufacturers (Vestas and Bonus)
which cover almost half of the world market for wind, but also of a large blade producer (LM
Glasfiber), large subcontractors within steel and electronics components, and smaller subcontractors
such as consultants, transport companies, financing companies etc. To this may be added the
electricity companies Elsam and Energi E2 as well as research clusters at Danish universities (DTU,
AUC) and research institutions (RISOE, DHI) (Energistyrelsen et al, 2003: 5). According to Jakob Lau
Hoist from the Danish Wind Industry Association some 75 % of the worldwide wind power
expertise is located in an area stretching from just south of Hamburg in Germany till Ringkøbing in
Jutland. For manufacturers this "wind power Silicon Valley", in the wind power business called the
"wind power hub", is a strategic and attractive area to be located in (Appendix C).
The DEA and the Danish TSOs have made a proposal for a strategy for Danish wind energy
research in order to help prioritising the public funds for wind power research (cf. the research
strategies described in chapter 7.1.1. As part of the strategy a survey has been carried out including
interviews with app. 20 key stakeholders within the wind power industry, power generators
(customers and users), consultants, subcontractors and financing companies. The interviews have
concerned visions for the industry (10-15 perspective), research needs as well as the preferred
organisation of the research activities145.
In order to maintain the development activities of the wind power industry in Denmark, the
interviewees pointed at three main activities:
Testing of new (large) wind turbines. This requires an option for testing prototypes plus a
domestic market of a reasonable size. Placing of wind turbines in Denmark to help the designers
of the wind turbine manufactures receive optimal feedback on their products.
Maintaining the scientific and technological network. The wind power cluster (see above) is
to some extent self-perpetuating, but local projects and public funds for the basic research are
necessary to feed the network.
Extension of offshore wind power. Experience with offshore power is important to build up
the competences for the future offshore markets in particularly Germany and the UK. Though
Denmark is at the forefront of the development new initiatives are needed such as offshore test
facilities for the industry and new wind tunnel facilities. Also development of new equipment
and procedures for operation- and maintenance, innovative wind farm foundation solutions and
surface treatment are mentioned as important fields of focus in relation to offshore.
(Energistyrelsen et al., 2003: 22-24)
145
 Recommended research fields include aeroelastic research, the wind turbine as a system (improved interplay
between components), improved knowledge on loads and materials, production estimation at new sites, third party
control of new turbine design and offshore challenges (e.g. designs for high-depth sites, over 15 m) (Energistyrelsen et
al., 2003: 20-21).
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The former as well as the latter bullet-item requires market pull incentives to some extent. Jakob
Lau Hoist from the Danish Wind Industry Association also highlighted the home market as
important to ensure the possibility for continues testing of new designs146. Particularly he
emphasized the establishment of offshore wind farms since this technology is still in its infancy and
demonstration of the technology in Denmark is important to convince the world that this is "proven
technology" (Appendix C).
On the face of it, since 93 % of the wind turbines produced by Danish manufacturers were sold to
foreign countries in 2003 (www.windpower.org/da/stats/topmarkets,htm, 2004-08-15), the Danish market for
wind power can however be expected to have only a limited impact on the technological
development process of Danish manufacturers147. Therefore I think it is important that the Danish
demand-pull is directed into particular rewarding areas.
According to Jakob Lau Hoist (Appendix C) these could for instance be small-scale deep-water (35-
40m) offshore wind farms and procurement of onshore test sites for future multi-MW offshore wind
turbines (as height-limits are about to be reached at current test-sites). Extreme locations for wind
power plants (deep water sites with greater wind, wave and ice loading) require application of
technologies that have yet to be developed and could become an important object for competition
within the industry. Development of deep-water wind turbines is for instance recognized as a
separate research activity in the US Wind Energy Program (Multi Year Technical Plan for 2004-2010, U.S.
Department of Energy, 2003: 27), and power generator Elsam also sees big potentials in developing wind
farms for extreme locations, e.g. for future hydrogen production (Interview w. Flemming Nissen, Elsam,
Appendix A).
To take full reward of the home market I therefore recommend directing the demand-pull support
for wind power into special fields such as deep-water wind farms and multi-MW turbines - thereby
helping Danish manufacturers to stay in front148.
7.1.5 Roundup
Energy technologies have different needs for support during their technological development
phases. The current Danish technology support lacks incentives to drive the demand-pull, thus
causing a risk that new technologies (and techniques) are not picked up by Danish manufacturers. I
recommend that tendering procedures become the primary (but not the only) means to ensure that
146
 Such announcements should of course be interpreted with reservations. In Denmark the "importance of a home
market"- argument can be promotional for the industry, but does the home market really differ from other markets?
147
 The business signal of Denmark being a pioneer country within wind energy should however be an (other) important
driver for a domestic effort according to Peter Hjuler Jensen, program manager from RISØ's wind energy department
(Teknologirådet, 2003: 27)
It should be stressed that Danish manufacturers of energy equipment would of course only be benefited by demand
pull incentives to the extent that they win possible projects (cf. EU competition rules).
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new technologies are promoted in the power market in order to stimulate the technological
development which is necessary for the energy sector in the long-term and to support Danish
manufacturers. It is important that future arrangements for new capacity are coordinated with the
R&D strategies, which are being developed and coordinated with the interests of the Danish energy
equipment industry.
7.2 A new strategy for the energy sector
I recommend that the schemes proposed in the previous section to provide for investments in new
and renewable energy technologies should take part of a new general strategy for the energy sector.
The strategy should (of course) be developed at the political level but benefit from a high degree of
stakeholder participation in order to coordinate with the interest and views of the TSO's, energy
equipment manufactures, research and development interests, NGOs etc.
Similar to the energy plans of the 1990'es the strategy should contain concrete estimations of the
imagined contributions to the energy supply of the different energy technologies, and set specific
targets for important technologies like wind power. Because of the international approach to COi
regulation, arising from among others the introduction of the EU ETS, defining national CO2
reduction objectives does on the other hand seem less relevant than previous. In the new context I
see the focus should be on technological development and maintaining/extending Danish industry
strongholds, which may play a part in a global development.
The new energy strategy will also have to rely on different means of regulation than in the past. In
previous energy plans instructions to power utilities have constituted important political
instruments, e.g. requiring utilities to apply certain fuels or to install certain amounts of wind
power. Moreover prohibitions against district heating boilers using certain fuels have been used to
promote CHP (see. e.g. "Energi 2000", Energiministeriet 1990). These means do however not agree very
well with the ideas of liberalisation. In the strategy I propose competitive tendering schemes should,
in combination with the EU ETS, be the primary means to promote change. The outcome could
however be the same as previously - establishment of wind farms (by tenders), conversion of heat
boilers to CHP (municipalities and private companies joining forces to bid in a tender for a new
biomass CHP plant) or fuel change (market players preferring to change from natural gas to coal
because of high CO2 quota prices).
I suggest that the strategy include two steps:
A short-to-medium term action plan with a 5-10 year horizon, containing proposals for
concrete measures within generation, transmission and consumption.
A long-term strategy with a 30 year horizon, including declarations of intent about the
envisioned future energy system so as to guide equipment manufactures, market players,
TSOs etc. on decisions, which are dependent on the long-term development.
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The long-term strategy should of course be subject to changes depending on the development of
different technologies, fuel prices, power consumption, transmission/power capacity in
neighbouring countries etc., whereas the measures of the short-to-medium term plan should be
related to the immediate demands for ensuring sufficient power capacity. By introducing a joint
approach to the planning for generation, transmission and consumption measures, the problems with
lacking coordination described in the previous chapter should be diminished.
I recommend that new and RE technologies and energy savings make up the majority of the
required power capacity, but realistically some contribution from new fossil fuel plants may be
required as well. A key question arises in this regard, whether new fossil fuel plants should also be
promoted by tendering systems meaning that the central agent takes the full responsibility for
ensuring sufficient power capacity, or if the market should decide on the amount of fossil fuel
capacity (see Figure 44).
The market decides or...
If price elastic consumption is developed to an extent, which is capable of making the market work
properly, I recommend that the market be relied on to provide for the remaining capacity to the
extent this is needed (if a high degree of demand response is achieved the demand for new capacity
can be reduced). This approach would involve two ways for provision of new capacity: A centrally
decided green scheme and the conventional market. This will resemble the current approach to
providing for new capacity, though the time frame for the green scheme should be considerably
longer than the ad-hoc decisions by the political system, which we see today.
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Figure 44: Measures to deal with projected demand for new capacity. Tenders for RE and other prospective technologies
should be able to provide for a significant share of future capacity demands (wind power capacity is marked with a dotted
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frame, because of its fluctuating nature). The question is if the market is capable of providing the remaining capacity
needed for security of supply reasons (own figure).
Furthermore unlike today where it seems to be the intention that market players more or less
unrestricted should decide on the nature of new power plants on the commercial market, I
recommend that profound requirements be also made to these plants. I suggest that a limit on the
relative CO2 emissions from new plants is introduced (kg/MWh)149 and furthermore that large
power plants should be capable of using several fuels, including biomass. This is to ensure that new
investments are capable of complying with the CO2 and security of supply demands of the future. It
should also be a part of the short-to-medium term plan, to point out specific locations for the next
large power plants in order to ensure proper coordination with transmission measures within gas
and power.
...central decision-making
Suppose the market is not capable of providing sufficient conventional capacity (this may only be
so in a transitional period) the TSO's would have to make up for this either by taking over
decommissioned plants or by tendering for new capacity. Essentially this means that the market is
annulled as a driver for new investments. In such a system it would automatically become the
responsibility of the central agent to ensure that sufficient amounts of capacity is added to the
system (avoiding lack of and excess capacity). I recommend that decisions on new plants necessary
for the security of power supply (or decisions related to taking over decommissioned plants) are
decided by a general framework, which should be set out in the short-to-medium plan in order to
avoid ad-hoc decisions.
Since RE technologies, among these wind power, should make up a large share of new investments,
a situation where the market is not capable of providing sufficient capacity will make it particularly
interesting to further examine the value of wind power to the security of power supply (cf. chapter
6.2.1).
Estimating future decommissioning of power plants, and thereby the demand for new capacity
could pose another challenge in a set-up with centralised decision-making. In the current system
decisions on decommissioning of power plants lie with market players and I think it makes sense to
keep them there: Firstly because the in-depth information about the plants' conditions is there, and
secondly because forced closing of plants would be in conflict with market principles unless
justified in environmental demands or similar regulation. For planning purposes it will however be
necessary to have information about expected future decommissioning rates, because the
construction time of a new power plant can be up to 4.5 years150 - to this comes time for planning
149
 This demand exists in the current authorisation procedure (put at 500 kg/MWh), but plants encompassed by an
emissions trading scheme are excepted (LBK 151, 2003) - i.e. all plants above 20 MW thermal capacity.
150
 A new advanced coal or gas fired steam turbine plant (DEA et al., 2004: 17)
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and approval procedures. Again I will advocate for consensus-based solutions to the problem. The
time of decommissioning can be expected to depend on the development in the specific plants'
physical conditions, power and fuel prices, the requirements of the directive on emissions from
large combustions plants etc. A joint approach where existing producers, TSO's and authorities
establish likely decommissioning scenarios would however be able to narrow down likely
outcomes. This could provide the basis for a plan for required power plant capacity in a 5-10 year
horizon. This plan could be used in case the security of power supply is threatened (the initiatives
by market players are insufficient).
7.2.1 Roles and tasks
In Table 171 have illustrated the roles and task of stakeholders in the development and
implementation of a coordinated strategy for the energy sector. I advise that the process of
developing strategies is repeated at least every five year as the demand for a new short-term strategy
emerges.
It should be noted, that the roles and tasks of the different stakeholders would of course depend on
whether the market is capable of providing the remaining needed investments or if the central agent
(the TSO's) are to tender for this capacity as well.
7.2.2 Keeping the strategy on track
The strategy outlined above relies on and aims at a coordinated long-term planning for sector. This
is important because decisions in the sector are often lumpy and long-term and because the
technological development and market players confidence are dependent on stable framework
conditions. One may ask however if it at all is reasonable to expect a stable planning for the sector
(c.f. the recent years changing energy policy), i.e. if the politicians can fulfil these demands. Does it
mean that politicians will have to act non-politically?
In this regard a future strategy development for the sector could find inspiration in a recently
initiated project of the Danish Board of Technology. The aim of the project is to bring politicians
and important stakeholders of the sector together in a series of meetings/hearings over an 18-month
period to discuss scenarios for the development of the energy sector (www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?
article=1074&toppic=kategori7&language=dk, 2004-09-24). Though politics is a changeable business
continuing such events could be beneficial for finding the needed consensus.
7.2.3 Financing
In accordance with the polluter pay principle I recommend that electricity consumers finance the
tenders for new and renewable energy technologies through the power price. Though this should
lead to higher consumers prices, consumers will on the other hand obtain greater certainty about the
future cost of power because the suggested long-term agreements with renewable energy generators
will act as a price hedge.
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Stakeholder Strategy development Implementation of short-to-medium
term plan
Politicians
DEA
TSOs
(incl. natural gas
TSO)
Market players
Municipalities/
counties (regions)
Manufacturing
industry
R&D institutions
Other sectors
International
partners:
Neighbouring
TSO's and energy
authorities, Nordel,
EU
Take part in discussions regarding the creation of
the strategy. Approve strategy - important with
broad political support and commitment.
Overall responsibility for developing the strategy.
Ensure a high degree of stakeholder involvement.
Provide input on R&D strategies (the need for
demand pull).
Provide input on transmission measures
(gas/power), the demand for new capacity (power
balances), import possibilities, alternative peak
load resources (interruptible consumers, activation
of UPS plants etc.), integration of fluctuating
energy sources.
Provide input on R&D strategies (the need for
demand pull).
Provide input on existing power plants' condition,
and the interaction of possible new plants with
these. Coordination of national CO2 reduction
strategy and EU ETS requirements. Comment on
strategy.
Provide input on local resources: e.g. wind and
unexploited district heating potentials.
Provide input on industry requirements and
potential industry deliveries.
Provide input on R&D strategies (the need for
demand pull).
Coordination with CDM/JI measures of the DEPA
and Danida.
Ensure coordination with measures within e.g. the
transport sector (such as bioethanol or hydrogen
production).
Coordination of transmission planning and power
balance surplus/deficit (import/export possibilities).
Approve legislation.
(Remain as loyal as possible to the strategy,
participate in scenario discussions).
Implement necessary legislation.
Develop sites for new large plants in
cooperation with municipalities/counties and
the TSOs.
Responsibility for carrying out tenders.
Develop sites for new large plants in
cooperation with municipalities/counties and
the DEA.
Decide on new plants.
Bid for new capacity.
Carry out physical planning and heat planning.
Develop sites for new plants in cooperation
with the TSOs and the DEA.
Provide equipment for market players
(investors).
Follow up on demand-pull incentives (do
technologies perform as expected).
Ensure implementation of Jl and CDM projects
with focus on technological development.
Initiate possible coordinated measures within
the transport sector.
Table 17: The roles of stakeholders in the development and implementation of a coordinated strategy for the energy
sector (own table).
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7.2.4 How should the demand for CO2 emission reductions be handled in a new regulation
framework for the sector?
I recommend that the EU emissions trading scheme continues to be the primary means to ensure
compliance with CO2 reduction targets. Instead of forcing a conversion of the Danish power sector
toward achieving the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol by domestic means I recommend a
gradual change of the sector as the demand for new capacity necessitates this.
In this regard it should be recognised that electricity savings and capacity extensions with
renewable energy technologies like wind power do not immediately lead to reductions in emissions
from Danish power plants (Cf. Finansministeriet, 2003:137,146). As the dispatching of power plants is
decided by the market it is likely that e.g. power produced from wind turbines located in Denmark
will replace production from for instance Polish or German power plants with lower efficiencies
and higher cost (and emissions) than Danish power plants. Therefore it can be expected that
Denmark will have a considerable electricity export (and corresponding emissions) in the Kyoto
Period in spite of the implementation of the emissions trading scheme and gradual implementation
of RE technologies (see also the discussion in Appendix 3, p. 158).
I do however find it inexpedient to implement specific domestic measures to prevent Danish power
plants from running, as this would only increase pollution from power plants in other countries.
This point of view is (of course) also adduced by the Danish power generators (cf. Dansk Energi et al.,
2004).
On the other hand I think it is important that the Danish demand for quotas are provided through
projects supplying real reductions and not by hot air. It should be recognized that the development
of new energy technologies does not necessarily have to take place physically in Denmark151.
The Danish government has announced that Denmark's use of the flexible mechanisms should be
project based, so as to relate the effort to real reductions in GHG emissions (Miljømininisteriet, 2004b).
The Danish Environmental Protection Agency (DEPA) is responsible for CDM and JI projects in
Eastern and Central Europe and Danida of the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign affairs coordinates
the effort in developing countries (CDM projects). The DEPA strategy is based on three sources:
A) Purchase of project credits in Eastern and Central Europe using the expertise from previous
projects in these countries.
B) Purchase of indirect project credits from international quota/credit banks such as the
Prototype Carbon Fund.
151
 Judged by my previous experience with analysing energy planning in South Africa there could be many good
projects available, for instance within wind power, which have the potential to reduce emissions in a sustainable
manner, to improve local environment and create jobs (see Martinussen et al.,2002).
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C) Continuous tenders where companies may present project ideas to the DEPA for possible
support.
(Miljøministeriet, 2004b)
According to DEPA, the following broad range of project types are eligible for JI and CDM
projects in Eastern and Central Europe (www.danishcarbon.dk, 2004-09-10):
• Renewable energy, e.g. introduction of wind power, biomass, solar, geothermal energy and
small-scale hydropower (below 20 MW).
• Fuel switch from CO2-intensive fuels to cleaner fuels, e.g. coal to gas, fuel oil to gas and
introduction of waste to energy.
• Energy efficiency, e.g. combined heat and power (CHP), process optimisation, lighting and
insulation.
• Methane capture, e.g. landfill gas extraction, coal mine methane and biogas extraction.
• Reductions in the industrial GHG and N2O.
I recommend, that the future choice of projects are coordinated with the strategy for the energy
sector in order to give preference to support for prospective technologies, as opposed to supporting
the cheapest reduction measures (could be a fuel-switch from coal to gas, which has no or limited
technological spin-off effects). In this regard I find it unsuitable to acquire project credits from
international credit banks, as this would reduce the possibilities for concentrating the effort into
fields where Danish research and industry have strong positions.
With the introduction of the EU ETS a significant share of the CO2 burden will of course lie with
the power producers, that are expected to be short of quotas - and they will be solely responsible for
the way they will comply with their CO2 cap.
The implementation of JI and CDM projects by market players is however to a wide extent
dependent on the approval from authorities (UNFCCCb, 2002), and the financing from CO2 credits
only make up a small contribution compared with total costs of most energy sector projects (CO-
industri & Dansk Industri, 2003: 27). The government may therefore still play a role as facilitator of the
"right projects". For instance by supporting human capacity building in host countries within areas
which have technology spin off-effects (e.g. RE, CHP or energy savings) or by co-financing
projects, which for other reasons are important, e.g. from a sustainability/development point of
view. According to Flemming Nissen it would be advantageous for Elsam to be involved in
JI/CDM projects with more general development perspectives (Interview, Appendix A). In order for
Elsam to commit it self to such projects a proactive approach from the Danish government,
negotiating contracts and contributing to the financing, is however required.
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I recommend that partnerships be established between the government and the Danish industry
(manufacturers and power producers) to establish such projects.
7.3 Roundup
This chapter has examined how new and RE technologies may be supported, and recommend a
tendering scheme as the primary means to provide for RE technologies. The tendering scheme has
the advantage of ensuring a high degree of competition, which makes it attractive in the context of
liberalised market focusing on economic efficiency. Furthermore tendering makes it possible to
promote many different technologies with varying demands for economic support.
It is proposed, that the tendering scheme is made part of a new strategy for the energy sector, which
takes into account the demand for coordinated and long-term planning for sector. The main
objective of the new strategy should be to ensure that new investments in the power sector are made
with a view to the long-term strategic challenges facing the sector. The EU ETS should still play a
part in the regulation of the sector, with respect to ensuring compliance with the CO2 reduction
targets of the Kyoto Protocol. In this regard it should however be considered to provide the strategy
with an international dimension so as to ensure compliance with CO2 targets via sustainable
reductions generated through JI/CDM projects. The government should promote/facilitate such
projects.
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8 Conclusion
In the coming decades the Danish energy sector will be faced with severe challenges. It can be
expected that considerable CO2 reductions will have to be made, beyond what is required by the
Kyoto Protocol, and the security of fuel supply issues may reappear with renewed vigour. To this
comes the question whether the liberalised market is capable of providing sufficient investment
(and consumer demand response) to maintain a high level of security of supply.
In the long-term a transition toward an energy system based on renewable energy sources is needed
to deal with the CO2 reduction- and fuel supply challenges. As shown in this report the current
framework conditions provided by the liberalised market and the EU emissions trading scheme do
not provide the necessary incentives for this gradual shift to take place. One of the consequences
has been that society's natural interest in the development of the sector has resulted in unplanned,
ad-hoc decisions to support certain technologies. For market players, including developers of RE
technologies, the uncertainty about future measures is detrimental.
The current regulation does not take into account that society is the actual customer of the market
players. The market may be a good means for making the sector more efficient, but it does not show
how the future power system should be shaped. I therefore think it would be advantageous if the
state took greater responsibility for shaping the future development.
As shown in this project a firmer regulation would also allow the government to coordinate the
investments in the Danish power sector with the interests of Danish energy equipment
manufacturers and ensure harmonization between decisions of the monopoly activities
(transmission system) and the market (power plants).
I recommend that the government develop a long-term strategy for the energy sector, coordinating
the different measures for ensuring the security of power supply, promoting technological
development and taking into account the interests of the Danish energy equipment industry. The
strategy should include an action plan with a 5-10 year perspective containing concrete measures
within generation, transmission and consumption of energy. A tendering scheme should be used as
the primary means to divert the majority of new investments in power capacity toward renewable
energy technologies.
If the market is capable of ensuring sufficient power capacity (development of price elastic
consumption will be crucial in this regard) it should still play a role in deciding on new commercial
capacity, next to the tenders for renewable energy technologies. Requirements with regard to fuel
use for new commercial plants (multi-fuel plants to be preferred) should however be implemented
and similarly there should be limits on the relative CO2 emissions from new plants. If the market
proves unable to provide for the necessary capacity to maintain a high level of security of power
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supply, additional tenders for new capacity should be carried out in accordance with the long-term
strategy for the sector.
A well-implemented emissions trading scheme can be a helpful instrument to ensure fulfilment of
Kyoto emission targets, and should still play a part in the above outlined strategy. The current set-
up of the EU emissions trading scheme does however involve some drawbacks primarily related to
the need for allocation of quotas. The solution to these problems is to move as quickly as possible
toward a scheme where quotas are auctioned instead of allocated.
Auctioning of quotas is recommendable for several reasons:
• It removes any speculating in updating, which would reduce the efficiency of the scheme
• It removes EU member states' incentives to favour their own companies. This may jeopardise
the environmental integrity of the scheme, if too many quotas are handed out.
• It removes the incentive to keep old inefficient power plants in operation in order to collect
quotas from future allocations.
• It ensures the best distributional effects because consumers this way compensate the
state/society for the externalities related to CO2 emissions (unlike compensating some arbitrary
companies, which would be the case if quotas were allocated).
Because Denmark is likely to have a considerable demand for purchasing quotas - in spite of the
incentives recommended above to support renewable energy technologies - it should be considered
to provide the strategy with an international dimension so as to ensure compliance with CO2 targets
via sustainable reductions generated through JI/CDM projects. In this regard the government has a
responsibility with regard to facilitating international projects, which promote technological
development.
8.1 European perspectives
The above recommendations on coordinated strategies for the energy sector can with advantage be
applied in the other EU member states as well.
Since renewable energy resources are unevenly distributed in Europe, in Eastern Europe biomass
resources are vast, in the westernmost parts of Europe the wind resource is good and in the south
solar insulation is high, well arranged national strategies for technological development can
contribute to making a range of different technologies competitive. The high concentration of some
RE resources in specific areas/countries can be used as (large) niche markets to drive different
technologies forward. In this regard the EU ETS will give a needed (but insufficient) incentive to
bring forward the renewable energy.
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Appendix 1: Liberalisation of the gas market
Natural gas has become increasingly important in the Danish energy supply, covering some 24 % of
gross energy consumption in 2002 (Energistyrelsen, 2003a: 15). The objectives of development in the
regulation and organisation of the gas sector are similar to those of the electricity sector, "...the
Government wants a separation of ownership between natural monopoly activities, including
system operation and transmission on the one hand, and activities exposed to competition on the
Other. " (Danish Government, 2002: 15).
As for the electricity sector, the EU has been a driver behind the liberalisation, with the adoption of
the directive on gas markets in 1998. The directive demands a full opening to all consumers in 2007
and market access for all commercial customers in 2004. Denmark is ahead of these demands as 40
% of consumption is included in the market today and all consumers have been free to elect supplier
from 1 January 2004 (Energistyrelsen, 2003e: 16-17).
DONG A/S (Danish Oil and Natural Gas), which is owned 100 % by the Danish State, is the main
player on the gas market in Denmark. DONG A/S owns:
the gas pipes in the North Sea
- the gas treatment facility where gas is made ready for delivery
the main natural gas stock facilities
- a great part of the distribution grid
(Danish Government, 2002b: 22)
A separation of trade and infrastructure into different companies was demanded in 2003. As a
response the overall transmission grid was separated from DONG the 1st of January 2004 into a new
company Gastra A/S. Gastra owns and is responsible for the technical and commercial operation of
the gas transmission system (www.gastra.dk. 2004-02-29 and Økonomi- og erhvervsministeriet 2002: 24). Other
players on the Danish natural gas market are three regional gas distribution companies, which
following the market introduction have been split up into trading and distribution companies.
The Danish government has announced that it wishes to privatise DONG, though maintaining the
infrastructure (grid and gas stock facilities) at the hands of the state (Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeriet,
2002: 24). Part of the solution could be the establishment of a common Transmission System
Operator (TSO) company for gas and electricity, thus combining the future system operator of the
power sector, EnergiNet Danmark and Gastra, as suggested in the Energy Policy Statement of 2003
(Energipolitisk Redegørelse 2003)
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Appendix 2: New plants are treated different in the National Allocation
Plans
Case: identical new plants (100 MW thermal input) located in different countries
DEN GER FIN SWE DEN GER FIN SWE
DEN GER FIN SWE DEN GER FIN SWE
Bars = allocation Line = actual emissions
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Appendix 3: Fuel change at existing power plants
The dispatching of power plants is dependent on the plants short run marginal costs. A fuel change
can take place if for instance a coal and a gas power plant change merit order and the power price
allows one of the plants to become uncompetitive in the market or if it is profitable for a plant,
which is capable of doing this, to apply a different fuel. Several circumstances impact on a plant's
short run marginal costs: fuel type, variable O&M costs, fuel prices, electricity and heat efficiency,
CO2 costs and other environmental costs, among others. In Denmark where almost all power plants
produce combined heat and power the marketing conditions for heat also play an important role.
To examine the effect of CO2 quotas on the dispatching I have elected four plant types for
comparison, which are characteristic for the Danish power system: a coal fired plant, two gas fired
plants (gas boiler and a gas engine) and a biomas s fired plant152. In reality only the coal power plant
and the two gas technologies will be competing against each other on market conditions because the
existing biomass plant as described in chapter 3.2.4 receive a fixed price of app. 600 DKK/MWh. I
have however included the biomass plant in the analysis to show how new plants will compete with
the other plants under different CO2 quotas prices. The biomass plant is expected to be benefited by
a 100 DKK/MWh subsidy, which applies to power produced from new biomass based power plants.
Data on the plants efficiency have been chosen with inspiration from a DEA spreadsheet containing
information about existing Danish power and heat plants performance in 2002 (Energistyrelsen, 2003h).
Their specifications appear from Table 18. The gas engine and the biomass plant are presumed to be
smaller distributed plants whose primary purposes are to serve a heat demand, whereas the coal
fired plant and the gas boiler are larger plants with the main aim of producing power.
The two small plants are dimensioned to serve district-heating systems and do therefore over the
year have higher total efficiencies than the large plants (which on the other hand have higher
electric efficiencies). Fuels prices are estimated using rounded off figures from Elkraft System153
(Elkraft System 2003b: 69), and various literature sources have been used to set variable O&M costs154.
Other environmental costs than CO? are not taken into account of.
l>1
 Wind power plants have been excluded from this part of the analysis because their SRMC are so low that they are
not relevant to analyse on.
153
 The fossil fuel prices have their basis in IEA projections. In addition they take into consideration fuel transport costs.
Lv
* IEA based estimations have been used for the two the large plants (IEA, 2003: 20), and Elkraft System as the source
for the estimation of the variable O&M costs for the gas engine (Elkraft System, 2002a, 22). DEA estimations of the
O&M cost for a new wood based power plant has been used to estimate the O&M cost for this plant (DEA, 2004: 40).
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Coal
Gas boiler
Gas engine
Biomass
40%
45%
35%
25%
70%
70%
85%
85%
9 0 %
9 0 %
9 0 %
9 0 %
12.5
30
30
33
25
11
50
53
Table 18: Specification on power plants for SRMC comparison
In Figure 45 the SRMC of all four plant types are shown in condensing as well as full CHP mode
under different CO2 quota prices. When running in CHP mode all plants are assumed to have a total
efficiency of 90 % (for the case of simplicity electric efficiencies are assumed to be the same in
both modes). It is assumed here that fuel and CO2 costs for heat production are paid for by heat
consumers using a 100 % heat efficiency method as basis for the allocation between heat and
power. 155
It appears from Figure 45, that the plants are generally much more competitive when producing
combined heat and power instead of only power - and as CO2 prices increase the advantage of
producing in CHP mode becomes greater. Of the plants running in condensing mode only the coal
power plant has sufficiently low SRMC costs to be able to compete with the other CHP plants. At a
CO2 price of app. 190 DKK/ton all CHP technologies will however be more competitive than the
coal power plant running in condensing mode. As mentioned in chapter 3.2.2, it is only as of the 1st
of January 2005 that the small power plants will be competing on the liberalised market. It appears
from the figure that the ETS may help the small CHP plants stay competitive in the market (and the
smallest plants below 20 MW thermal capacity will become even more competitive as they are not
part of the scheme).
Without the ETS there is a risk that the SRMC of (some) of the decentralized power plants e.g. the
gas engine, is so high that it at some times - depending on the market price of power - would afford
for heat consumers to produce heat using a heat boiler because e.g. the coal power plant would have
a lower SRMC for power. Historic power prices (cf. Figure 9) confirm that such situations, which
155
 This means that heat consumers pay for their full share of these costs, which gives a relatively high value to the heat
production. I believe however that this is the most realistic approach in a short run marginal perspective assuming that
the alternative to heat supply from the CHP plant in most cases would be supply from a heat boiler with almost 100 %
heat efficiency. Note that the impact of heat taxation on the power plants incentive to produce has not been taken into
account of. In Denmark fuel for heat is taxed quite heavily, whereas there are no taxes on fuels for power production. In
CHP plants the fuel for heat production is allocated using a 125 % heat efficiency method at small plants and plant
specific heat efficiencies at larger power plants (usually higher than 125 %) (Interview w. Lars Gullev, VEKS Appendix
F). This gives an incentive to produce power at CHP plants instead of producing at heat boilers where all fuel is
allocated to heat production. As a consequence CHP plants may have lower SRMC for electricity than what appears
from the above examination.
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are unsuitable from a fuel utilization point of view, could occur. Therefore it cannot be excluded
that the ETS will instigate some changes in the dispatching of power plants - or at least remedy
some of the "problems" that could occur when the decentralized plants, which previously received a
fixed (high) price for their power production, are to compete on the market.
Since all plant types have the highest production cost when running in condensing mode this is
where the merit order matters the most (the assumption is that the power prices should at most times
be so high that running in CHP mode should be more profitable than producing heat from a boiler.)
It can be noted from Figure 45, that it will require a CO2 quota price of app. 290 DKK/ton for the
gas boiler to become more competitive than the coal power plant when both plants run in
condensing mode. The biomass plant running in condensing mode has lower SRMC than the gas
engine at a CO2 price of app. 120 DKK/ton, but since existing biomass plant receives fixed prices
this should not impact on their production patterns.
A fuel switch can also take place for instance by replacing coal with natural gas at existing coal
power plants or co-firing with biomass at coal power plants. Under the simple and somewhat
unrealistic assumption that no investments cost are needed for the fuel switch a calculation based on
a coal power plant running in condensing mode indicate that a CO2 quota price of app. 250
DKK/ton is necessary for substitution with biomass to be profitable156. For a switch from coal to
gas to take place a CO2 quota price of more than 300 DKK/ton is required (see Figure 46).
Because of the many different conditions for managing power plants (CHP/condensing mode,
market prices/fixed prices/subsidies) it is possible that the costs for CO2 in some situation will have
the effect of changing the merit order of Danish power plants.
All in all there is not much to indicate however that we will see any significant fuel change in the
Danish power sector caused by changing merit order in the CO2 price interval up to 150
DKK/MWh. It should be noted though that this conclusion could be altered somewhat by (most
notably) different fuel prices. If the gas fuel price goes drops by 50 % i57 it would only require a
CO2 quota price of app. 30 DKK/MWh for a coal to gas fuel switch to be profitable (see Figure 47).
156
 This assumes that the power from biomass is not subsidised. This is in agreement with § 57b of the electricity supply
act (L 236 B, 2004), which states that as a starting point no subsidies are provided for newly initiated co-firing with RE.
The minister can however approve to subsidise renewable energy co-firing. Had the plant received a 100 DKK/MWh
for the power based on biomass the CO2 quota price should enter 140 DKK/ton for the fuel change to be attractive on
the above conditions (to this comes investments in new hardware, possible decreasing power efficiencies etc.).
157
 Historically it has been fluctuating much because it is l inked to the oil price, cf. Figure 3 3 , p . 9 5 . In the four year
period going from Jan. 1998 to Jan. 2002 European gas impor t prices varied by more than +/- 40 % (IEA, 2 0 0 3 : 22)
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Figure 45: Comparison of SRMC of characteristic Danish power plants (see Table 18) running in CHP- as well as
condensing modes - under different CO2 quota prices (See appendix I).
In the interview with the Flemming Nissen, Elsam it was confirmed that Elsam, at the expected CO2
price levels does not expect its power plants to change production patterns (Appendix A). According
to calculations'38 provided for the government's climate strategy (Energistyrelsen 2003f: 72ff) a quota
price of 100 DKK/ton should yield domestic emissions reductions due to changed dispatching of
power plants in the order of 2.6 Mt CO? per year in the 2008-2012 period. For comparison total
expected emissions from Danish power plants are expected to be app. 28 Mt in the same period.
The above calculation assumes that the CO? quota price of 100 DKK/ton will only result in an
increase in the power price of 40 DKK/MWh (compared to 70 DKK/MWh, which I find more
probable, as previously argued). Because higher power prices would increase the incentives for
Danish power plants to produce reductions in the order of 2.6 Mt is probably an overestimate.
158 Using the energy model RAMSES 5.
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F/gure 46: SRMC at power plant with 40 % electric efficiency. No heat sale, (upper, see appendix I)
Figure 47: SRMC at power plant with 40 % electric efficiency. No heat sale. Low gas price, (lower, see appendix I)
159
Emissions trading and security of supply
Appendix 4: Additional figures related to chapter 4
£ 500
150
CO2 quota price [DKK/ton]
"Coal ~i'S!~' Gas CC Biomass "—""Wind - onshore ^ ^ " W i n d - off-shore
Figure 48: LRMC comparison assuming depreciation time = technical lifetime. Otherwise reference conditions (see
appendix H).
100 150 200
CO2 quota price [DKK/ton]
-Coal •"'••- Gas CC • ' Biomass Wind - onshore ^ — Wind - off-shore
Figure 49: LRMC comparison assuming 10 years depreciation time and a 100 DKK/MWh subsidy for wind power.
Otherwise reference conditions (see appendix H).
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Figure 50: LRMC comparison including gas engine with the following specifications: Electric capacity: 1-5 MW, electric
eff. 41.5 %, total efficiency in practice: 85 %, investment: app. 7.5 mill. DKK/MW, total O&M: 60 DKK/MWh (DEA et al.
2004: 34). 10 % interest rent, 20 years depreciation time assumed (see Appendix K).
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